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Multi-speed membership parties are said to shift the boundaries of political parties
by incorporating affiliates of all sorts into the narrative of membership. Building
on this concept of a diverse, inclusive, and individually adaptive understanding of
political party support, Indian Summer re-evaluates the relationship between polit-
ical parties and individuals in the age of internet-based communication technologies
and growing sociological diversification. Data of the accompanying population sur-
vey of the 2017 German Party Members Survey is used to address questions of
who it is that contributes to the success or breakdown of a party, what individuals
do, and what the underlying demographic, motivational, and psychological patterns
are. The study finds that non-membership based party affiliation plays a crucial
role in 21st century party politics, especially due to the mass of affiliates compared
to traditional members. Moreover, traditional party members and affiliates differ
remarkably in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, which is especially impor-
tant in the light of representative democracy. Additionally, it is argued that recent
political parties’ bearing structure is best described using seven distinct types of
affiliates. Due to the inner structure of affiliation types, this taxonomy challenges
the multi-speed membership model and sees formal membership as the continuing
center of gravity for political parties. Yet, profiles of more loosely linked affiliates
indicate that parties may have to deal with eroding ties in the future and over-think
their modus operandi, which might mirror the functions of US American parties in
the future.




Mit dem Multi-Speed-Membership-Modell sollen die Grenzen politischer Parteien
neu definiert werden. Hiernach sollen Verbindungen zwischen Parteien und Indi-
viduen unterschiedlichster Art in das Verständnis von Mitgliedschaft einbezogen
werden. Aufbauend auf dem Konzept einer vielfältigen, integrativen und individuell
anpassungsfähigen Unterstützung politischer Parteien untersucht Indian Summer
die Beziehung zwischen politischen Parteien und Individuen im Zeitalter internet-
basierter Kommunikation und zunehmender soziologischer Diversifizierung. Daten
der begleitenden Bevölkerungsumfrage der Deutschen Parteimitgliederstudie 2017
werden verwendet, um die Fragen zu beantworten, wer zum Erfolg oder Zusam-
menbruch einer Partei beiträgt, was Einzelpersonen diesbezüglich unternehmen und
welche demografischen, motivationalen und psychologischen Muster dem zugrunde
liegen. Die Studie stellt fest, dass eine Unterstützung von Parteien, die nicht auf Mit-
gliedschaft beruht, im 21. Jahrhundert eine entscheidende Rolle spielt und vornehm-
lich auf dem Engagement von Nicht-Mitgliedern beruht. Darüber hinaus unter-
scheiden sich traditionelle Parteimitglieder und moderne Parteianhänger erheblich
in Bezug auf soziodemografische Merkmale. Ferner kann Indian Summer zeigen,
dass die aktuelle Individualstruktur parteipolitischer Zugehörigkeit am besten an-
hand sieben verschiedener Typen beschrieben werden kann. Aufgrund der inneren
Struktur der Zugehörigkeitstypen stellt diese Taxonomie das Modell der Multi-
Speed-Mitgliedschaft in Frage und sieht die formelle Mitgliedschaft als das weiterhin
vorherrschende Element der Parteizugehörigkeit an. Die soziodemografischen und
motivationalen Profile von lose verknüpften Zugehörigkeitstypen deuten jedoch da-
rauf hin, dass die Parteien in Zukunft mit weiter erodierenden Bindungen umgehen
und ihre Vorgehensweise überdenken müssen, was möglicherweise eine bevorstehende
Funktionslogik nach dem Vorbild US-amerikanischer Parteien widerspiegelt.
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1 Introduction - Party Membership in a
New Age
In the study of political participation, distinguishing party-based from non party-based participation is a very common underlying structure. The question is
whether this is an effective approach to understanding political participation. Party-
based political participation is regularly reduced to only one kind of participation,
namely traditional party membership. However, this places unnecessary limits on
political participation scholarship.
Parties have been the leading means of political organization within German so-
ciety for the better part of 150 years now and have formed the basis of the German
political system since at least 1945. Since then, apart from voting, party member-
ship has made its way to being the most important variant of supporting a party.
But traditional membership has never been the one and only form of participation
within the sphere of parties. There are several ways in which individuals can and
do contribute to the political development and the success of a party without being
a traditional party member. And even if they are not traditional party members,
individuals can and do take on several functions to serve a party’s needs, just like tra-
ditional members do. Besides voting for their specific party, which the vast majority
of traditional party members does, non-party members can volunteer in campaign
activities, donate money, and take part in (semi-) open discussions regarding specific
policies. Thus, individuals serve specific purposes of a party when participating in
any way, regardless of their actual status.
Voting is an individual act which is, at least in theory, carried out privately.
Hence, by voting, individuals do contribute to the electoral success of a party, but
they only influence one single aspect that is relevant within the sphere of parties in
electoral democracies. According to the principle “one man, one vote,” an individ-
ual’s contribution is only the effect of one vote within the process of an election. By
1
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taking on other activities, individuals can multiply the effect of their contribution.
Some individuals might do this without even being aware of their behavior and the
potential consequences. Non membership-based contribution already begins when
individuals start a discussion on a specific topic, arguing in favor of one party and
its suggestions for solving societal problems. Even if individuals are not conscious of
this process, they are carrying out a mild variation of non membership-based party
affiliation, which includes the possibility of convincing other individuals to vote for
a specific party or to support the party’s platform. Assuming just one individual
might change their attitude as a consequence of this discussion, the voter turnout in
this isolated setting would be doubled. Of course, this is a simplified example that
in real life would be much more complex, but it shows how non-party members and
even non-affiliates can contribute to a party’s success without even realizing it.
However, within modern political science, it seems that scholars have never made
the effort to understand and explain party-related participation carried out in ways
other than traditional party membership and voting. Considering the member to
electorate ratio (M/E-ratio), this is no surprise. In Germany, only two percent of
the electorate are members of one of the leading German parties. Since formal party
membership in general offers the most extensive opportunities for members to par-
ticipate in party life and influence the party’s policies as well as its selection of
personnel, it is a legitimate question as to who would actively participate in a party
without being a member. At first sight, participation without membership seems
like a bad deal for individuals. Given that members hold specific rights that make
party membership reasonably attractive, it is not far-fetched to doubt that the phe-
nomenon of non membership-based party affiliation has any impact on everyday
politics at all.
Yet, there are certain societal and technological developments as well as distinct
aspects of party affiliation that should increase the interest in non-membership party
affiliation. First, non membership-related party affiliation can be carried out in sev-
eral different ways, which can be more or less demanding. This offers the opportunity
for party-political participation even to those individuals who have been previously
discouraged by commitments that go hand in hand with traditional party member-
ship. Of course, party members are not required to maintain a consistent level of
activity and there is a fairly large proportion of party members who are not active at
2
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all. But even party membership itself regardless of the party, implies certain require-
ments which might involve extra pressure for some such as the pressure to justify
membership to friends or perceived professional drawbacks. Non membership-based
affiliation provides an opportunity for those who, for whatever reason, do not want
to be a registered party member but are still interested in participating politically
in the context of a party. Given that non-member affiliates are not expected to make
any regular contributions – members at least have to pay their monthly dues – the
absence of guaranteed rights might still be a sacrifice many people are willing to
make.
Secondly, 21st century communication technology offers multiple ways of support-
ing a party that can be carried out with relatively low contributions from individuals.
Not only can people make use of internet-based technologies to inform themselves
about issues of interest or to participate in on-line discussion groups and computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW). Regardless of the actual setting, there are
two additional developments that facilitate (political) participation and are able to
support party-related participation as well.
First, the internet has become not only wireless, but also mobile in recent years.
On-line activities are increasingly carried out using mobile rather than stationary
devices and mobile network technologies such as GPRS or LTE. That not only
means that mobile devices are used, but that they are actually increasingly used
in a truly mobile fashion. Since public provision of wireless local area networks
(WLAN, sometimes referred to as wi-fi) is still fairly poor in Germany and many
other places, advanced mobile communications technology is the key to mobile in-
ternet use. Whether using wireless or true mobile technologies, people now have
access to internet-based services wherever they are: on public transport while com-
muting to work, while enjoying recreational activities in the park, or while waiting
for their hairdresser’s appointment. Opportunities for internet-based participation
are ubiquitous.
Secondly, politics has made its way into social networks. Of course, there are still
restricted areas of internal discussion on-line, but a considerable amount of political
discussion is taking place publicly via social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
Thus, political discussion has moved into a sphere where people, political or not,
are already present for different reasons. The initial purpose of social networks was
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to connect people more easily. But it did not take long before companies and all
kinds of interest groups (including parties) took notice of the vast opportunities
of on-line social networking. By presenting themselves in social networks, interest
groups go to the people instead of the other way around. Hence, people do not have
to be proactive anymore and take the initiative, but are rather picked up along the
way by parties and other interest groups. This way, political as well as non-political
organizations infiltrate everyday life more through social networks than by any other
technological development. On-line participation therefore requires much less effort
compared to traditional ways of political participation. It is much easier to respond
to a tweet or even to click on a (like-) button than to attend a party’s meeting after
a hard working day.
Simultaneously, it has been proven that parties all over Europe suffer from mem-
bership losses (van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke 2012) which force them to think about
alternative ways of how to reach out to the electorate and maintain or expand their
societal impact. One of the most convincing explanations for party membership
losses is a development called the individualization of lifestyles. In a nutshell, people
in western societies follow traditional lifestyles less and less, opting instead to live
according to their individual needs and anomalies. This often means that individual
lifestyles, values, and goals do not fit into traditional molds, but rather consist of
a potpourri of several characteristics associated with very different lifestyles. One
striking example would be the development of ecological awareness within societal
groups. Some 30 years ago, private ecologically-minded behavior was mainly as-
sociated with hippie fundamentalists with filthy hair wearing self-made pullovers
from organic wool. Today, caring for the environment has become a rather common
concern, especially amongst the highly educated middle class. Given that Lipset &
Rokkan’s cleavage theory (1967), according to which parties have developed along
the lines of great societal conflict lines (the so-called cleavages), has been the most
influential approach to explaining party development, it is no wonder that parties
have a hard time maintaining their members-to-electorate ratios. At the same time,
this change of lifestyles and traditional class-shaped politics opens up some space for
other ways of political participation that are less demanding and highly adaptable
to the changing individual needs that correspond to very different periods of time
in an individual’s life.
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Of course, this development raises the question of whether there is a need for
political parties at all for people who are willing to express their political attitudes
or contribute towards changing society. Regardless of individual attitudes towards
parties, there is no doubt that despite their member losses, parties have succeeded in
maintaining their major influence in European societies and still do play the leading
role in the structure of parliamentary democracies across the world. That means
that parties are still the most important and promising vehicles in order to succeed
within the political process and to enforce one’s political goals.
These ideas are combined in Susan E. Scarrow’s theory of “multi-speed member-
ship” parties. First extensively laid out in the 2015 release of Beyond Party Mem-
bers – Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization, Scarrow describes what the
future of party membership might look like and offers a universal approach on new
forms of party affiliation. Scarrow proposes to expand entrenched ideas regarding
party membership and to consider new ways of affiliation that differ from tradi-
tional membership settings. This redefinition of party membership is based on the
assumption that even non-traditional ways of party participation can fulfill very
specific functions which have previously only been attributed to traditional party
members.
One simple example for this argument is the fact that no election campaign today
can succeed without some kind of on-line concept. The aforementioned on-line social
networks are the prime vehicles for reaching out to millions of people and potential
voters, since the use of these is very much entangled with everyday life and private
communication habits. If social network users, for example, are revealing themselves
as supporters of a specific party or a party candidate, and are basically arguing in
favor of the party, they provide support just like traditional party members would.
This means that people participating in discussions or even simply sharing a party’s
logo are contributing to a party’s success or failure as though they were official
members campaigning in the streets or canvassing. This is of course only a very brief
example of how non-party members are playing a role in party support, which will
be elaborated on later in more detail. Nonetheless, it shows how people, willingly or




Yet, it is important to remember that new forms of party affiliation are not strictly
separated from traditional membership, but rather can overlap with each other.
Consequently, individuals should not be divided into members and affiliates, but
into common compositions of several affiliation modes, one of which is formal party
membership. Although the idea of different affiliation compositions is inherent to
Scarrow’s (2015) approach, distinct specimen are not provided apart from a depiction
of how different modes might overlap. Unfortunately, it is not mentioned whether
the compositions that can be deduced from this depiction (Scarrow 2015, p. 33) are
the product of some theoretical idea, which makes them to appear rather arbitrary.
Until now, the empirical evidence for and relevance of alternative forms of party
affiliation has not been sufficiently scientifically investigated. In addition to theo-
retical arguments for why this will be a future issue for parties and their members,
Scarrow does make an attempt to shed light on the empirical observability of multi-
speed membership parties. Yet, Scarrow only deals with the supply side of party
membership, which means that opportunities offered by parties for participation
outside of traditional membership settings are investigated.9 However, people’s de-
mand for new forms of party affiliation is not taken into account. Since supply is
only half of the equation, it is essential to acquire a good understanding of people’s
reception of opportunities, without which a party’s efforts would dissipate. Hence,
it is the first and foremost goal of this study to produce this very knowledge about
people’s participation and support in favor of parties without being party members.
This work is divided into two parts. In order to provide the necessary historical
and theoretical context, Part I – named History & Theory – starts with chapter 2
that provides a recapitulation of the important stages that are to be considered in
the development of late 20th and early 21st century party membership. Why have
membership-based political parties evolved at all, what are their historical roots and
how did they develop before culminating in what is known today as the prototype
of political participation? Since history always leaves a footprint in future develop-
ments, the evolution of traditional party membership is crucial for understanding
today’s perception of membership as well as reasons for change. Additionally, the
9Of course, individuals as well could be assigned the supply side since it is they who supply labor,
money, and time which parties demand via membership or other ways of affiliation. It is a matter
of definition as to which is which side of the equation. Throughout this study, the supply side
of party affiliation is assigned to the parties themselves, since they supply opportunities for
political participation to individuals.
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development of party membership figures in Germany will be explored. This review
will not present figure after figure without context, but will instead connect the
development of party membership to the party system as a whole and its histori-
cal context. Consequently, this chapter will explain the German party system after
World War II and the role of individual party membership in postwar Germany. This
approach is vital for this study, as it links the historical roots of party membership
to the special case of modern Germany that provides the data for this study.
Following this background information, chapter 3 is entirely dedicated to third
party research. This study draws inspiration and theoretical grounding from Scar-
row’s work on multi-speed membership parties (Scarrow 2015). The chapter therefore
starts with a historic reference that Scarrow herself refers to, which is a model of
party membership (the bull’s eye model) by French political scientist Maurice Du-
verger (1959) from the 1950s. Following this scientific basis, the third chapter lays
out Scarrow’s theoretical approach in detail and presents empirical findings based
on the parties’ efforts to implement elements of multi-speed membership into both
their official statutes and processes as well as their means of communication.
A considerable section of Part II is dedicated to the question of who opts for multi-
speed party membership and what motivates people to do so. Therefore, chapter 4
introduces three different theoretically- and empirically-grounded models that have
been used extensively in the last decades of party membership research. Although
these models were not originally developed in order to explain 21st century party af-
filiation as it is understood here, but rather traditional registered party membership
and inner party activity, voting choices, and political participation in general, they
will also be used in this study. The reasons for this approach are fourfold: Firstly,
theses models are theoretically very well-grounded and the scope of this study does
not allow for the development of a novel theoretical framework. Secondly, given the
assumption that it is not the functions of party members that change over time, but
rather the means people use to fulfill these functions, it is not unlikely that similar
processes are at work regarding the preconditions and motivations of these people.
Thirdly, it is interesting to explore whether multi-speed party membership follows
the same or at least similar rules as traditional party membership does. Lastly, all
of the regressions’ reference groups (chapter 9 on page 213) will actually be groups
dominated by traditional party members.
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Chapter 5 once more entirely deals with third party research. This is where the
current state of research on both the multi-speed model and general non-membership
based party affiliation is presented.
Since this study is motivated by and entirely empirically based on data from the
2017 German Party Members Survey, the second and main part of this study – Data
& Empirical Work – begins by giving an introduction to this data basis. Chapter
6 presents technical information on interview techniques, questionnaire design, and
samples.
With the 7th chapter, the core of this study is finally reached. Here, the basic uni-
and bivariate findings are presented, with regard to new forms of party affiliation as
well as traditional membership.
The aim of chapter 8 is to answer the question as to whether or not the aforemen-
tioned technical and social developments lead to a new type of party supporter who
stands diametrically opposed to traditional party members (as supporters do in Du-
verger’s bull’s eye model). Another possibility is that new affiliation forms are rather
expanding or simplifying traditional members’ engagement, participation, and ac-
tivities. In this case, new affiliation modes would transform party members’ way of
working together rather than the perception of what it means to be a party member
in general. This chapter will identify subsets within the sample using cluster analysis
with the aim of finding a new classification of individual party affiliation.
Finally, in order to explore the underlying structure of clusters in more detail,
the preconditions and motivations of non-traditional party affiliation shall be inves-
tigated in chapter 9 using logistic regression methods.
The structure of this study, especially chapters 7 to 9, is primarily based on three
underlying dimensions and corresponding questions drawn from Scarrow’s proposal
of a multi-speed membership model:
1. Basic statistical evidence of affiliation modes
In what way are alternative, non enrollment-based ways of party affiliation not
only supplied by parties, as Scarrow argues, but also demanded by people, and




2. Relationship between affiliation modes and traditional party enrollment
What is the relationship between enrollment and other affiliation variations? Is
there a significant portion of party affiliates that chose to be affiliated without
simultaneously being enrolled in a political party or are modern affiliation
variations rather circling around a centered point of gravity that consists of
classical party enrollment? What can be seen regarding relationships among
affiliation modes?
3. Motivations and preconditions of non enrollment-based party affiliates
If variations in the relationship between different affiliation types can be found,
to what extent can existing theoretical models on political participation suf-
ficiently explain these variations and what can be learned regarding motives
and preconditions of different affiliates?
Finally, there is the question of whether the results of this study are limited to
the specific research case or perhaps illuminate a general phenomenon that can also
be found in other national party systems. The scope of the multi-speed membership
model is neither limited to a specific country nor is it depended on the party system,
the type of democratic tradition, or any other accompanying factor. Rather, Scar-
row (2015) applies the approach to any modern liberal democracy that is based on
formal party membership (which is why the United States are not considered10). As
such, the specific case of Germany is nothing more but certainly not less than this: A
liberal democracy with a party system resting on formal registration processes that
entail obligations and rights for both political parties as well as members. Germany
is simply the case for which the most extensive data basis is available to assess the
multi-speed membership model. Moreover, developments that are said to be under-
lying drivers of party affiliation development, such as technological advancements,
sociological diversification, and declining membership figures are not specific to the
German case. Rather, these factors can be observed everywhere in contemporary
Europe and major Commonwealth Nations, i.e. Australia and Canada. Therefore,
the findings presented here are not country specific but should generally apply to
all countries featuring similar prerequisites. Nevertheless, the empirical verification
10Party membership in the USA is very different from that in a European understanding. “Party




of this statement is an interesting question and scholars should feel encouraged to
challenge this assumption.
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Part I - History & Theory

2 Membership Crisis in Germany?! -
The Motive for Affiliation Research
2.1 Roots of Membership Based Party Organization
Although the great history of modern membership parties is stressed very often,politics did more or less function without parties for a much longer period of
time. Even though politics in the sense of the ancient Greek, the Roman Republic,
or the Roman Empire is far away from modern democracies11, the basic origins of
modern democratic parties are located just there. Political factions can be traced
back as far as the late Roman Republic where the Senate had been predominantly
divided into Populares and Optimates. However, it was not until the end of the 19th
century that our modern parties or their close predecessors have developed. And
even then, parties in general were far away from being organizations for or from
the masses. Additionally, the late 19th and early 20th century is famous for another
very important and radical political development: The widespread democratization
of Western societies, which played a major role in the parties’ success. A connection
that Max Weber already highlighted in 1919 when he described parties in his famous
lecture and essay Politics as a Vocation as the “children of mass democracy” (Weber
2010, p. 35). This strand shall be investigated in further detail to get access to the
roots of modern party organization. Of course, the development from anti-democratic
monarchies to modern democratic societies, where parties and thus people are one
of the central institutions of a state’s architecture, did not follow the same route
everywhere. Consequently, although parties all over Europe do share some historical
roots due to their joint cultural and regional backgrounds, they also share the fact
that no two system developed alike since preconditions and powers within a nation’s
11The author is aware of the fact that with modern democracies only a very small fraction of the
world’s population is considered and most of the modern world does not benefit from political
freedom at all. See for example The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018).
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history shape the parties’ fortune too. That is why the upcoming section cannot be
more than the lowest common denominator of European party history.
The word party derives from the Latin word pars, which can be translated as
share, faction or direction. Accordingly, the very first gatherings of people with a
shared political opinion were loose portions of a greater political elite, only held
together by some type of shared attribute. These early parties were not based on
the idea of representing the people who were not directly member of the deciding
political body or who have not been accepted as relevant political subjects at all.
Early political factions are therefore rather comparable to a parliamentary faction.
Although today’s parliamentary factions are most often much stronger associations
due to a shared party membership of the faction’s individual members. Hence, the
analogy with modern parliamentary factions should not be stressed too far. One
prominent example of early, or even the very first, party predecessors’ formation is
said to be the so called Exclusion Crisis. Regarding three Bills aiming to exclude
King James II’s brother James, Duke of York from succession to the throne, because
he was Roman-Catholic, two major factions faced each other. Both Whigs and Tories
eventually developed into stable political parties later on.
Until the 18th century, the term party had been mostly applied to factions of
people gathering around a shared political idea or personal interest. Even opposing
portions within Catholic and Protestant churches were named this way. In most
cases party was used in a negative fashion, indicating a fraction of people endanger-
ing peaceful government due to personal interests (Scarrow 2006). The positive and
secular use of the word party did not even come into place with the French Revolu-
tion, a mark in history generally associated with everything positive modern politics
is about. In general, one’s own political opinions were based on Rousseau’s idea of
the General Will, whilst opponents were called partisans. Whilst the French notion
of partisanship is said to be somewhat extreme, during the 18th and 19th century,
party remained a word, mostly rejected as a self-attribution. It is English philoso-
pher politician and writer Edmund Burke, who is credited with a rather moderate
connotation of early parties (Scarrow 2006) when he is cited in 1796 with the words
that a party was “a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours
the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”
(Burke 1887, p. 530)
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By the middle of the 19th century, early parties had build around local notable
elites in semi democratic systems with very limited suffrage. Since political rights
at this time had been very much connected to material properties, both running
for office as well as voting was granted to a very limited group of individuals only.
Consequently, financial expenditures as well as organizational efforts remained very
limited and huge bureaucratic apparatuses were not necessary to reach out to the
electorate (Diamond & Gunther 2001, p. 175).
Between the late 19th and early 20th century however, most of Europe had un-
dergone parliamentarization and a great spread of suffrage. The evolvement of mass-
membership parties is in general understood as a logical consequence of this democ-
ratization of society. Scarrow explains the development of Europe’s membership-
parties in terms of three distinct contextual factors that facilitated the emergence
of mass political organizations, whereas democratization represents the functional
aspect.12 Functional here means, parties, as membership organizations of ordinary
people, provide the solution to a specific problem and therefore fulfill a certain
function for political elites. These problems are: “how to win elections, how to co-
ordinate activity in legislatures, how to advance political careers, how to handle
political recruitment” (Scarrow 2015, p. 41). Duverger (1959, pp. 84) explains that
parliamentary delegates feel the need to associate with politically like-minded, and
bundle their efforts to the extent that parliamentary bodies enlarge their power and
profit from greater independence from governing authorities.
Yet, these challenges did not occur before fundamental political changes had
flooded Europe. Based on the 1848/49 revolutions, parliaments increased their say
in legislative regimes, electorates expanded and associational restrictions had been
lifted. Although none of the revolutionary regimes maintained their power, and many
monarchies were able to restore after a short time, some of the newly gained polit-
ical developments could actually be secured. However, as Scarrow (2015, table 3.2
on p. 48) shows, only by the late 19th to early 20th century, most of the European
countries had established full manhood suffrage and competitive elections. This de-
velopment created new incentives for political elites for coordinated organization
of their efforts and early political organizations developed. Yet, the emergence of
organized political campaigning and national extra-parliamentary political organi-
12Other factors are seen in the cultural context of “nineteenth century’s associational efflores-
cence” (p. 41) and the parties’ ideology (Scarrow 2015, pp. 37).
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zations did not necessarily mean, that these, still loose factions and clubs, recruited
individual members. Where membership had been introduced at all, mostly indirect
membership, based on other associational organizations, mostly trade unions, was
the rule. Only very few countries had developed individual membership parties by
1910 and even fewer shared this achievement across both left and right wing parties
(Scarrow 2015, p. 55).13
After World War I had mostly stopped democratic developments, the interwar
period between 1918 and 1939 was a time of fundamental changes again. By 1920,
almost all European countries had implemented full manhood suffrage. In conjunc-
tion with the increasing popularity of a proportional electoral system, incentives for
grassroots organization had increased again, since every voting district needed to be
addressed. Particularly left wing socialist parties developed extensive organizational
structures to shape and provide leisure activities of affiliates, such as sports clubs
and women’s organizations. These parties were also the ones who accepted indi-
vidual membership in some countries first. Driven by ideological roots in Marxism,
socialist and social-democratic parties, especially in Austria and Germany, began to
build up large individual membership parties that focused on the needs of a rapidly
growing and exploited urban working class (Scarrow 2015, pp. 57). These parties
also are the blueprint for Duverger’s parti de masse, a theoretical model to describe
early party affiliation and the starting point for the multi-speed membership model
by Scarrow (Duverger 1959, pp. 79).
On the other hand, right wing conservative and Catholic parties only very slowly
approached an organizational model based on individual or associational member-
ship. Rather informal clubs had remained the organizational idea of choice. Yet,
there were exceptions from this rule, such as the German Center Party as well
as the Dutch (individual membership) and the Belgian (associational membership)
Catholic Party. Most right wing parties however only had moderate success with
their emulation of the socialist and social-democratic mass-membership models.
Another aspect of mass-membership party development had been anti-democratic
parties of the 1920s and 30s. These parties, which were spread all over Europe and
had been especially successful in Germany, Italy and Spain, used mass-membership
as part of their “narrative of legitimacy” (Scarrow 2015, p. 20)14 and registered mil-
13See also Scarrow (2015), table 3.4 on page 56.
14Scarrow (2015) does not use this term in the context of early 20th century anti-democratic parties.
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lions of people as individual members. The Third Reich’s NSDAP for example, the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party, counted around 850,000 members at the
beginning of 1933 and increased this number over ten years to over 7.5 million (Grüt-
tner 2014, pp. 101). Yet, membership in these anti-democratic parties did not mean
the same as in early socialist mass parties, leave alone in after-World War II parties
in the 1950s until today. On the one hand, party members were not a respected
body to whom party leaders were responsible. Rather, they were ascribed a role as
fans or even adherents to uncritically follow and support ideological believes of the
leaders (Scarrow 2015, pp. 60). In this respect, fascist parties of this time differed
from socialist parties, which also made use of an effect of the masses to underline
their policies’ legitimacy but rather understood themselves as cleavage representa-
tion parties and members featured common socio-economic characteristics. On the
other hand, membership in early 20th century anti-democratic parties was not based
on the idea of free associations at all. Whilst it could not be confirmed that people
had been registered as members of the Nazi party secretly, membership was not at
all based on true voluntariness. Fixed rates of pursued membership ratios created
pressure, which was passed on to lower levels of authority. Moreover future public
officials were assured, that membership might support or even safe their careers and
subsistence (Grüttner 2014, p. 101).
It was the after-war period in the 1940s and 1950s, when party membership was
at best a phenomenon of the masses. However, Germany is one of the few excep-
tions, where M/E-ratios peaked in other times (Scarrow 2015, p. 71). After World
War II, many European socialist and social-democratic parties re-established and
fueled their popularity by promising social welfare after the “economic hardships”
(Scarrow 2015, p. 61) of the Great Depression and the burdens of war. Yet, not just
a few stuck with the model of associational membership. That means that a major
part of those parties’ growth reflected the trade unions’ success rather than party
political affiliation. Trade union membership in those days was much more a source
for social security insurance than an act of political activity. However, the conducive
momentum for political parties is without question.
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2.2 Post WWII Traditional Party Membership Development in
Germany and Historical Background
Functions of party members are very diverse as well as vital for the effec-tive operation of parties as transmission belts (Böhret & Kronenwett 1988,
p. 90) of representative democracy. Although section 2.1 on page 13 underlined that
widespread party membership is at best a post World War II phenomenon, party
members today play a crucial role in a democratic state’s structure with widespread
suffrage and parliamentarianism as its defining features. Because of this people-
centered change in politics over decades and centuries, many scholars and state
representatives are afraid of declining party membership, although party members
footprint in political history is rather small. The underlying theoretical approach of
this study refers to declining party membership itself as one of the motivations to
redefine what it actually means to be member of a political party. Accordingly, this
chapter gives information on the specific situation of traditional party membership
in Germany. At first, membership is assessed in terms of absolute numbers, while
at a later stage, ratios between party membership figures and the electorate will be
reviewed as well.
Figure 2.1 on the facing page and figure 2.2 on page 20 show the development of
membership figures for selected German parties for a period of over 70 years, from
1945 until 2018. For the sake of ascertainability, parties are pictured differentiated by
the level of membership, i.e. large parties (CDU and SPD) are displayed with figure
2.1 and small parties (CSU, FDP, Greens, The Left, Pirates & AfD) with figure 2.2.
The selection of parties considered in this description is based on the relevance of
parties since the beginning of the 1960s, as this is the time, when party membership
slowly started to flourish in comparison to earlier decades. Numbers before 1990 are
for West Germany only.
As can be seen in figure 2.1 on the facing page, the two by far largest parties, the so
called Volksparteien, which have been examples for the introduction of Kirchheimer’s
(1965, pp. 28) term of the catch-all-party15, feature a fairly similar development until
the late 1970s. The same pattern applies to the regional equivalent for Bavaria in
the conservative-Christian camp, the CSU (figure 2.2 on page 20).
15Kirchheimer (1965) himself also uses the German term Allerweltspartei, which is quite provocative
as it implicitly states the redundancy of different parties.
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SPD: Pre-1990: Boyer and Kössler (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019); CDU: Pre-1990: Franz and
Gnad (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
Vertical dashed line indicates time of German reunification. Exact figures see: table A.2 on page 289.
Figure 2.1: Membership figures of German Parties 1946-2018, large parties
Initially after World War II, both parties were able to gain new members, although
records are not available for CDU membership before 1948. Yet, not founded until
1946, it is still fair to interpret the years between 1946 and 1948 as a time of strong
membership increase for the party. This attractiveness within the first three post-
war years has been described as an indication of high societal politization. Driven
by an ongoing conflict about the economic and societal direction in which the newly
formed Federal Republic of Germany should develop, people were motivated to have
their say and state their position (Wiesendahl 2006, p. 85, pp. 89).
Additionally, people for the first time since 1933 experienced a new political free-
dom in West Germany. The social-democratic SPD as well as other parties and
political organizations had been subject to massive repression by the Nazi-Regime
since NSDAP’s seizure of power and throughout the years of war. The formerly
leading conservative Catholic party, the Zentrumspartei (DZP) and its Bavarian
equivalent, the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) had even been dissolved by 1933 and
both had not reemerged before 1945/46.
19
Chapter 2












































CSU: Pre-1990: Franz and Gnad (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019); FDP: Pre-1990: Gnad, Gniss,
Hausmann and Rebel (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019); Greens: Pre-1990: Boyer and Kössler
(2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019); The Left: Niedermayer (2019); Pirates: 2006-2013: Spier (2014),
2014-present: Statista (2019); AfD: Niedermayer (2019).
Vertical dashed line indicates time of German reunification. Exact figures see: table A.2 on page 289.
Figure 2.2: Membership figures of German Parties 1946-2018, small parties
Furthermore, it is argued that all three parties started their reemergence with a
new openness to a broader range of societal subgroups as compared to their orien-
tation during the short period of the Weimar Republic. For the SPD, this openness
is seen in its efforts to incorporate different societal subgroups into the party. Not
only blue-collar workers, the classic social democratic clientele, were welcome to take
part in the reconstruction of social democracy in Germany, but also farmers, white-
collar employees, small businesses and even intellectuals (Lösche & Walter 1992, pp.
135) . The incorporating element of conservative parties CDU and CSU however, was
their confessional liberalism as opposed to formerly Catholic dominated conservative
parties (Niedermayer 2013b, p. 158; Franz and Gnad 2005, p. 67).
The fourth party to be reviewed here, the liberal FDP (formerly DPD), shows a
rather different development. While it did not take long for CDU, CSU and SPD
to experience first membership losses after World War II, the FDP proved to be
very open to all sorts of people in the post-war years. This also included right-wing
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conservatives and former NSDAP members, even before denazification officially came
to an end in 1951 (Gnad, Gniss, Hausmann, & Rebel 2005, p. 59). With this strategy,
the FDP was able to increase its membership until 1960, without being subject to
the decrease in membership at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s16. By 1948,
party membership had increased to 55,00017 for the FDP (1947), 847,000 for the
SPD, 360,000 for the CDU and 85,000 for the CSU.
However, it did not take long until the first short but intense period of decline
in membership started. This dramatic loss hit CDU, CSU and SPD hard. By 1953,
the parties had lost between one fourth and more than half of their membership
compared to 1948.18 In general, the most important factor19 leading to this dramatic
decline in membership, is seen in the 1948 monetary reform in the Western German
occupation zones (Niedermayer 2013b, p. 159; Boyer and Kössler 2005, p. 69; Franz
and Gnad 2005, p. 67), initiated by the allied military administrations. This reform
had foremost been intended to erase the excessive money surplus, which had evolved
from war finance by means of increasing the national debt, the issue of the AM-Mark,
the Allied Military Currency (AMC), and a concurrent shortage of goods. All of a
sudden, money actually had a value again and thus, party membership effectively
was not for free anymore. This lead to both decreasing membership numbers as well
as unstable revenue flows from those, who had not yet turned their back on political
parties.20
In the following years between the early 1950s and 60s, the CDU as well as the SPD
experienced a period of rather stable membership numbers with only a slight increase
in membership figures. Until 1963, the CDU managed to incorporate around 33,000
new members, equivalent to a 6% increase since 1953. Similarly, the SPD increased
16Unfortunately, no membership records are available for the period between 1953 and 1959.
17Membership figures within the text are rounded to the next thousandth. Exact figures as well
as development in percent compared to the previous record are available from table A.1 on
page 286.
18SPD: -26%, CDU: -42%, CSU: -59% (figures are rounded to the next natural number).
19For both parties, the CDU as well as the SPD, additional factors are discussed. These factors
either facilitated the impact of the currency reform on party membership figures or accompanied
it, without being structurally connected to each other. Yet, while the purpose here is only to
shed light onto the general trends of party membership, these factors are not discussed in further
detail. For further details see: Lösche and Walter (1992, p. 138) for the SPD and Niedermayer
(2013b, p. 159) for the CDU, whereas at least one of Niedermayer’s references actually refers to
the late 1950s/early 1960s and not the membership loss of the late 1940s.
20Unfortunately, there is no comment to be found in the literature, why the FDP had not been a
victim of this monetary policy.
21
Chapter 2
their membership by around 15%, equivalent to 41,000 new members. Given the low
level that both parties started from after the 1948 monetary reform, even a steady,
yet very slow, increase in membership was not satisfying.
Especially for the SPD this reflects a time of a distinct party crisis, since it always
understood itself as a party for the masses. Yet, the masses changed, whereas the
SPD remained stuck within its traditional narrative, behavioral and attitudinal pat-
terns. These attracted first and foremost male blue collar workers (Boyer & Kössler
2005, p. 70), much against the aforementioned idea of being open to all sorts of
people, publicized by then party leader Kurt Schumacher. This is also underlined
by the fact that by the mid 1950s, still between 50 and 66% of the SPD member-
ship had been blue collar workers. White collar workers, civil servants, independent
workers, small businessmen and younger people only accounted for marginal parts
of the membership, in a time when a larger middle class began to emerge and shape
society as a whole (Lösche and Walter 1992, p. 137, 140; Boyer and Kössler 2005, p.
70).
While the SPD could not expand its national election results considerably over
30% throughout the 1950s, the CDU reached almost 40% in 1957 as compared to
only 25% in 1949. Surprisingly, the party was not able to increase its membership,
although there was obviously a time of greater popularity for Christian-democratic
policies. The growing Christian middle class remained skeptical about party mem-
bership (Franz & Gnad 2005, p. 68), which pursued DZP-traditions. The pioneer
party of political Catholicism and ideological ancestor of German conservatism had
mostly limited itself to motivate sympathizers in times of elections (Schmidt 1986,
p.642). Additionally, an aversion against party politics, deriving from experiences
with the Third Reich, was mostly a phenomenon of middle class conservative voters
(Schönbohm 1992, p. 48). The CDU of the 1950s is said to have been to a great
extent a party of local notables, at least on the lower levels of organization, and as
such resembled very much the earliest elite based parties of the mid 19th century
(Gunther & Diamond 2003, p. 173). Moreover, distinctly Catholic branches tried
to seal off the party from an inclusive Christian approach, which bore a threat of
liberalization to distinct positions of political Catholicism (Schönbohm 1992, p.48).
Contradictory to the SPD of the late 1940s, when party membership had also been
a means for patronage and careers, the CDU of the 1950s suffered from the opposite.
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It was quite sufficient to be part of a wider Christian democratic ethos to built a
career on and thus, it was simply not that interesting to become a registered member
(Franz & Gnad 2005, p. 69).21
For its Bavarian counterpart, the CSU, the early 1950s equally were a time of
stagnation. As a consequence of the late 1940s membership decrease because of the
1948 currency reform, the CSU also widely redeveloped a system of local notables.
This restraint of widespread membership as well as cultural and economical inner-
Bavarian conflicts seriously threatened the existence of the party (Mintzel 1983, p.
669). Moreover with the newly established BP, the CSU faced a strong competitor
courting Catholic conservatives (Niedermayer 2013b, p. 159). It took until 1954 and
the unexpected loss of governing powers that the party regained its momentum of
inclusion. Under party leader Hanns Seidel the party was able to almost double its
membership to around 58,000 in 1961 as compared to 1953.
The early 1960s is the time when “the golden age of party membership” (Scarrow
2015, p. 61) finally started in Germany and even accelerated quickly at the end of
the decade. This development is contradictory to most other European countries,
where the high times of party membership occurred at least 15 years earlier, namely
in the immediate aftermath of World War II, as Scarrow (2015, p. 71) shows. Most
other countries, in which party membership reached its peak later than a decade
after World War II, actually were authoritarian regimes at this time (Greece, Spain
and Portugal).
Coming back to the German case, by the mid 1970s, the SPD had reached its
all-time membership high with over 1 million members in 1976 (+57% compared to
1960). At the same time, the CDU even increased its membership by an enormous
167% up to 652,000 members and the regional CSU counted 144,000 registered
members in the same year (+176% compared to 1960). However, the liberal FDP
experienced ups and downs during the 1960s and 70s. By 1971 with only 54,000
members, the FDP reached the lowest recorded number of members. However, only
five years later all losses from before were regained.
21The most prominent example is likely to be Ludwig Erhard, who made it to Federal Minister
for Economics (1949-63) and even Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1963-66)
and whose registered party membership is still in doubt. Very likely, Erhard had not formally
registered with the CDU before being elected as party leader in 1966.
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On the one hand, this positive development for three out of the four leading
German parties (SPD, CDU and CSU) of this time reflects an extensively com-
petitive situation between a social-liberal government from 1969 to 1982 (coalition
government of SPD and FDP) and the Christian-democratic (CDU)/Christian-social
(CSU) opposition on the federal level (Niedermayer 2013b, p. 160). This situation
allowed these parties to gain members from societal groups, who formerly had strong
concerns against political party membership. On the other hand, distinctive individ-
ual factors for each party come into play as well.
Looking at the SPD again, membership figures started to rise already by the early
1960s, yet stagnated during the mid 60s due to resistance to the Grand Coalition22
between 1966 and 1969. Especially strong was the resistance from the so called APO,
the extra-parliamentary opposition (Außerparlamentarische Opposition). This group
of extra-parliamentary activists especially opposed the weak role of the parliamen-
tary opposition during the Grand Coalition (Lösche & Walter 1992, p. 150). The
end of this coalition and the beginning of a social-liberal coalition in 1969, in the
eyes of many APO-members and sympathizers, brought the SPD back on the right
track. This underlined the SPD’s claim of being a modern progressive reform-party
in the tradition of the German labor movement (Lösche & Walter 1992, p. 151) and
a keynesianistic expenditure policy (Jun 2018, pp. 469).
The CDU had undergone a significant organizational rearrangement as a conse-
quence of its oppositional role. Formerly know as the “Kanzlerwahlverein” (Nieder-
mayer 2013b, p. 161) (chancellor voting club), the party itself gained confidence
and was no longer in the shadow of the government and the parliamentary fac-
tion (Schönbohm 1992, p.94). Accordingly, the party gave members a stronger say
via participatory elements, which especially supported the party’s general congress’
role as an important deciding body. Moreover the CDU, invested heavily into cam-
paigns to gain new members. In 1963 a nationwide campaign by then managing
party leader Josef Herrmann Dufhues, which had been expected to end in 100,000
22In Germany a coalition government between the SPD and the Union-parties of CDU and CSU
(who form one parliamentary faction) is commonly referred to as a Grand Coalition due to the
extensive number of parliamentary seats those parties occupied between 1966 and 1969, which
had been 90%. Today, this expression is still used for the coalition governments between 2005
and 2009 (72% of parliamentary seats), 2013 and 2017 (80%) and since 2018 (56%). Due to the
continuous loss of parliamentary shares, it has been argued whether Grand Coalition is still the
appropriate term. Yet, in all of these parliaments, both factions represented and represent the
largest factions of opposing political directions.
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new members until 1964, did not bring the expected upswing (Schönbohm 1992).
Yet, by the beginning 1970s, increasing membership figures were at the top of the
party’s activities, which culminated in elaborate measures, such as a handbook of
membership promotion, incentives for successful promotions and the position of a
full-time membership consultant.
Hence, while the SPD mainly benefited from explicitly political decisions (policies
and the resignment from the Grand coalition) the CDU actually decided to become a
party based on extensive and strong membership. The CSU combined both of these
factors. On the one hand, the end of the Grand Coalition, although not the product
of a CSU decision, eliminated the reason for ongoing membership losses in favor of
the NPD. Additionally, the BP vanished from the scene and their membership was
partially absorbed by the CSU (Niedermayer 2013b, p. 161). On the other hand,
just as the CDU, the CSU also made the decision to develop itself into a strong
membership party, in which the times of honorary circles and self-elected party
ghettos would be over (General secretary Streibl in 1969 as cited by Gnad et al.
(2005, p. 555)).
All of these parties reached their all-time membership maximum by the late 1970s
or early 1980s. With only small losses, SPD and CDU were able to largely maintain
this level until the German reunification in 1990, the CSU even beyond this landmark
of newer German history until the late 1990s.
The fourth major party of mid 20th century Germany however, the FDP, was not
part of this described upswing in membership figures. While the wish for a larger
membership basis had also been there, measures that were taken neither were of
great nor were they of sustainable success. This is mainly explained by various state
branches not coordinating their campaigning efforts (Franz & Gnad 2005, pp. 60).
About 10 years before German reunification in 1990, just when most major Ger-
man parties were on their peak regarding membership figures, another party devel-
oped. Based on the aforementioned APO, emerging out of the universities and the
so called New Social Movements, several citizens’ initiatives were formed in the early
1970s. In terms of programmatic emphasis, the later were movements concerned pri-
marily with ecological sustainability, the consequences of the use of nuclear energy,
women’s rights and equality, (nuclear) non-proliferation, and peace as well as Third
World development (Mende 2011, p. 37). Since political parties altogether did not
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address these topics sensibly, at the end of the 1970s several local and regional elec-
toral alliances were formed to increase attention for environmental concerns in the
political process (Probst 2018, p. 203). To compete in the 1979 European elections,
leaders of several of those splinter groups decided to form the so called Sonstige
Politische Vereinigung DIE GRÜNEN 23. Reaching 3.2% in their first election was
a very reasonable success for a small protest party, which was not at all accepted
as a sensible political competitor by other parties. The official foundation of the
party Die Grünen(The Greens) in January 1980 was the logical consequence of this
success.
First records of membership report around 11,000 members as of 1979. Major
steps to increase this number significantly were the official foundation of the party
in 1980 and electoral achievements in several German state elections. Even more
so, the huge success during the 1983 national election resulting in 5.6% electoral
share and 28 parliamentary seats, boosted The Greens’ membership figures. With
this result, for the first time since the 1950s, a new party had entered the German
Bundestag and roughed up the old and deadlocked German party landscape. With
the election in 1987, the result could even be improved and the party reached 8.3%.
By 1987, The Greens measured around 42,000 members, which was the result of
great electoral successes both on the national and regional level and an ongoing
shift in values (Probst 2013, pp. 509).24 Yet, the main reason for the increase in
membership is seen in the party’s roots in several political protest groups. Until the
late 1980s, membership of The Greens mainly increased due to self-mobilization of
activists (Raschke 1993, p. 666). The Greens are one of only two German parties,
who are able to keep increasing their membership in times of generally declining
membership numbers (the other being the AfD, which will be addressed later).
Just when The Greens emerged and began to foster their position within the Ger-
man party system, SPD and CDU experienced first losses after at least a decade of
steadily growing memberships. As mentioned already, the SPD reached its member-
ship record in 1976 with over one million25 party members. Seven years later, the
CDU reached its all-time high with around 730,00026 members. On the other hand,
23Approximate translation: Other political association THE GREENS.
24For further information see: Inglehart (1977) and for a link with Lipset/Rokkan’s Cleavage Theory
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967) see: Kitschelt and Hellemans (2006).
251,022,191 to be exact (Boyer & Kössler 2005, p. 133).
26Exactly 734,555 members (Franz & Gnad 2005, p. 101).
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the CSU was able to continue its membership growth until 1990 (186,198 members
(Niedermayer 2019, p. 6)) with only a small setback in the mid 1980s. At least since
the early 1990s however, three of four dominating parties of post WWII Germany
(CDU, CSU, SPD) are continuously loosing members, a pattern, van Biezen et al.
(2012, p. 34) have proved to be applicable to most European countries. This picture
is especially impressive with regard to the two major German catch-all parties, the
CDU and the SPD. With an average shrinkage rate of -2.2% (CDU) and -2.7%
(SPD) per year since 199227, both parties have lost almost half of their membership.
This trend in party membership can be observed all over Europe (van Biezen et al.
2012), at least on the aggregate level28, and is therefore to be explained not by in-
fluencing factors on the party level, but by macro trends, which apply to at least all
modern liberal democracies.
These macro trends are situated on both sides of the equation. On the side of
membership supply, a decrease in party affinity is assigned to being the result of
an individualization of lifestyles and the corresponding erosion of classic societal
milieus (Blondel, Thiébault, & Czernicka 2010, pp. 1). Parties’ development is com-
monly connected to major conflicts between these milieus, called cleavages (Lipset
& Rokkan 1967). From this standpoint it seems inevitable that party affinity is
suffering, when individuals emancipate themselves from distinct social belonging.
Moreover, parties experience new competitors with regard to leisure activities. Par-
ties formerly have been much more than only clubs of politically interested people,
gathering to compete in elections in order to influence the legislative process. Besides
this, political parties have also provided social as well as educational activities and
even holiday trips (Scarrow 2015, p. 74) and they do so even today. Yet, competi-
tion has grown over decades with endless numbers of (sports) clubs, the spread of
information via TV and internet as well as a diversifying world of political actors
27The Year 1992 is chosen in order to not dilute the arithmetic mean by the increase in membership
of the CDU brought by German reunification, since the gain of around 100,000 members did
neither stop nor reverse the general trend and was lost only 5 years later. Including this gain of
14.6% into the calculation of the mean would have led to an average shrinkage rate of 1.6%.
28As Kölln (2016, p. 465) argues, former studies about declining membership (Scarrow (2000), Mair
and van Biezen (2001), Delwit (2011), Whiteley (2011), Krouwel (2012) and van Biezen et al.
(2012)), the latter being the one cited the most, suffer from two major problems: Aggregate data
on the country basis and few points of measurement. These drawbacks are said to potentially
hide differences between parties within one country as well as fluctuation between points of
measurement, which may help understanding a general trend.
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such as numerous NGOs. Just as with political party life, these organizations pro-
vide individuals with opportunities to fulfill personal needs like activism, folksiness
or appreciation among others.
The demand side has also changed over time, namely whether parties need and
want party members at all, which should result in more or less membership cam-
paigning. Increasing party subsidies are said to attenuate the parties’ dependence
on membership fees as one of several means to match revenues to their financial
needs. Additionally, media intensive campaigning via TV, internet and - more re-
cently - social media suggest a lesser requirement of manpower (Scarrow 2015, pp.
73). Especially since social media are not only mass media that can reach out to nu-
merous individuals, but also because they simultaneously provide a strong workforce
of actual human beings.
On the aggregate level, these macro trends, which all point to declining mem-
bership figures, seem to be valuable arguments. As Figure 2.3 on page 30 shows,
the ratio of party members to the electorate (M/E-ratio) has been steadily declining
since 1980, speeding up in 1987 and softening its declining slope since the mid 1990s.
From the highest number in 1980, when 4,6% of the German electorate were mem-
ber of a political party, to 2017, the year of the last national election, the M/E-ratio
has been cut by more than half. Today, only slightly more than 2% of the electorate
are party members.
Yet, in Germany, the picture of party membership since the 1980s and especially
since 1989 is split. The M/E-ratio, while representing the trend of two parties (CDU
and SPD) fairly accurately, is far too simple an approach, in order to deliver a com-
plete picture of party membership numbers in Germany. Not only did the Greens
emerge in the late 1970s/early 1980s, but in 1990 German reunification took place
as part of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and a direct consequence of the Peaceful
Revolution in East Germany in 1989. This brought major changes to the German
party system, since two very different party systems, one democratic and one au-
thoritarian, had to be merged. Even today, the former GDR part of Germany is
clearly distinguishable within German society in various aspects. This history comes
to light not only when it comes to voter turnout in general or preferences and an-
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tipathy for certain parties.29 Party membership itself is also something different in
the Eastern part of Germany.
While the increase in membership due to the expansion of the electorate was
marginal (CDU, see figure 2.1 on page 19) or even non-existent (SPD, Greens, CSU30;
see figures 2.1 to 2.2 on pages 19–20), one party experienced a massive increase in
membership. The FDP, which had not been able to accelerate membership growth in
the 1970s as other parties had, also had to deal with decreasing party membership
during the 1980s. Yet, the party experienced a phenomenal high in 1990 due to
German reunification. The merger with the East German BFD (itself a merger of
LDPD and NDPD), F.D.P.31 and DFP brought the party previously unseen numbers
of members of around 178,000. Record updates and withdrawals from East German
branches however relatively quickly brought the FDP back to its former level between
50,000 and 75,000 members in the mid 1990s. In the aftermath of the 2009 national
election, the party lost more than 25% of their membership within the following
legislative period and two thirds of their political popularity according to voting
polls within one year (From 14.6% in the national election on September 27th, 2009
to around 5% in the polls as of October 2010 (infratest-dimap 2019)). Additionally,
between March 2011 and March 2012, the FDP lost all seats in state level legislations
at six out of seven elections. Niedermayer (2012, pp. 481) sees both policy as well as
personnel related mistakes as being responsible for the development of the party’s
voter popularity. This however, is something different than membership figures. Yet,
interactions between voter popularity and membership attractiveness are likely.
In October 1990, with the former GDR state party SED, a whole new party entered
the scene. This party had been the product of a forced merger of the Eastern branches
of the KPD and SPD in 1946, pushed by Joseph Stalin and Walter Ulbricht, the
latter already playing a leading role in the early KPD years in times of the Weimar
Republic (1918-1933). With the idea to conclude with its repressive history during
the GDR regime, the party was renamed to SED-PDS in December 1989 and to
PDS in February 1990. Of course, this party was not at all comparable to democratic
parties of the West, but had been a state and cadre party of an authoritarian regime
29For more information see voter turnout since 1990 distinguished for Est- and West Germany:
Bundeswahlleiter (2018, pp. 22).
30The CSU only competes within Bavaria and hence was unaffected by reunification.















































Members/Electorate-ratio M/E-ratio, large parties
M/E-ratio, small parties Number of party members
Aggregate membership figures are based on:
AfD (2013-2017), BHE (1943-1959), BP (1948-1953), CDU (1948, 1952-53, 1955-57, 1960, 1962-2017), CSU
(1946-53, 1960-61, 1963-2017), DKP (1969-2013), DVU (1987-2010), DZP (1946-1950), FDP (1947, 1951-52,
1960, 1967-2017), Green (1979-2017), KPD (1945-1954, 1956), Left (1990-2017), MLPD (1982-2013,
2016-17), NPD (1964-2013, 2017), Pirates (2006-2013, 2017), REP (1983, 1985-2014, 2017), SPD
(1946-2017).
Recent large parties:
CDU (1948, 1952-53, 1955-57, 1960, 1962-2017), CSU (1946-53, 1960-61, 1963-2017), SPD (1946-2017).
Recent small parties:
AfD (2013-2017), FDP (1947, 1951-52, 1960, 1967-2017), Green (1979-2017), The Left (1990-2017), Pirates
(2006-2013, 2017).
Vertical dashed line indicates time of German reunification. Exact membership figures and references see
tables A.2 to A.3 on pages 289–292.
Electorate figures: Bundeswahlleiter (2018, p. 6).
Figure 2.3: M/E-ratios and overall party membership figures in Germany, 1949-2018
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and essentially the long arm of the Soviet Union. Once the GDR regime and the
Eastern Bloc as a whole had fallen, the purpose of being a member of the SED had
blown off as well. Accordingly, masses of members flew from the party, so that it
lost almost half of its members within one year of reunified Germany.
This massive decrease continued for around one and a half decades, although with
continuously decreasing intensity, and only came to its preliminary end in 2006. Until
then, the PDS, meanwhile renamed to The Left Party.PDS, had lost almost 80%
of its former membership. However, because of its distinct historical background,
this massive decrease in membership of The Left Party.PDS, which is solely called
The Left since 2007, should not be seen in the light of national or even international
macro trends. Membership of the SED in the Soviet Military Zone and the GDR
was not at all comparable to membership of democratic parties in all other Allied
Military Zones and West Germany. Members of the SED had not been the basis of
the party in terms of building a voluntary organization to chase their common goals
in a competitive electoral system. As has already been mentioned above, the party
itself was an artificial product, promoted by the Soviet Union and leaders of the East
German KPD, whose primary concern was to implement a communist system. There
was no doubt about SED supremacy both theoretically and practically (Mampel,
Siegfried as cited by: Jesse 2001, p. 90) and the GDR legislation, the Volkskammer
had no democratic power. Rather, all legislative power was accumulated in the hands
of a circle of leaders within the Politburo of the Central Committee, whose decisions
were binding for minor party branches as well as all state institutions (Schroeder
2013, p. 500). In accordance to this all-mighty and repressive position of the SED,
motivations of membership were essentially dualistic. Except for the very beginning
of the GDR, when membership had been a way to state ones anti-Nazi attitude,
most members of the SED were either motivated by material benefits or ideological
belief. Without SED-membership, higher occupational status was unlikely or, in the
case of military or security relevant organizations, absolutely impossible. This can
even be backed up by data, since the share of white collar workers in the SED
increased rapidly at the expense of blue collar workers’ representation, already in
the beginning of the GDR (Malycha & Winter 2009, pp. 412).
Hence, when the end of the GDR regime was foreseeable at the end of 1989, a
massive number of members left the party (see figure 2.4 on the following page),
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Figures pre-1989: Jesse (2001); 1989: Moreau and Schorpp-Grabiak (2002), 1990 - present: Niedermayer
(2019).
Vertical dashed line indicates time of German reunification. Exact figures see: table A.4 on page 294.
Figure 2.4: Membership figures of the SED/Left in the GDR and Germany, 1946-
2018
either due to the now missing benefits of membership or due to frustration about
corruption and misuse of power by the leaders (Bortfeldt 1992, p. 123). On the other
hand, the expansion of territory brought the PDS only marginal growth of several
hundred members (Bortfeldt 1992, p. 228) in West German branches, that were
founded after reunification.
Until today, The Left is still in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the party
is still losing members in the Eastern part of Germany, the former GDR territory.
And still, the history explained above is a key factor in this development, since
members from SED-times are structurally older and dying. Yet, on the other hand,
modern and more general explanations are likely to intertwine with these long-term
historical effects. In the rest of the country, former West Germany, The Left was
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able to increase its membership. In the context of its merger with the WASG in
2007, which had bound some far left membership potential since its foundation in
2005, the party increased its West German membership numbers from around 7,000
to more than 20,0000 (without Berlin). This level however remains relatively stable.
In the more recent history of the German party landscape, two new parties
emerged and became relatively popular in a short period of time, the Pirates Party
Germany and the Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Inspired by the Swedish Pirates Party, the Pirates Party Germany had been
formed in 2006 but remained under the radar until the beginning of 2009 (Nie-
dermayer 2013a, p. 620). Membership and party life almost exclusively took place
on-line. Accordingly, membership figures had not even hit the mark of 1,000 mem-
bers at the end of 2008. Yet, in the first half of 2009, just before the 2009 European
Elections were to take place, the Pirates were able to take the lead of an extra-
parliamentary opposition against a legislative act that should give German author-
ities the opportunity to block certain internet content. With the European Election
taking place in May 2009, the Pirates were the only party to vote for, to express
ones opinion against this legislative act. This unique feature also introduced a first
period of membership growth. The popularity of party politics remained high among
the media until the end of 2009, because this year also brought a national election
in Germany. Moreover, political discussions about internet policies favored a young
party, which originally only addressed one single topic: copyrights, especially in con-
nection to modern technology. By the end of the so called Super Election Year, the
Pirates had increased their membership from under 1,000 members to nearly 12,000
members within less than one year.
Just two years later, in the context of the state level election in Berlin, a second
period of massive growth started. Once more, only within just over half a year, the
Pirates had to include around 10,000 new members and reached their membership
climax at the end of 2012 with over 34,000 members. Since structure and manage-
ment of the party could not compete with this rate of membership growth, Bieber
(2012, p. 29) describes this development as unhealthy. In accordance to this descrip-
tion, both electoral turnout and membership figures started to decrease almost as
rapidly as they had risen the years before, while the former, together with organi-
zational challenges of liquid democracy (for further reading see (Reichert & Panek
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2014)) within the party, is likely to cause the latter. At the end of 2018, the Pirates
are reported to have only a little more than 8,000 members left.
The latest notable offspring of the German party system was founded in 2013 as
the AfD (Alternative for Germany), an organizational development of a political
interest group called Wahlalternative 2013 (Election Alternative 2013), a spin-off of
the CDU, but which had never been an independent party itself. The AfD emerged
from a 20 year old dispute and dissatisfaction within conservative and neo-liberal
circles of the political spectrum, which had its initial with the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty and the proceeding implementation of the European Economic and Mone-
tary Union. Insofar, the First Economic Adjustment Programme has only been the
catalyzing event for a much longer and deeper conflict within the German party
system (Niedermayer 2014, p. 88). An early ancestor of the AfD, almost dating back
to the time of the Maastricht Treaty, is to be seen in the BFB (Bund freier Bürger)
(Lewandowsky 2018, p. 161), a political party existing from 1994 to 2000 and itself
the ancestor of the Civic Movement for a Europe of Nations, which promoted the
adherence on national currencies in Europe and the abandoning of the Maastricht
Treaty agreements (Freudenberg 2009, pp. 19).
Right from the start, the AfD pursued a clearly anti-Euro policy. It based its
campaigns and narrative on the 2010 European debt crisis, decisions along the Eu-
ropean integration process, which were supposed to be responsible for the crisis,
and the management of this crisis itself. This went as far as the party choosing its
name following an expression of German chancellor Merkel, who recurrently justi-
fied political measures, such as financial assistance to Greece or bailouts of financial
institutions, as being without (sensible) alternative (Merkel 2010). However, already
from the start of the party, it has been the aim to construct a partnership of con-
venience. Alongside a critical economic and monetary branch within the early AfD,
Christian-conservative and national-conservative ideas have been present as well and
both have taken over as the major topics in everyday parliamentary work and as the
leading “narrative of legitimacy”32 (Lewandowsky 2018, pp. 161).
Members of this early AfD, in regard to their political party history, came pre-
dominantly from three different directions: Formerly party-less people, dissatisfied
CDU/CSU and FDP members and even former members of right-wing populist par-
32See footnote No. 14.
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ties (Lewandowsky 2018, p. 162). In contradiction to The Greens or the Pirates
Party as examples of other notable party foundations of the more recent history, the
AfD united under its roof a lot of former party members with longtime experience
in party politics and a great amount of (academic) knowledge.33 Relying on these
resources, the AfD was able to establish state level branches and organizational
power to cope with the enormous interest in membership. This however, is only one
aspect to explain the steep rise in membership figures the AfD experienced since its
foundation. Besides politically experienced personnel, the party could also benefit
from media know-how of founding members Adam and Gauland as well as from the
telegenic front-runner of the beginning Lucke (Niedermayer 2014, pp. 89). With this
set of features and resources, the AfD attracted more than 17,000 members until
the end 2013, the first year of its existence.
Since then, the party has been continuously in conflict with itself, searching for
its own identity and its position within the German party system. The main conflict
line lies between ordo-liberals like the founding party leader Lucke and national-
conservatives (some say right-wing populists or even extreme-rights) (Lewandowsky
2018, p. 162, inserts in parentheses not from original). As Lucke saw himself forced to
leave the party in 2015, a first decrease in membership occurred, since a whole wing
of sympathizers withdrew from the party (Niedermayer 2017, p. 370). Moreover, the
defeat in the race for party leadership against Frauke Petry brought the preliminary
decision for the ongoing dispute between ordo-liberals and national-conservatives in
favor of the later (Lewandowsky 2018, p. 163).34
It is questionable, whether the party would still generate this much interest, both
in terms of voting results as well as membership figures, if not for the 2015 so called
European migrant crisis. This event and its management by the German government
as well as by the European Union played into the hands of the AfD. They were now
able to back up their anti-migration and anti-Islam narrative with demonstrative
footage of thousands of people approaching the European or German borders and
with the impression of a helpless state apparatus. While still under the constant
impression of internal controversies and the growing power of a far-right-national
33So much that the party had been dubbed “professors’ party” (Gamperl 2013) by a leading German
newspaper.




wing under Björn Höcke, the party managed to steadily increase its membership up
to around 33,000 members by the end of 2018.
Whether this evolution of party membership ultimately needs to be called a crisis
is in the eye of the beholder. On the one hand, both the absolute number of party
members as well as the M/E-ratio have decreased considerably since the late 1980s.
Total party membership only experienced a slight upswing due to German reunifi-
cation in 1990 and the corresponding accumulation of former GDR party members.
Despite the fact that this increase in total membership had merely been a historical
artifact, it never was reflected in the M/E-ratio.
On the other hand, just as Kölln (2016) mentions, those aggregate figures hide
important details that might tell a different story of German party membership.
First of all, it has to be considered that the M/E-ratio in Germany never exceeded
4.6% and thus has never been on the high side, as the comparison to other countries
illustrates (Scarrow 2015, p. 71). Moreover, the success of the Pirates, the AfD
and especially the sustainable growth of The Greens’ membership shows interest
in smaller parties aside from the 1960s catch-all parties. In fact, parties outside of
the two major political camps of conservatives and social-democrats were able to
increase their specific small-party-M/E-ratio slowly but steadily. As figure 2.3 on
page 30 reveals, recent small parties develop against the aggregate trend, which is
highly biased by the massive membership losses of the CDU/CSU35 and the SPD.
Lastly, it has to be taken into account, what kind of people parties are failing to
incorporate and what aspects of party membership are considered. A lot of party
members need to be regarded as inactive members, who do not do anything for the
party, despite being registered and paying their dues (Spier 2011, p. 111). If it was
only inactive members the parties are loosing, a crisis of active party life needed to
be denied. Yet, if the parties’ financial situation or their societal support were to be
addressed, even inactive members were a valuable resource. The evaluation of the
question regarding a party membership crisis, could then be answered differently.
Overall, it seems more appropriate to generally speak of a membership trend or
development without overly simplifying membership figures based on the aggregate
M/E-ratio decrease and leave the crisis-argument to very sharply defined analyses,
which give deeper insight into the consequences.
35Since both parties do not compete in any election and form a joint parliamentary faction since
the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany, they are joined here as well.
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3 The Multi-Speed Membership Model
Unsurprisingly, political parties also noticed developments, both with regardto membership losses (if applicable) and with regard to changes in political
communication, campaigning and participation due to increased digital possibili-
ties. Hence, Scarrow considers parties to react to these ongoing changes with the
transformation of means of participation supplied to interested individuals. In the
following chapter, Scarrow’s theoretical approach of multi-speed membership parties
and its historic background will be explained. Furthermore, Scarrow’s own empiri-
cal observations with regard to the parties’ multi-speed offerings will be reviewed as
well.
3.1 Historical Background - Duverger’s Bull’s-Eye Model.
The basis of Scarrow’s work is a model of party membership, which has beenoriginally published by Maurice Duverger in 1954 (Duverger 1959, pp. 79).
Duverger already had a very diverse understanding of party membership. As he de-
scribes with respect to different parties in different electoral systems, the question
of individual party membership will be answered very differently, based on the re-
spective party itself and its distinct understanding of membership. Moreover, each
party features multiple types of members, Duverger adds, referring to individual and
collective membership with the British Labour Party. Duverger starts his analysis
from a model that describes the relationship between individuals and parties by
means of three or four concentric circles, each of which represents a specific form
of party ties. The innermost circle comprises the party activists. Party members (if
the respective party knows the concept of formal membership), sympathizers, and
finally voters follow further outward (see figure 3.1 on page 40).
A rapprochement to the concept of party membership takes place against the
background of a dichotomous party landscape of mass as well as framework parties.
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These party types do not necessarily differ in terms of the number of members. De-
cisive for a classification is rather the parties’ own structure and thus the respective
understanding of membership.
Employing the example of the French Socialist Party, efforts of the mass parties
are directed towards political education of the working class, the recruitment of a
political elite and ultimately towards the formation of a government. In addition,
the financing principle of the mass party is geared to the collection of membership
dues. Consequently, Duverger states that the members are the real matter of the
party, they are the substance of its activity. Members of the mass party are both
politically and financially the core of the party itself. Moreover, mass parties are
democratic by their very nature, since those parties do not appeal to distinct local
notables, but to the mass of ordinary people (Duverger 1959, p. 81).
In contrast, the logic of the framework party is not based on the quantity of formal
membership, but on the quality of its social position and thus on the functional
benefit of a few. The main objective of the framework party is to unite individuals
of public repute in order to prepare the elections and to maintain and influence the
relationship with the candidates. In addition, there are influential individuals who
ensure a certain number of votes, people who master the technique of election, as
well as those who ensure financing (Duverger 1959, p. 82).
Both party types do have members according to their self-image, but their mean-
ing and individual role differs fundamentally from one another. In the latter case,
membership is a highly selective matter, tied to certain individual resources from
which the framework party benefits directly. Consequently, membership of this spe-
cial kind is only possible for a very limited part of a state’s population. A mass
party, on the other hand, addresses the large audience (Duverger 1959, p. 82) and
achieves its social significance not through the individual, but through the collec-
tive. If membership is understood as an obligation of the individual towards a party
and rests upon regular membership fees, framework parties do not have members
at all, Duverger argues. At the same time, however, it is noted that there are very
few pure framework parties. Rather it is the case that framework parties open up
to ordinary members and thus imitate the mass party. This is the main reason why
it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between these two party types. Even
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hybrids, such as American parties with closed primaries, can be observed (Duverger
1959, pp. 83).
According to Duverger framework and mass parties almost exactly resemble the
distinction between right and left wing parties. This assumption is based on the idea
that due to early limited census suffrage, early civic/conservative parties have never
been dependent on the integration of a lot of individuals, neither politically nor fi-
nancially. Yet, with the spread of a more general suffrage, by the beginning of World
War I, most European electoral systems had developed some kind of socialist party.
Emerging from Marxist ideological roots, the term of class played an important role.
In order to represent a whole class of people, it is necessary for the representing orga-
nization to absorb this class as far as possible. Simultaneously, this mass integration
into the party enabled the working class to separate from civic/conservative parties’
guardianship (Duverger 1959, pp. 84).
Similarly, framework and mass parties mirror a distinction between parties accord-
ing to their organizational logic. Basically, framework parties are described as being
only loosely structured due to committees and decentralized organization. Mass par-
ties on the other hand rely on fixed regional branches and centralized party offices
to achieve a more tightly structured order (Duverger 1959, p. 88).
Yet, as easy as this division between framework and mass parties is, Duverger
argues that a third type has evolved over time. Based on the observation of ideolog-
ical cleansing and membership checks in European parties, he sees a development
of mass parties into elite parties, both with socialist as well as fascist parties. The
“party of devoted”, as Duverger (1959, p. 88) calls it, is more open than framework
parties, yet more closed than original mass parties. Consequently, even within a
party, different levels of membership can be observed, corresponding to the extent
of devotion as well as activity (Duverger 1959, pp. 88).
On the basis of this dualistic understanding of party organization, Duverger de-
scribes the relationship of different levels of individuals in the realm of parties using
concentric circles (figure 3.1 on the next page). As longs as a party is unaware of
formal registered membership, three concentric circles are sufficient to describe all
levels of devotion and activity. The outermost ring is occupied by the electors, who
vote for the specific party in question. This seems fairly straight forward and it ac-












Figure 3.1: Duverger’s bulls-eye model of party affiliation, (Duverger 1959, pp. 79)
voting statistics were not necessarily as reliable as today. While this is not a problem
of today, another challenge is described. If not parties are elected, but candidates
of a party, it is questionable, whether electors of a candidate can be assessed with
this concept. As Duverger himself admits, one could distinguish general and local
elections, so that the assignment of an individual to one specific party in at least
two elections may no longer be unambiguous (Duverger 1959, pp. 107). It can be
argued however that the classification as electors merely aims to determine the sta-
tus quo and does not presuppose long-term party affiliation. On the other hand,
even a status quo is hard to determine when it comes to an election in which voters
have more than one vote at their disposal. In this case, it is not unlikely that voters
split their votes and vote for one party and for the candidate of another party.36
Hence, what seems straight forward at first sight, becomes a lot more complex upon
further inspection, albeit only when the empirical assessment of different categories
is considered, which is of no concern for the theoretical value of this model.
Making the way further to the circles’ center, sympathizers are the next group of
affiliates. Sympathizers are harder to distinguish as Duverger himself admits. Just
as electors, sympathizers vote for a party. Here, a general principal of Duverger’s
concept of party affiliation becomes clear: All members of inner circles (activists,
36At the elections to the German Bundestag for example, each voter has two votes. Strictly speaking,
with the first vote it is not a party but a candidate that is elected with the majority of votes.
Nonetheless, a candidate has to be necessarily proposed by a political party (§ 34 I 2 Nr. 2
Bundeswahlordnung), so that a relationship between the voter and a party is given at least
indirectly.
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members (if applicable) and sympathizers) are inevitably also members of all circles
following further outward. While this seems logical at this point, it is one of the ma-
jor drawbacks that urged Scarrow to revise this concept and propose a modernized
version. In addition to voting for a party, sympathizers also confess to their party
and publicly admit their affiliation with the party. The general respect for the elec-
toral secret principle shows that there is a significant difference. Duverger describes
this difference on the basis of the propagandistic element, which is inherent in the
confession of sympathizers and on the basis of which a group formation can take
place. By contrast, this group formation with respect to voters is only aggregated
and possible for statistical purposes. A second level of sympathy is reached (yet
not distinguished within the model), when individuals’ sympathies are associated
with positive efforts towards the party, such as reading party newspapers, attending
events or making financial donations. As Duverger admits, reliably assessing the
group of sympathizers via statistics is only possible by means of survey (Duverger
1959, pp. 118).
Interestingly, the next group of the party hierarchy, the members, are examined
by Duverger with much less emphasis. While other levels of party affiliation are
described in much more detail, members, or more precisely membership figures,
only serve as a scale against which other affiliation modes are measured (Duverger
1959, p. 108). With regard to the members’ position and function within the party,
their position between activists and sympathizers is nearly all that is mentioned.
Although Duverger acknowledges a different meaning of membership in different
parties, this point is not elaborated on in detail (Duverger 1959, p. 111).
The bull’s-eye of party affiliation is formed by activists in both framework and
mass parties. Yet, although in both cases the same term is used, activists differ
between each of the party prototypes. With mass parties, activists are formed by
a unique kind of members. In contrast to ordinary members, activists are those
members, who really keep the party alive. They regularly attend party meetings,
advise to work out the party’s manifesto and help with electoral campaigns. Those
people actually execute physical work for the party and do not only pay their fees,
as simple members do (or at least should do). Yet, activists are not to be confused
with party leaders. The latter are leading the party and take decisions, while ac-
tivists are not leaders but executives and sustain the main activity in local or other
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low organizational units. Regarding the framework party, no distinction is made
between activists and members. Framework parties simply do not employ the con-
cept of low-level/activity membership. Rather, activists are equivalent to members,
since characteristic party committees of framework parties only consist of high-level
activists (Duverger 1959, p. 126).
3.2 The Multi-Speed Membership Model in Detail
Based on the early model of party membership by Duverger, which has beenexplained in section 3.1 on page 37, Scarrow designs a modern equivalent. The
model of “multi-speed membership parties” (Scarrow (2015, p. 3), see Scarrow (2015,
p. 33) for the graphical realization) is supposed to overcome specific shortcomings of
the Duverger-model and to be an appropriate and up to date approach to explain the
relationship between political parties and individuals. Given the time passed since
Duverger’s approach - as of the year 2019, it has been 65 years since the original
publication - a revision appears not to be a bad idea. However, Scarrow’s motivation
is not simply drawn from the time passed, but rather from distinct societal and
technological developments. Moreover, Scarrow undertakes quite some effort to build
her model of party membership on the basis of empirical observations. Section 3.2.1
will assess the key aspects of Duverger’s model, which are to be criticized from
today’s standpoint, while section 3.2.2 on page 46 will explain the model itself. The
next section (section 3.3 on page 53) will then present empirical information on the
parties’ supply with regard to the multi-speed model.
3.2.1 Scarrow’s Critics of the Bull’s-Eye Model
According to Scarrow’s review (2015, pp. 28), Duverger’s bull’s-eye model of party
membership falls short and key aspects of the model are not in line with today’s
reality of party affiliation. By closer inspection of Scarrow’s critics, three main points
stand out:
1. New modes of membership
First of all, Scarrow observes new types of relationships between parties and
individuals. Parties’ efforts to foster and formally organize relationships to
non-members besides actual political party life have already been taken into
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account by Duverger, though not included into the model. Yet, today’s ap-
proaches differ remarkably from those 65 years ago, as Scarrow argues.
With regard to the organizational prototype of the mass party, Duverger de-
scribes the idea of organizations, affiliated to the party. Those organizations
are used to somewhat unionize sympathizers by transforming an amorphous,
indiscriminate and invisible mass into a coherent collective. People, who, for
whatever reason, cannot or do not want to join a party, but nevertheless sym-
pathize with one, can then be perceived and addressed as one group of peo-
ple with distinct shared attributes. An attempt is made to disseminate party
principles in a milder fashion, through directly or indirectly party-dependent
organizations, thus enabling an expansion and deepening of the supporters’ re-
lationship. Expansion is based on satellite organizations, such as youth groups,
sports offerings, or women’s associations. Those satellites are not explicitly po-
litical and people do not have to be member of a party to participate. Yet,
a party can indirectly promote its message and even control the satellite’s
organization (Duverger 1959, p. 123).37
Scarrow argues, Duverger’s satellite associations were often only weakly tied to
the national party level and did not directly pursue political ends. Yet today’s
forms of extra-party party loyalty differed fundamentally. With modern means
of communication, parties found new and cheap ways to connect with potential
supporters, be it via e-mail newsletters, blogs or Facebook. Consequently, any-
one who wants to learn about the work of the party, events or the like, can sign
up for a variety of party message channels quickly, easily and free of charge.
This relationship however, is generally directly linked to the national party
level. It is decidedly political, be it partisan or issue related, and sympathizers
are immediately used as “digital ambassador” (Scarrow 2015, p. 28) and urged
to forward messages to their peers and networks. Additionally, some parties
created milder forms of formal membership that allowed sympathizers to get
to know the role of a party member with little or no commitment. All modes
of the multi-speed model will be explained under section 3.2.2 on page 46.
37Duverger describes the mechanisms used as being horizontal relationships between a party’s and




2. Variation and dynamics between modes
Secondly, Scarrow sees these new forms of party loyalty to be neither exclusive
nor congruent. This relation is true for both new modes of party affiliation
among each other and in relationship to traditional party members as well
as voters. With this “imperfect overlap” Scarrow (2015, p. 29) departs even
further from the Duverger-model of concentric circles. This model originally
presupposes that activists under all circumstances belong to the group of party
members, sympathizers and electors. Equally, party members are said to be
necessarily both sympathizers and voters of the same party. Lastly, those, who
can only be counted as sympathizers, are always electors of the same party as
well. There is simply no room for variation in terms of defining either activism,
membership or sympathy. Individual arrangements are not possible at all.
Of course, activists and other party affiliates do have the opportunity to ex-
ecute their own party live differently. Yet, this is only true with regard to
distinct actions that are assigned to their respective status. For example, with
the original Duverger model of party affiliation, sympathizers of a party can
interpret their status differently. As Duverger (Duverger 1959, p. 119) himself
admits, different levels of expressing ones sympathy are possible. On the one
hand, sympathizers could simply articulate a long standing or at least stable
affection towards a party, which is proven by means of voting for this specific
party. On the other hand, a new level, however a new level of the same status
(sympathizer), is reached, when activity can be observed aside from elections.
Yet, what is not possible with the original model, is to break out from the
fixed arrangement of concentric circles, which has been described above. It is
well imaginable that long standing sympathizers of one party do not vote for
this same party at an election. As long as this happens once, it is well worth
to still consider those people as sympathizers. Similarly, a sympathizer of one
specific party, who also voted for this party at the national election, might see
reasonable ground to vote for another party at the upcoming local elections.
This kind of long term versus short term discrepancy or a discrepancy of elec-
toral behavior on different legislative levels is not allowed for with Duverger’s
model of party affiliation.
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Another example shall underline the conceivableness of this idea: Considering
new ways of relations between parties and individuals as described above and
modern means of communication, a person can follow the development of a
party just as members can. Moreover, one can for example also advocate in fa-
vor of the party in social media discussion and this way actively engage within
a party’s campaign efforts. Although, people do not have to be traditionally
registered members of the party, this kind of activity would have to be consid-
ered as party activism. Yet engaging with a party like that is not provided by
the bull’s-eye model (figure 3.1 on page 40).
Hence, even if Duverger had been correct in this assumption, which Scarrow
2015, p. 29 doubts, strict coverage of different forms of party association is no
longer appropriate in times of multiple party ties and individualized lifestyles.
Indeed, many individuals who are or want to be active in a party choose to
become a formal member of that party as well; however the key is that this is
neither automatically nor necessarily the case and allows for individualization
of affiliation.
In addition to the criticism of this strict assignment of individuals to certain
affiliation modes, which allows for only four kinds of party affiliates with mass
parties (three kinds with framework parties), Scarrow mentions static assign-
ments as another aspect. “The movement between (...) these circles” (Scarrow
2015, p. 28) is not possible with Duverger’s model. Yet, in the following, this
point is somewhat intertwined with the aforementioned question of the affili-
ation modes’ overlap and not elaborated on in detail. However, this comes at
no surprise, since there is simply no starting-point for this idea. Although Du-
verger himself does not mention the aspect of individuals’ dynamics between
different modes of affiliation, there is no reason to see this aspect as incom-
patible with Duverger’s model. Moreover, dynamics are inherent to the model,
since generally, individuals are sympathizers of a party previous to becoming
a member. Even in the original model’s derivation and discussion, an indica-
tion is hidden, which implicitly accepts dynamics between different affiliation
levels: Membership with the framework party, which is equivalent to being an
activist, is described as being the consequence of selection from a very distinct
circle (Duverger 1959, p. 82). No matter which circle is meant, to be selected
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for some kind of party affiliation is logically impossible if an individual had
been part of the same affiliation mode previously. Therefore, a minimum of
dynamics between circles is necessary.
the problem with dynamics is rather a methodical challenge than it is a the-
oretical. To reliably carve out dynamics between different affiliation modes,
longitudinal data would be necessary, which tracks the development of single
individuals over time. Yet, this kind of data had not been available to Duverger,
nor is it available today with regard to the multi-speed model.
3. Relative size of individual modes
Ultimately, Scarrow finds the size of the original model’s concentric circles, and
thus the relative number of associated persons, to be faulty. In more detail,
affiliation types are ordered from the center to the outermost ring according
to their corresponding degree of commitment. According to Scarrow (2015, p.
29) today’s new forms of party ties are still in development and therefore still
attract comparatively few people. It is not necessarily the case today that the
group of sympathizers is larger in number than the group of party members
or activists.
However, while the degree of commitment is at least problematic, if not im-
possible to measure, it is also a very personal question. Depending on vari-
ous explicit or implicit circumstances in life, taking part in either affiliation
mode can mean very different things with regard to the necessary level of
commitment. A simple example enhances this limitation of Scarrow’s critique:
Considering that a not so small share of traditional party members does not
engage at all with the party or fellow members, it is by no means necessarily
the case that party members are more committed than sympathizers. And if
those party members additionally live in an environment, where membership
with a specific party is well regarded, individual commitment is nothing more
than regularly paying the dues.
3.2.2 Individual Modes of the Multi-Speed Model
Emerging from the bull’s-eye model by Duverger, Scarrow (2015, pp. 128) draws a
modern equivalent, which is said to overcome the explained aspects of inadequacy
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Figure 3.2: Scarrow’s multi-speed membership parties model (Scarrow 2015, p. 33)
with today’s means and possibilities of party organization and communication: The
multi-speed membership model (figure 3.2). According to Scarrow, parties in par-
liamentary democracies of today offer a total of at least six additional possibilities
to establish or foster links between the party and individuals, with very few parties
offering or promoting all variants equally. This subsection aims at explaining each
of the eight multi-speed modes that theoretically parties are said to offer to individ-
uals according to the multi-speed model.38 Empirical evidence, which is presented
by Scarrow (2015, p. 145), will be addressed by section 3.3 on page 53 afterwards.
1. Traditional members
First of all, of course, parties offer the familiar form of traditional member-
ship, which, starting from the mass parties of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, has become the central model of party organization in
many democracies. Compared to all the following affiliation variants, tradi-
38Scarrow does not address all of the modes explicitly with the model’s description. Yet, since the
graphical approach consists of eight distinct affiliation modes, it seems valuable to present all
different modes coherently in one part of this study.
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tional party membership is the one that goes along with the most comprehen-
sive rights as well as most duties.
2. Light-members
Light-membership can be understood as sort of a “second class” (Scarrow 2015,
p. 30) party membership, although parties themselves would probably never
use this term. Yet, variations of light-membership are meant to offer a milder
form of party membership and as such, are in many ways subordinated below
traditional membership. The idea behind this is to offer a way to experience
party membership and/or party life for interested people, without taking the
plunge and becoming a full member.
Light-membership schemes can be designed rather differently though. Accord-
ingly, the parties’ own terms range from supporters to promoters to guests or
test members. Most schemes are time restricted with durations of generally one
year, though longer and shorter periods apply as well and even unlimited guest
membership exists. Sometimes re-issuing is applicable for an additional time
frame. Rights of light-members as well as obligations are normally reduced in
comparison to traditional members. With respect to individual parties, direct
obligations range from reduced membership fees to no obligations at all. On
the other hand, it is also designed differently, which rights of a traditional
member are reduced for light-members or even abandoned completely. Mostly,
light-members are allowed to participate in member assemblies and are also
entitled to speak and to table motions. The right to vote in is normally reduced
to working groups or denied completely.
Common to all different schemes and corresponding designations is the idea
of making a low-threshold offer to potential members and gain new members.
From this point of view, light-membership could also be understood not as a
specific kind of party affiliation, but rather as a kind of membership campaign.
Light-membership schemes are not meant to establish permanent ties between
a party and individuals, but to recruit potential traditional members.
3. Cyber-members
Cyber-membership represents a virtual kind of traditional or light party mem-
bership. The idea is to establish a way of party membership as it would proba-
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bly be designed, if party membership was a 21st century development. Cyber-
membership schemes also can be laid out very differently. With regard to
rights and obligations, cyber-membership can mimic traditional membership
(almost) completely (Scarrow 2015, p. 138). In this case, cyber-membership
would simply be a form of traditional membership, without being assigned to
a specific local party branch. Yet, a variation where rights are decidedly lim-
ited to a cyber sphere are also possible, which would create a distinct on-line
membership basis besides a traditional off-line membership. Moreover, cyber-
membership can be thought of as some kind of facultative add-on to traditional
party membership, which simply allowed traditional party members to connect
off-line and engage in decentralized discussions and organization. In that sense,
cyber-membership would much more be an extension or modernization of an
existing membership variant and would not be meant to establish completely
new forms of party affiliation. A uniting characteristic though is the necessity
that cyber-members register with the website of a party or any other party-
owned on-line offering. With respect to individual parties, their specific target
group for cyber-membership, and the corresponding construction, additional
criteria might be necessary to meet besides self-registration, such as individual
approval of the party or proclamation of supporting the party’s basic principles
(Scarrow 2015, p. 30).
All these ways of affiliation between a party and an individual have in common
that they go beyond psychological attachment. Each individual needs to formally
register with the party, which makes an important difference. On the one hand,
individuals are in general expected to provide personal information. Even if this
additional information might only be the address, it can imply useful information
for the party. Moreover, a formal registration process much more offers possibilities
for parties to dismiss individuals for whatever reason. Consequently, parties can
better keep track of and control who it is that they maintain a relationship with
and additional communication channels might be accessible. On the other hand, a
formal registration process involves stronger commitment and can just be enough to
restrain people from getting in touch with a party.
In addition to those formal registration-based affiliation modes, the multi-speed
membership model employs five informal modes of party relationship, which all rely
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on self-registration and regulative interference options for a party are very limited,
if not utterly impossible:
4. Activists
At first sight, activism is not really a way of party affiliation, but rather what
different affiliates are expected to do for the party: To be an active mem-
ber/affiliate and thus supporting the party’s efforts to compete in elections and
to implement policies. However, party activism in the sense it is used with the
multi-speed model does not include every kind of action related to the party.
Rather it is voluntary physical off-line work which shall be addressed with this
mode. Hence, neither holding a parliamentary seat nor paying dues nor for-
warding a Facebook post can be considered party activism. These actions are
either not considered as party affiliation at all (parliamentary mandate), or
they are addressed by other affiliation modes (paying dues and Facebook ac-
tions). On the other hand, classic examples of party activism are campaigning
in the streets, canvassing or engaging in party work groups on specific policies.
Moreover, another reason to value activism as an independent mode of party
affiliation is the possibility that individuals do not maintain any other relation-
ship to a party except for activity in the aforementioned sense. Those people
would be withdrawn from the model, if activism was considered a mere sub
group of any other mode.
5. Financial sustainers
Financial sustainers support a party through financial contributions. Exact
modalities of the grants do not matter at this point. However, taking into
account the objective of the multi-speed model, donations from small or large
corporate institutions are discarded at this point. Only contributions by private
individuals give information about individual party affiliation. Additionally,
any financial contribution based on a legal agreement is also not considered
as financial sustaining, since it is not legal obligations that are meant to be
addressed but psychological attachment, expressed financially. Accordingly, all
membership dues and the pass-on of office holding allowances39 do not count as
39Elected officials on the community level are commonly expected to provide their efforts for mu-
nicipal councils on a honorary basis.
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financial sustaining either. Aside from these restrictions, further details of the
financial relationship are not of any interest. Significant and regular financial
gifts, as well as only small amounts granted irregularly, are considered as well
as any other combination of amount and time frame (Scarrow 2015, p. 31).
6. Social media followers
Social media followers and friends (Scarrow 2015, p. 31) are to be seen pre-
dominantly in contrast to cyber-members. While cyber-members are defined by
their use of party-owned internet-based tools, such as an on-line-registration
form, chat-rooms and polls, social media followers and friends utilize third-
party products. Extensively employed examples include Facebook, Twitter or
Instagram. Although these networks are party-led with regard to content, reg-
istration to a party’s or a politician’s account is possible unilaterally by the
affiliate. Once registered, individuals receive automatic updates from the ac-
count owner. Yet, as part of web 2.0, social media are designed not merely as
one-sided communication channels, but as a place of interaction between those,
who run an account and subscribers as well as among subscribers. Hence, a
real-time and two-way communication between individuals and a party is pos-
sible. As a result, a substantive discussions can take place here as well. Further-
more, social media followers can contribute to the dissemination of the party
and the spread of its party message via specific communication tools, such as
hitting the like-button on Facebook or re-tweeting a massage on Twitter. Both
may draw additional attention towards the original party content, even from
non-subscribers.
7. News audience
Unlike the previous category of social media followers, the group of news audi-
ence is not defined by the possibility of a two-way communication, but rather
on the basis of one-sided consumption of party information. Party information
has ever since been distributed via party newspaper, which can be bought
and subscribed to by any individual, regardless of their membership status.
Additionally, with newsletters, news feeds and press releases via e-mail, party
newspapers are expanded with immediate short-term information. Even those,
who regularly and intentionally follow the news about a specific party via TV
or Radio count as part of the wider news audience (Scarrow 2015, pp. 31). With
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respect to the specific way of an individual’s information gathering, a party
can accumulate contact information of interested people and might further
address them as potential candidates for more intense party affiliation.
Since in all modes of informal party affiliation, parties themselves are not involved
in a registration process, these modes cannot be controlled by parties. Accordingly,
informal party affiliation is not exclusive. People can maintain relationships to more
than one and even potentially opposing parties, which is regularly impossible with
regard to any form of officially registered membership. Moreover, all new affiliation
modes (this includes, light-membership, cyber-membership, financial sustaining, so-
cial media following and news auditioning) share three distinct features to reduce the
overall costs of joining a party’s cosmos; they are: centralized, digital and accessible.
Centralized in this respect means that the relationship ties directly to the central
party/national branch office itself. Lower organizational levels, such as state or local
level branches are not involved, even if they are primarily responsible for traditional
party membership (Scarrow 2015, p. 136). Additionally, all or most of the afore-
mentioned affiliation modes are said to be digital. Yet, the term digital is much too
broad to capture the distinctiveness. New affiliation modes as described by Scarrow
rather rely on the use of internet-based applications such as the World Wide Web,
E-Mail, or file sharing. Internet-based party affiliation can be quite expensive and
time-consuming to maintain. Yet, an almost infinite number of individuals can be
reached by one and the same offering, which inhibits enormous economies of scale
(Scarrow 2015, p. 137). Another important aspect is that theoretically both, par-
ties as well as individuals, have equal access to this infrastructure (net neutrality),
which allows for a whole new level of affiliation and communication. Finally, most
new affiliation modes are readily accessible and come at no costs at all. This is partly
a result of the extensive use of digital applications, which mostly employ financing
schemes that rely on advertisements, and thus the user pays with his attention to
product placements and even additional information about browsing history etc.
Only light- and cyber-membership give parties a possibility to keep control of their
digital relationships. Accordingly, individuals might be asked to supply additional
information and/or pay dues.
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3.3 Empirical Evidence on Parties’ Efforts to Multi-Speed
Membership Implementation
Based on the multi-speed membership model and its different modes of partyaffiliation, Scarrow reviews parties’ empirical efforts to ask for non-traditional
party affiliation by members as well as by non-members. Simultaneously, the model
itself takes inspiration by just this, the “augmenting traditional membership struc-
tures by creating new ways for supporters to affiliate” (Scarrow 2015, p. 135). Hence,
Scarrow (2015) remains unclear, whether her review is based on a theoretical model
or the model itself is based on an empirical review of the parties’ efforts.
The following section presents Scarrow’s own empirical assessment of the multi-
speed membership model. Although Part I of this study is named History & Theory,
the review of the supply side of new affiliation models seems to fit best at this
stage. The parties’ inventory is essential for the upcoming research about individuals’
demand, since it is only what is offered that can actually be used by potential
affiliates. Moreover, the parties’ supply of multi-speed modes means presentation
of other scholars’ empirical work, while the upcoming Part II (Data & Empirical
Work) is entirely dedicated to original empirical work.
All information presented here is based on a 2011 party web page survey that
covered 109 party web pages from 19 countries40. At first, Scarrow’s results regarding
individual modes are given, while model specific indexes are introduced afterwards.
From a market perspective, these results represent the supply side of alternative
party affiliation by the parties themselves, while individuals’ demand is subject to
this study’s empirical Part II.
3.3.1 Individual Modes
Light-membership
According to the 2011 party web page survey, only 13% of the parties offer a light-
membership option. While in 3.7% of the cases, this was a time limited option to
40Information was collected between February and May 2011. Countries include Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
53
Chapter 3
recruit traditional members, 8.3% of the parties employed a long-term scheme based
on reduced rights and obligations (Scarrow 2015, p. 138).
Cyber-membership
Unfortunately and without any apparent reason, no empiric information is given
about the implementation of cyber-membership options. The only information re-
garding the mentioned 2011 survey is that cyber-membership “may parallel the
rights and duties of traditional membership” (Scarrow 2015, p. 138), while in other
cases this options is organized much more loosely.
Alternatively, Scarrow reviews two parties qualitatively with regard to their in-
troduction of cyber-membership as the main principal of party affiliation, the Ger-
man Pirates Party a well as the Italian Five Star Movement. However, both of
these parties have not been part of the 2011 web page survey, since they have not
been part of their national level legislative body at that time. Hence, this review
only serves the purpose of demonstrating, what can ultimately be done regarding
cyber-membership. Yet, it brings no value for the overarching goal of quantitatively
assessing the parties’ approach to multi-speed membership in general.
Financial sustainers
Although two thirds of the sample’s parties promoted options for a donation and thus
to become financial sustainer, only 7% support donations via text message. The lat-
ter is greatly preferred by Scarrow (2015, p. 140) due to the spontaneous momentum
that can be expressed by low threshold options like test messaging. Furthermore,
every text message donation also provides contact information of the donor, which
allows parties to “easily follow up with these self-identified supporters” (Scarrow
2015, p. 140). An equal share of parties asked for donations, yet only supported tra-
ditional means of setting up “standing order on bank accounts” (Scarrow 2015, p.
140) or even asking to be contacted for detailed instructions. However, the vast ma-
jority of parties within the sample (58%) supported some kind of medium threshold
internet donation options such as credit card or tertiary payment processors (e.g.
PayPal).
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Social media followers
According to Scarrow (2015, p. 141)41 in 2011 83% of the parties had placed links to
either the party’s or the party leader’s Facebook page on their website (figure 3.3 on
the following page). This makes Facebook the most advertised tool of all social media
assessed by the survey. Twitter ranks second with 76% of the parties offering links to
their twitter accounts, followed by blogs (54%). Delicious, a social bookmarking tool
that allows multiple users to maintain shared internet bookmarks, was also part of
the web page survey in 2011. However, results are not reported, which might indicate
that it does not play a significant role in social media strategies. Additionally, it is
not clear, why blogs are reviewed under the topic Social Media Followers. Although
it might be possible to comment blog entries, a blog itself is not meant to serve two
way communication.
While party Facebook pages seam to be a regular and prominent tool for parties
to use, these pages have not been very popular, at least not by 2011. With the review
of numbers of Facebook likers, Scarrow (2015) goes beyond the demand side of the
multi-speed model and rudimentarily assesses one aspect of the individuals’ supply
side. According to this review, only 64% of the parties had Facebook pages that
were “readily identifiable” (Scarrow 2015, p. 141) as such, while only one of these
(1.4%) listed more than 100,000 members. On the contrary, 90% of the parties’
Facebook pages listed less than 10,000 members. In fact, Scarrow identifies only a
weak relationship between party membership numbers and numbers of Facebook
likers, even if the latter was standardized in terms of a country’s overall Facebook
users.
3.3.2 Cumulative Impact Indexes
As a country aggregate assessment of the multi-speed model, a multi-speed index is
presented (Figure 3.4 (a) on page 59). The corresponding scoring scheme is accessi-
ble via table A.6 on page 296. Essentially, this index ranks countries along a 10 point
scale based on the threshold that a country’s parties on average set for individuals
to become an affiliate of specific multi-speed modes. Scarrow (2015, p. 146) calls this
“...the diversity and flexibility of party efforts...” High numbers indicate low thresh-
olds and vice versa. For example, financial sustaining is rated according to whether
41While Scarrow (2015, p. 141) refers to her own Figure 5.3, Figure 6.5 is the correct one.
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% of parties advertising option on their website
Figure 3.3: Parties’ advertisement of on-line tools, in % (Scarrow 2015, p. 144)
parties simply ask for a donation; accept on-line donation, PayPal or credit card;
or even accept donations via text message. Likewise, Scarrow estimates the value
of parties’ traditional membership on the basis of member only pages, new member
discounts and youth discounts. Hence, the multi-speed index extents the multi-speed
membership model beyond it’s original meaning in the sense that not only the ex-
istence of different modes is reviewed, but also the on- and off-line accessibility or
even attractiveness in terms of costs and benefits. However, it is not obvious, which
theoretical approach this review follows and how specific options come into play,
while others do not. Discounts or other characteristics, for example, do not play
a role for light-membership as they do for traditional membership. It also is not
clear, why member only pages, a distinctively on-line tool, are not understood as
part of a cyber-membership but rather as part of traditional membership, which is
said to be fulfilled entirely off-line. In addition to these conceptual particularities,
the country average multi-speed score only incorporates five of the eight original
model’s modes. According to Scarrow, this is because “party web pages offer [only]
sufficient information to compare (...) five types of affiliation categories” (2015, p.
146). Moreover, results for the Netherlands are reported twice, though with different
scores. Very likely one of these survey results is meant to represent New Zealand. It
is not possible however to reconstruct the correct assignments.
The revision of all surveyed countries’ multi-speed scores reveals that it is es-
pecially the UK’s parties, who promote multiple party affiliation modes employing
various possibilities or low level access to at least five of the multi-speed modes. On
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the other end of the scale, Portuguese and Greece parties are more reluctant to the
implementation of alternatives to traditional party membership or set high thresh-
olds to enter different affiliation modes (3.2 or 3.5 points respectively). The rest of
the 19 countries (or 17 countries if the Netherlands and New Zealand are excluded
from this review, due to the ambiguous assignment) range within one point above
or below the sample’s overall average of 5.3 multi-speed points.
In addition to the multi-speed index, an on-line affiliation index is presented as
well (figure 3.4 (b) on page 59), which employs the same country order as the multi-
speed index. According to Scarrow (2015, p. 148) this index serves to “...assess the
extent of party developments...” It does so by evaluating “three types of supporter
activities” (Scarrow 2015, p. 148): Joining, donating and volunteering. For the on-
line accessibility scoring scheme see table A.7 on page 297.
While it can be questioned, whether joining itself deserves to be understood as
party activity at all, it is also not clear, why different types of membership are not dif-
ferentiated at this point. Only to sign up on-line does not make traditional member-
ship itself an on-line activity. The same is true for volunteering. The digital/internet-
based characteristic of new affiliation modes is not described with regard to where
an opportunity is promoted, but where a mode is actually carried out. Therefore it
makes no sense to score parties one on-line accessibility point, if their website men-
tions off-line action opportunities. Moreover, cyber-membership, which necessarily is
an on-line activity/membership is not mentioned at all with the on-line accessibility
index.
Unfortunately, the on-line accessibility index uses a nine-point scale, while the
multi-speed index uses a 10-point scale, which limits easy comparability of both
scores for one country and the country order among both scores. Yet, it is not
entirely clear, what each of these indexes actually measures and what the benefit of
their coexistence is. That is why comparability might not be a major concern.
Regardless of the conceptual weaknesses of both scores, it is obvious that the UK
excels with the on-line accessibility, too. Simultaneously, the lower part of the multi-
speed index also scores relatively low with the on-line accessibility index (Portugal,
Greece, Belgium, Italy, and Finland). However, it is not a minor group of countries,
who perform differently in both of these scores. Especially Canada, The Netherlands,
and Ireland are found higher in the list of the on-line accessibility index as compared
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to the multi-speed index. For Austria, Spain, and Switzerland the situation is the
opposite.
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(b) On-line accessibility index
Figure 3.4: Multi-speed and on-line accessibility index, country average
With the multi-speed-index, the Netherlands is reported twice, one of which is supposed to
represent New Zealand. Unfortunately it is not possible to reconstruct the correct country
assignment.
Multi-speed index: 10-point scale, data: Multi-Speed Score (Scarrow 2015, p. 147, Table
6.2).
On-line accessibility index: 9-point scale, data: Combined Accessibility Score (Scarrow
2015, p. 149, Table 6.4).
Scoring schemes see tables A.6 to A.7 on pages 296–297.
Country abbreviations see List of Abbreviations on page XVII.
59

4 Models on Preconditions and Motivations
The aim of this study is, not only to describe party related affiliation structures,but to understand, which forces are responsible for these specific structures. It
is not only the question whether and how people might opt for certain ways of party
affiliation, but also why people are choosing that special way of participation in the
sphere of political parties. With this question in mind, the much more complicated
area of understanding political participation is entered, compared to only describing
it. However, political participation can mean a lot of different things. There is not
only the field of party membership, but also questions on party activism or voting
to name only the prominent examples. Moreover, political participation does not
necessarily have to deal with parties at all. There is a myriad of actions that can be
understood as political participation following one or another theoretical approach.42
Although there is an array of approaches, we will concentrate on three very specific
approaches that have been used to explain party membership and party activity, but
also various other forms of political participation and have stood the test of time.
This is simply motivated by theoretical assumptions of party affiliation. Multi-speed
party membership is an approach, deriving from the discussion of decreasing party
membership all across Europe, basically from the 1960s onwards. According to this
utopia, theoretically, different modes of party affiliation executed by individuals
replace as well as complement traditional party members in serving for parties as
well as for societal concerns (for a detailed description of the multi-speed membership
model see chapter 3 on page 37). Hence, preconditions and motivations that have
been tested for traditional party membership are a logical first step to understand
other kinds of party affiliation, especially if those affiliations are meant to be the basis
of a redefinition of the membership term. At a later stage of this study, individuals
will be divided into clusters in order to extract distinct types of party affiliation




based on the multi-speed membership model. In determining, whether affiliates of
clusters differ to other groups, underlying determinations can be uncovered that are
responsible for cluster structures. From this point onwards, a model is constructed,
specifically to represent non-membership party affiliation according to the cluster
structure.
4.1 The General Incentives Model
Scholars have proposed different models to understand the processes of polit-ical participation in its varying forms, which derive from concurring assump-
tions about the nature of human attitudes and actions. Following Mancur Olson’s
description of the “Logic of Collective Action” (Olson 1965) and his selective incen-
tives based solution, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) have developed the general incentives
model.
Originally coming from economics, Olson understands collective action based on
rational choice theory. Rational choice theory again relies on the concept of method-
ological individualism. In order to understand general incentives theory and what
it has to do with non-membership based party affiliation, Olson himself has to be
understood first.
Methodological individualism derives from the assumption that macro-level phe-
nomenons have their roots in micro-level behavior and attitudes of individuals.
Hence, the individual stakeholder is the core link for the investigation of societal
matters. Rational choice theory further assumes that the micro level is occupied
by rationally acting individuals (Rohrbach 2013, p. 36). Rationally should not be
misunderstood as sensible or comprehensible. Rational action in this sense means
that individuals choose their actions based on costs and benefits that go along with
specific options. Although scholars do not agree completely on assumptions that are
necessary for individual rational actions, they at least agree on three basic assump-
tions, which are, one way or the other, described as key assumptions and make up
the uncontested core of rational choice theory with regard to content (Bamberg,
Davidov, & Schmidt 2008, p. 143):
1. At first, individuals’ actions are lead by individuals’ preferences and actions
are eligible to achieve individual preferences/goals.
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2. Secondly, individuals take into account all restrictions that determine whether
they can achieve their goal by undertaking specific actions.
3. Individuals act in a way, that satisfies their preferences the most, i.e. they act
according to maximizing their individual benefit.
However, that is about all scholars can agree on. In a very narrow understanding
of rational choice theory, preferences as well as constraints are specified in a cer-
tain way, to make them applicable in research designs. Ambassadors of this narrow
sense of rational choice assumptions only accept egoistic preferences, which means
any kind of altruistic behavior does not exist. Correspondingly, only hard constraints
such as measurable rewards or penalties are relevant for individuals’ decision making.
Similarly, individually perceived constraints are not of any interest. Moreover, the
narrow understanding assumes that individuals have access to complete information,
i.e. they do not face any kind of uncertainty or information costs. In another way, a
narrow variant departs somewhat from the aforementioned general assumptions in
that it assumes that restrictions are sufficient to explain individuals decisions. This
derives from the assumption that only restrictions divide individuals, whereas pref-
erences are expected to be stable for different individuals and over time (Bamberg
et al. 2008, p. 144).
In contrast to this restrictive idea of rational choice decision making, a wider
understanding aims to depart somewhat from this neoclassical homo oeconomicus
and be more realistic in its assumptions about human functionality and behavior. Of
course one can argue, this makes a wider rational choice idea rather more complex
than only more realistic. However, more modern specimen of rational choice scholars
emphasize that maximizing one’s benefit does not necessarily have to mean to aim
for selfish ends. Hence, altruistic preferences are accepted as well, as long as they
contribute to an individual’s well-being and thus to its benefit. Consequently, soft
restriction such as remorse or social punishment add to the equation, too (Bamberg
et al. 2008, p. 145).
With regard to information, two aspects are important for this wider understand-
ing. On the one hand, individuals do not need to have access to full information,
i.e. they may face situations of deficient information available to take decisions. On
the other hand, individuals may be simply overwhelmed by the amount of informa-
tion and see themselves bound by cognitive capacities of information processing as
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described by Simon (1959). This later became known as “bounded rationality” in
contrast to “substantive or objective rationality” (Simon 1985).
Lastly, this variant does not assume congruence between preferences of different
individuals or even for one person, rather preferences are expected to change over
time. This is why, in opposition to the narrow understanding, preferences are a
feasible and necessary aspect to explain behavior (Bamberg et al. 2008, p. 145).
Starting from here, Olson (1965) describes in The Logic of Collective Action how
rational choice theory fails to explain what is called the participation paradox. While
Olson uses the example of trade unions, the principle is applicable to political parties
as well. The reason for this is that both institutions supply collective goods. The
paradox now is, that assessing human behavior with rational choice theory, both
trade unions and political parties should not exist, yet no organizations at all should
exist. For Olson, the very reason of organizations, in the sense of multiple people
working together, is to achieve collective ends that satisfy certain needs of the or-
ganization’s members. These ends are public goods, since they add to the benefit
of multiple individuals.43 Unfortunately, public goods show two distinct characteris-
tics, which make them somewhat special. They are nonexcludable in allocation and
non-rivalrous in consumption.
At first, public goods cannot be supplied to a specific group of individuals but
can be used by everyone within a specific organization or even from third parties.
Secondly, the possibility of consumption is not affected by consumption of others,
meaning public goods do not get scarce due to consumption. A common example
are traffic lights. The group of users of traffic lights cannot be limited since they
are operated in public space and everyone who approaches crossroads is free to
use them.44 Additionally, the use of a traffic light by an individual does not affect
its operation and following individuals can gain benefits from the traffic light, no
matter how many individuals approached this very traffic light before. In essence,
individuals are not rivals when it comes to public goods.
However, these special characteristics of public goods impose a challenge called the
free-rider problem. Free-riders are those, who derive advantage from public goods,
43Public in this sense does not necessarily mean public to a whole society but is rather understood
as meaning public to members of the organization. These can be a state’s society as a whole,
but also only a hand full of employees in a corporation.
44Actually, individuals are not only free to use traffic lights but rather forced to use them by law.
However this is not of further interest here.
64
Theoretical Models on Preconditions and Motivations
while not contributing to its supply, i.e. to financing its provision. That is why traffic
lights are generally paid for via taxes or any other kind of duties. The same princi-
ples are applicable to goods supplied by trade unions or political parties as Olson
shows. He argues that political policies are equally public goods, as in case of elec-
toral success of a party, policies are applicable for everyone within a state’s borders
and policies equally are non-rivalrous in consumption. However, arguing with strict
assumptions of rational choice theory, both trade unions as well as political parties
should not exist at all and even more drastic, no one should attend elections at all,
too. This is due to a simple equation of costs and benefits as the homo oeconomi-
cus would do. It is simply not rational for an individual to contribute to the costs
of public policies via voting or political party membership, when potential benefits
inure to the benefit of everyone. Hence, nation states as well as other organizations
such as trade unions and political parties have to rely on sanctions and/or benefits
in order to nudge people of an organizational entity to participate and to ultimately
supply public goods. Olson argues that organizations offer selective incentives to
mobilize a latent group of people to build a working lobby. This is because selective
incentives are private goods, which are only available to those, who actually become
a member of the organization or provide any kind of support.
Although it is in general Olson (1965) where the roots of the general incentives
model are described, the idea that some kind of benefits is necessary to maintain
individual contribution to an organization, had not been knew. Olson himself refers
to Barnard (1960, originally from 1938), who assesses the individual as part of any
“coöperative [sic] system” (Barnard 1960, p. 66) including political parties. Barnard
(1960, p. 142) already distinguished between incentives “that are specifically of-
fered to an individual” and incentives that are “general, not personal, that cannot
be specifically offered.” While individual incentives are called inducements45, the
latter are termed general incentives46. Within both categories of incentives (induce-
ments and general incentives) however, Barnard (1960) describes various subgroups
to illustrate the enormous variety incentives occur in. Subgroups of inducements in-
clude obvious material inducements such as “money, things, or physical conditions”
45Barnard (1960, p. 142) exemplifies “(a) material inducements; (b) personal non-material oppor-
tunities; (c) desirable physical conditions; (d) ideal benefactions”.
46Barnard (1960, p. 142) exemplifies “(e) associational attractiveness; (f) adaption of conditions to




(Barnard 1960, p. 142) but also ideal benefactions that concern “pride of workman-
ship, sense of adequacy, altruistic service for family or others, loyalty to organiza-
tion in patriotism, etc.” (Barnard 1960, p. 146). General incentives address, besides
others, associational attractiveness (i.e. social compatibility) and the condition of
communion, explained as “the feeling of personal comfort in social integration” or
“solidarity, (...) the gregarious instinct, or social security (in the original, not the
present debased economic, sense).” (Barnard 1960, p. 148, parentheses from original)
In relation to this idea, Clark and Wilson (1961), also on the basis of methodolog-
ical individualism, state that organizations are in general in need of incentives to
motivate individuals’ participation. They identify three distinct groups of incentives,
which can be easily linked to the later idea of Olson (1965) and to the 1992 general
incentives model. On the one hand, they describe material incentives, which are, just
as Barnard (1960) explained it, monetary gains or are at least easily interchange-
able into monetary advantages. Olson’s outcome-based selective incentives resemble
this material aspect of participation incentives. Additionally, Clark and Wilson’s
solidary incentives sum up rewards that derive from the process of association it-
self. Solidary incentives include intangible rewards like “socializing, congeniality, the
sense of group membership and identification, the status resulting from member-
ship, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social distinction, and so on.” (Clark
& Wilson 1961, pp. 134) Thus solidary incentives not only remind of the general
incentives model’s selective process incentives by the term, but also with regard to
content. Finally, the authors mention purposive incentives. These are also intangible,
yet derive from the ends an organization states. Also termed “suprapersonal goals of
the organization” (Clark & Wilson 1961, p. 135), purposive incentives are expected
to finally bring members together. While it might be rewarding to an organization’s
members to get together and enjoy solidary incentives, “it is insufficient in itself to
maintain the group” as Clark and Wilson (1961, p. 136) argue. Considering this as-
pect of Clark and Wilson’s (1961) approach, Seyd and Whiteley’s (1992) ideological
incentives come to mind.
Although the roots of an incentives model can be traced back further, Olson’s
(1965) contribution to the understanding of collective action cannot be underesti-
mated since he explicitly addresses the aforementioned free-rider problem and thus
adds valuable thoughts to the understanding of organizations, which define them-
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selves mainly via the supply of public goods. Equally, Seyd and Whiteley’s (1992)
input is not at all obsolete. Rather they are the first, who pose the question of what
it is a political party has to offer selectively to motivate people to support a party,
not only by their vote, but by means of membership and party activity. While sup-
porting Olson’s idea that individuals in politics react to costs and benefits just as
in any other aspect of life, Seyd and Whiteley (1992, p. 59) argue, Olson’s approach
was “too narrowly focused to give an adequate account of why people should join
a political party.” Instead, they suggest to broaden the view on individuals’ needs
and to consider “a wider array of incentives” (Seyd & Whiteley 1992). However,
selective incentives are not at all abandoned from the idea of how party membership
and activity can be explained, instead they remain central aspects of the general
incentives model.
Seyd and Whiteley (1992) distinguish between two types of selective incentives.
Selective process incentives are those selective, i.e. private, incentives, which de-
rive from the process of participation itself. This for example can mean to meet
like-minded people, simply to enjoy working for a party, to be entertained by par-
ticipation47 or the feeling of social integration and belonging. Essentially, selective
process incentives refer to all private incentives that do not draw their satisfying
potential from the outcome of participation as a product, which is located later in
the chain. Rather selective process incentives deploy their beneficial value just in
time with the action itself.
Contrary to this, selective outcome incentives do not necessarily rely on the end of
participation, yet they are located somewhat outside of participation itself as they
represent benefits of a second order. The second order in this sense does not mean
lower value, but refers to the necessity of outcome incentives to be derived from
participation. The aforementioned process incentives in contrast can exist indepen-
dently from any outcome or outcome incentive. Examples for outcome incentives are
mainly located on the financial side, be it directly or indirectly. Seyd and Whiteley
(1992) mention occupational ambitions in the public administration or expectations
to be elected to legislations of various state levels. Other outcome incentives might
not involve public jobs or offices but private business connections since relationships
to other businesses or public officials can be of substantial value.
47Seyd and Whiteley (1992) refer to Tullock (1971, p. 92), who considers entertainment a relevant
motive for “pseudorevolutions as the recent student problems in much of the democratic world.”
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In addition to selective incentives, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) consider the prob-
lem of party membership and participation based on collective incentives, the basic
challenge Olson sees for any organization. While selective incentives only consider
egoistic thinking to be of any value for the explanation of working together in orga-
nizations such as parties or corporate businesses, “any adequate theoretical account
of collective action needs to consider situations where the individual ‘thinks´ col-
lectively rather than individually” (Seyd & Whiteley 1992, p. 61). According to the
authors, the key to understanding this idea is the assumption that individuals can
put themselves in the place of the group, chasing a common goal instead of personal
surpluses. As an example to clarify their idea, they portray the situation of family
members, who regularly ask themselves, what was the best for all family members
and not only for themselves. Similarly, party members (of the British Labour party
in this case) would join “because they believe that the Labour party members col-
lectively make a difference to outcomes” (1992, p. 61). Against Olson’s free-rider
problem, they come up with the simple statement, that in a purely individualistic
world, “individuals might be tempted to let other people do the work”, however
“people [actually do] think collectively rather than individually” (Seyd & Whiteley
1992, p. 62). The only accusation one could make was that an individual cannot
make decisions for the group, which is why “it appears irrational to try to work
out the costs and benefits of different courses of action at the group level” (Seyd &
Whiteley 1992, p. 62). Yet, this uncertainty of decision making would not be innate
to groups, but also occurs with individual decision making and as such is a challenge
to rational choice theory as a whole.
Collective incentives also occur in two types: positive and negative. Positive col-
lective incentives apply to actions that aim towards the implementation of policies,
which benefit not only an individual but the group (in this case a nation state) as
a whole. On the other hand, negative collective incentives do not aim on the imple-
mentation, but rather on the abolishment of certain policies. In this sense, “getting
rid of the collective ‘bads’ is the mirror image of seeking collective ‘goods’,...” (Seyd
& Whiteley 1992, p. 63). However, this is only a linguistic sophistry, since both types
of collective incentives are said to actually motivate individuals to participate and
to not rely on others to achieve common goods. Negative incentives, as will be dealt
with later, rather hold people off from doing something.
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With the 1992 study Seyd and Whiteley also introduce altruistic incentives. Draw-
ing inspiration from Muller and Opp (1986), Klosko, Muller and Opp (1987)48 and
Finkel, Muller and Opp (1989), the authors refer to the idea of the “unity principle”
(Seyd & Whiteley 1992, p. 63). According to this norm, all members of a group (i.e.
a democratic state system) “should contribute if the good is to be provided” (Seyd &
Whiteley 1992, p. 63). The question is however, where this norm should come from.
Even if such a norm existed, the lack of penalties gives rise to the free-rider problem
again. Of course it could be assumed, that social exclusion provides possibilities for
penalties. Yet, based on the idea of costs and benefits that are weighted against
each other, no rational actor would feel bound by this norm. That is why options
for penalties are limited since not everyone could be punished.
Consequently, the authors of the general incentives model argue that a rational
assessment of costs and benefits is not the appropriate framework to evaluate the
logic behind altruistic incentives. Rather, “emotional attachment” (Seyd & Whiteley
1992, p. 63) is what comes into play at this point. Emotional attachment leads people
to not estimate measurable costs and benefits of their actions, but to act according
to a feeling of belonging and in favor of the well being of a group because this is,
what defines group identity for them. Even if altruistic motives are seldom expressed
as such, but rather in terms of broad policy goals, it is rather the moral imperative
that brings people to act in favor of the masses, not specific policy actions.
Finally, the general incentives model is complemented with normative incentives.
Similar to altruistic motives, social norms lie outside of the homo oeconomicus’
framework of costs and benefits. Yet, altruistic and normative incentives differ re-
markably from each other in one key aspect. While actions motivated by altruistic
incentives are self-sufficing, actions driven by social norms aim for a specific outcome.
They are meant to score positive evaluation – or at least no negative evaluation –
by others. The other and his judgment is the motivating momentum here, not the
belief in a common good.
Seyd and Whiteley (1992, p. 102) show that a strictly rational costs and benefits
model that calculates returns of an individual for participating in politics by:
Ri = (pi)(B)− Ci (4.1)




Ri measures the returns from participating in politics for a given individual i,
pi measures the probability that i’s participation will bring about the policy out-
comes desired (or collective goods),
B measures the benefits to society of implementing the policy proposal of the party
(collective benefits), and
Ci measures the costs of participation for an individual i”
would necessarily result in negative returns (Ri) since the probability that an indi-
vidual’s participation will make the difference in favor of the desired outcome (pi)
is “vanishingly small” (Seyd & Whiteley 1992, p. 102) and therefore the whole term
(pi)(Bi) tends to zero as well.
With the general incentives model in mind, the authors propose a supplemented
formula that considers additional incentives as described above. Moreover, ideologi-
cal incentives are introduced as a special kind of process incentives. The assumption
is that individuals are more likely to participate in politics, when they feel the op-
portunity and need to express deep beliefs about the right way a society should
be organized, especially when these beliefs differ from the popular political values
in society or in the group these people are organized in (i.e a political party). The
general incentives model exclusively aims to measure and include into its calculus a
specific left-wing process incentive. It does so because the authors argue that active
Labour party members are more left-wing than both inactive members as well as the
party elite, which is known as May’s law of curvilinear disparity (May 1973). The
assumption with regard to the general incentives model is that political radicalism
leads to activity rather than the other way around, although the authors also con-
sider the opposite to be possible. With the cross reference to Labour’s right-wingers’
values mainly being in line with the dominant ideology in society, those would feel
the need to express their beliefs much less. Hence, in the original general incentives
model, ideological incentives are limited to being “an additional selective process
incentive” (Seyd & Whiteley 1992, p. 100) of a dedicated group of British Labour
party members. Strong ideological beliefs are not understood as being a general
motivating factor for political party membership or party activity.
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Another adjustment applies to altruistic incentives. Referring to the different kind
of motivational basis altruistic motives rely on as described above, Seyd and White-
ley (1992, p. 107), rather non-transparently, come to the conclusion that altruism is
“a product of affective or expressive motivations.” While the affective-part is under-
standable and completely in line with the idea that altruism does not grow from a
calculation of costs and benefits, but rather from a feeling of group identity, the idea
to complement this by the expressive-part appears rather surprisingly and without
any explanatory context.
Lastly, a modification is made with reference to Klosko et al. (1987).49 According
to empirical studies, despite arithmetically being only a marginal factor, individuals
have reported to believe in having an influence and consequently that their per-
sonal participation actually mattered. Moreover, an additional probability term pg
is incorporated that measures “the influence of the group on the provision of public
goods” (Seyd & Whiteley 1992, p. 108) and closely resembles the idea of a corpo-
rate mindset as represented by altruistic motives that leads individuals’ actions in
addition to personal goals.
Yet, both measures of probability are not expected to be independent from each
other. Rather, two alternative ways of perceived individual and group influence are
proposed. On the one hand, personal and group influence measures simply cumulate
in a multiplicative way ((pi)(pg), equation (4.2) on the following page). Alternatively,
individual and group influence are expected to be related in a curvilinear manner
((pi)(pg−p2g), equation (4.3) on the next page). This relationship is based on the idea,
that group influence has a different effect on the individual influence according to
its own level. Low group influence is said to necessarily correlate with low individual
influence, since it makes no sense to expect high personal influence, when at the same
time, the group or political party as a whole is expected to have low influence. Yet,
high group influence may work in two alternative ways. On the one hand, high group
influence can lead to high individual influence since individuals are part of a highly
49In the original text, Seyd and Whiteley (1992, pp. 107) cite Klosko et al. (1987) as Muller and
Opp (1987). This is because contributions to a controversy-article by Klosko as well as by Muller
& Opp are published under one common title Rebellious Collective Action Revisited. Seyd and
Whiteley (1992) refer to only one part of this controversy-article, which is however not listed as
a separate article in the table of content. Their own Klosko (1987) reference however, which is
supposedly meant to refer to the second part of this article, does unfortunately not exist. For
the sake of completeness and traceability the false reference is given anyway: Klosko, George
(1987), The Rationality of Collective Action, American Political Science Review, 81:557-61.
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influential group, which may promote satisfaction and a feeling of personal strength
as part of a strong group. On the other hand, it is also possible that high group
influence overrules the perception of an individual’s influence and thus individual
influence disappears in a strong group (Seyd & Whiteley 1992, pp. 108).
According to these extensions to Olson’s selective incentives theory, Seyd and
Whiteley (1992, p. 110) suggest to model political party membership and/or party
activism by:
Ai = (pi)(pg)(B)− Ci + S(Oi) + S(Pi) + Ei +Ni + IDi (4.2)
or alternatively
Ai = (pi)(pg − p2g)(B)− Ci + S(Oi) + S(Pi) + Ei +Ni + IDi (4.3)
where
Bi, pi and Ci remain unchanged and
Ai represents the activism index,
pg measures the group influence,
pg − p2g measures the transformed group influence following a curvilinear relation-
ship,
S(Oi) measures selective outcome incentives,
S(Pi) measures selective process incentives,
Ei measures altruistic or expressive incentives,
Ni measures normative incentives, and
IDi measures ideological (selective process) incentives.
The incentives’ different classification in connection to Olson’s underlying idea of
rationally working selective incentives is shown with figure 4.1 on the facing page.
Applying their extended general incentives model to the case of the British Con-
servative Party, Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson and Bissell (1993) make further adjust-
ments to the equation that is formulated to explain party membership as well as
party activism50. While most denominations are altered, theoretical ideas behind
probability terms pi and pig (formerly pg), collective benefits B, selective outcome
50There is also an extended monographic assessment of Conservative Party members. However
Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994) do not add anything in terms of theoretical development
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Figure 4.1: General incentives model, author’s own depiction based on Olson (1965)
and Seyd and Whiteley (1992, p. 64).
incentives Oi (formerly S(Oi)), selective process incentives Pi (formerly S(Pi))and
social norms Si (formerly Ni) remain the same.
Ideological incentives Ii (formerly IDi), based on May’s 1973 idea of curvilinear
disparity, however are now regarded as a general rule of party activism that is rel-
evant for all (political) groups, not only for British Labour Party members. In the
case of the British Conservative Party, active members are simply expected to be
positioned further on the right of both inactive members as well as the party’s elite.
Just because activism offers more radical members the opportunity to express this
deviance from the rest of the party, they are expected to be more active. With the
original Labour party survey of 1992, left-wingers are expected to be more active
because of their deviance from “the dominant political values in society” (Seyd &
Whiteley 1992, p. 106). Of course it is possible to apply this idea to the case of the
British Conservative Party’s right-wingers, who may deviate from the “dominant
political values in society” just as much as Labour’s left-wingers do, although these
values are seen further on the right side of the spectrum. Yet, Whiteley et al. (1993)
do not give a satisfying theoretical account as of why the relationship between polit-
of the general incentives model in comparison to the 1993 article (Whiteley et al. 1993), which
is why this publication is not assessed in further detail.
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ical radicalism and activity shall be applicable to political parties of all colors, while
it has originally been formulated to explain Labour party activity.
Furthermore, expressive incentives Ei and altruistic incentives Ali are now under-
stood as different categories, albeit unfortunately without any further explanation
as well.
Moreover, the idea of a curvilinear relationship between individual and group
influence, expressed by pg − p2g in equation 4.3 is abandoned too. The probability of
group influence is again only considered as a multiplication to the probability of an
individual’s influence on collective incentives Bi.
These changes lead to models of political activism Ai as represented by equations
4.4 and 4.5:
Ai = (pi ∗B)− Ci +Oi + Pi + Ii +Ali + Si + Ei (4.4)
or alternatively
Ai = (pi ∗ pg ∗B)− Ci +Oi + Pi + Ii +Ali + Si + Ei (4.5)
where
Ai, Bi, pi, pg and Ci remain unchanged and
Oi measures selective outcome incentives,
Pi measures selective process incentives,
Ei measures expressive incentives,
Si measures normative incentives,
Ii measures ideological (selective process) incentives, and
Ali measures altruistic incentives.
Figure 4.2 on the next page shows the underlying theoretical approach of the
general incentives model as applied by Whiteley et al. (1993) in comparison to the
former 1992 approach and the original 1965 Olson Model.
Although the model has been selectively adjusted in the following years, the 1993
version is as close as it gets compared to Klein (2006). With this adaption of a
general incentives model, Klein (2006) presents his own interpretation of the idea
of incentives driven corporation of individuals (figure 4.3 on page 77). With this
interpretation, which has also been the basis for the 2009 German Party Members
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Figure 4.2: General incentives model, author’s own depiction based on Olson (1965),
Seyd and Whiteley (1992, p. 64) and Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson and
Bissell (1993).
Survey, expressive incentives are again understood as separated from general altru-
istic needs. Additionally, individuals’ ideological motivations are no longer described
as being subordinated under selective process incentives. The difference being that
ideological incentive’s power can already make a difference, when it comes to party
membership. Klein (2006, p. 39) describes that already party membership shall be
able to demonstrate an individual’s support for the ideological basis of parties. Fur-
thermore, this gain is expected to increase in relation to the intensity of ideological
convictions.
Besides various incentives, the attention is also drawn to the costs of party mem-
bership and participation. In his adaption of the general incentives model, Klein
(2006) explicitly differentiates three kinds of investments: Opportunity costs, disu-
tility of labor and monetary costs. This distinction between different investments
had formerly only been acknowledged with the operationalization of the costs-item.
However, as Klein’s assignment of levels of affiliation shows (membership versus par-
ticipation), it is important not to assess costs as a single negative incentive, but to
consider several forms of appearance, since they appear on different levels of party
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affiliation and thus can be distinct factors for either party membership and/or party
activity.
The Model as shown with figure 4.3 on the next page also serves as the template
for the 2017 German Party Membership Survey and hence doubles as the theoretical
basis for one of the regression models which are introduced at a later stage of this
study. Operationalization of the general incentives model is also described at this
point with section 9.1.1 on page 219 and table 9.1 on page 220 (or see table A.9 on
page 300 for the original German wording).
4.2 The Standard Socio-economic Model and Beyond
4.2.1 Linking Socio-economic Status and Attitudes
A second theoretical approach to originally explain not only party membership
and/or activity, but political participation in various different ways, is called the
standard socio-economic status (SES) model (figure 4.4 on page 80). A model that
is referenced very often as a classic theoretical idea behind political participation,
yet very often misunderstood or simply not reported sufficiently. Based on a 1967
American national population survey, Verba and Nie (1972) try to empirically assess
various questions about participation including: “From whom does the participation
come” (Verba & Nie 1972, p. 12). The authors can show that “participants in fact
come from the more advantaged portions of society” (Verba & Nie 1972, p. 13).
Yet, they also admit that with this finding, their research only confirms, what oth-
ers already found out. Moreover, this aspect of the publication is not at all theory
driven, but inductive to its core. Therefore, besides empirical findings, the actual
achievement of the SES model is to go beyond this simple relationship between so-
cial stratification and political participation. They do so by raising the question of
why it is the case, that upper-status groups are overrepresented in certain groups of
political participators and by developing a theoretical model that incorporates not
only socio-economic variables, but also civic attitudes as a mediating variable. This
important theoretical aspect is unfortunately often peculated.
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Figure 4.3: General incentives model, Klein (2006, p. 41)
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The aforementioned 1967 survey gives access to information about 15 different
ways to participate in politics51, including Actively work for party or candidate and
Contribute money to party or candidate. However, non party related actions such
as Work with others on local problem and Contact state or national leaders - social
referent have also been questioned. Employing factor analytical methods, Verba and
Nie (1972) identify four distinct combinations of variables, each of which representing
a specific mode of political participation, which are mostly uncorrelated with each
other: Campaign activity, communal activity, voting and particularized contacting.
Based on this method of variable classification, the authors turn to classify indi-
viduals. Considering factor scales of each of the aforementioned modes as variables,
Verba and Nie (1972) perform a hierarchical cluster analysis that identifies six types
of participators (as opposed to modes of participation): The inactives, the voting
specialists, the parochial participants, the communalists, the partisan activists (or
campaigners) and the complete activists.
With this typology of people in mind, the authors review data about several
social variables. They do so by comparing representation ratios of certain social
groups52 (e.g. male or aged between 31-64 ) in general with representation ratios
within each of the aforementioned types of political participators. This comparison
gives information of whether specific social aspects are over- or underrepresented
with certain types of participators. In fact, the study finds an “overall pattern across
various types of actors” (Verba & Nie 1972, p. 100) and underlines eight aspects of
the relationship between political participation and social stratification:
1. “Participants come disproportionately from upper-status groups. (...)
2. The more difficult activities [operated by Complete activists, Communalists
and Partisan Activists] are engaged in heavily by upper-status citizens.
3. Those who limit their activity to voting come disproportionately from lower-
status groups.
51For detailed information see Verba and Nie (1972, p. 60: A Factor Analysis of the Structure of
Participation).
52Verba and Nie (1972) employ the following variables for this comparison: Education (Grade school
or less, High school or less, Some college or more), income ($4,000 and under, $4,000 - $10,000,
$10,000 and over), sex (Male, Female), age (Under 30, 31-64, Over 65), race (White, Black),
religion (Protestant, Catholic) and Location (Rural, Small town, Suburb, City).
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4. Parochial Participants (who limit their activity to ways that affect their per-
sonal circumstances) come from all parts of the status hierarchy, (...).
5. Men are somewhat overrepresented in the more activist groups, but not to a
great degree.
6. Blacks tend to be overrepresented in the inactivist category, and they are es-
pecially disadvantaged when it comes to communal activity and particularized
contacting. (...) Black are more likely to stay completely out of politics than
are whites, but once they become involved they may participate at high levels.
7. Communalists (...) are much less likely to be Catholic, the latter [Partisan
Activists] much more likely.
8. Communal activities (...) are more likely to be found in rural areas and suburbs
than in cities. In cities (...) both partisans and voting specialists are more likely
to be found” (Verba & Nie 1972, pp. 100).
Overall, this revision of the relationship between socio-economic status and po-
litical participation has been well established even at times of this very influential
study. Thus it can hardly be described as bringing forward a theory to explain po-
litical participation, or even political party membership and activity. Moreover, the
study does not even rely on any theoretical approach to assess socio-economic dif-
ferences and political participation at this basic stage. The only thing it does, is
to provide ad hoc explanations for the observed phenomenon (and this is said with
all due respect for this work and inductive research designs). Although the authors
occasionally use the term resources, they do not (yet) propose a distinct resource
based theory about political participation. Simultaneously, this basic relationship
between social stratification and political participation is not what the authors call
their standard socio-economic model. It is but one part of this Model, as the follow-




















Figure 4.4: Standard socio-economic model, Verba and Nie (1972, p. 19)
“According to this [the SES] model, the social status of an individual –
his job, education, and income – determines to a large extent how much
he participates. It does this through the intervening effects of a variety
of ‘civic attitudes´ conducive to participation: attitudes such as a sense
of efficacy, of psychological involvement in politics, and a feeling of
obligation to participate.”
(Verba & Nie 1972, p. 13)
Therefore, this study is not completely atheoretical. Just as Verba and Nie (1972,
p. 19) name it, the “standard socio-economic status model of politicization” is a the-
oretical model of the process of politicization that begins with social circumstances
and cumulates in a specific participation input. It is not a model of social circum-
stances directly impacting political participation, nor is it a theoretical approach
that explains political participation on the basis of accumulated resources beneficial
in politics, which themselves are determined by social circumstances. Moreover, it
is the context of Verba & Nie’s study that is relevant from a theoretical point of
view. The authors’ explanations of why participation matters, and what the impli-
cations of an unbalanced participation are for democracy (“Political leaders who
respond to participation will be responding to an accurate representation of the
needs, desires and and preferences of the public at large.” (Verba & Nie 1972, p.
12)), build a theoretical basis for an inductive research design. In this respect, it is
just as much a theory of democracy as it is a theory of the process of politicization.
Equally, regarding the confirmation of overrepresentation of upper-status individuals
in high-level participation, it is quality and insightful empirical inductive research
about unbalanced political participation.
Continuing their research, Verba and Nie (1972, p. 133) pose the question of
what it is “that links higher social economic status with political participation”.
They present different liking mechanisms that have been suggested, such as social
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Figure 4.5: The process of politicization: Overall activity rate, Verba and Nie (1972,
p. 134)
environment, resources and skills, or psychological characteristics. Although they
admit the likelihood of all these factors to play a mediating role, they focus on the
specific impact of organizational affiliation and the social environment, represented
by orientations they found to be characterizing the highly participant: Psychological
involvement in politics, a sense of political efficacy, information about politics, and
a sense of contribution to the community. Figure 4.5 presents the path model that
reports the basic empirical result of testing the SES model.
According to this general model - the authors also differentiate between their
established modes of participation - “socio-economic status relates strongly to the
civic orientations (.45)53 and the link between the latter and activity is similarly
strong (.46)” (Verba & Nie 1972, p. 134). Simultaneously, the direct impact of socio-
economic status on the overall activity rate is reduced from .37 to only .16, once
the mediating effect of civic orientations is included. This actually is the original
standard socio-economic model.
4.2.2 A Resource Model of Political Activity
Further developing their standard SES model of participation, Brady, Verba and
Schlozman (1995) introduce a theoretical approach that reevaluates the meaning
of civic orientations and the role they play for political participation in connection
to social status. Besides methodological challenges in relation to vague concepts of
efficacy or interest, Brady et al. (1995) also come up with doubts about directions
of causality. One could not be certain, that it is political efficacy and interest for
politics that stimulates activity. It was just as reasonable to concede a stimulus on
efficacy and interest to political activity. By their very nature, measures of psy-
53All numbers are Pearson’s r.
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chological engagement were very close to activity itself, which made them strong
predictors of political activity. Yet, civic attitudes were “trivial (and possibly spu-
rious) explanations for participation.” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 271, parentheses from
original)
Therefore, Brady et al. (1995, p. 271) go “beyond SES” and develop a coherent
and inclusive conception of the mechanism that links social status to political ac-
tivity: The resource model of political participation (figure 4.6 on page 86). This
model is meant to overcome shortcomings of two classic theoretical traditions that
face challenges when explaining political participation. On the one hand, although
recognizing the predictive power of the standard SES model, the authors argue
that it “fails to specify clearly the mechanism linking social statuses to activity”
(Brady et al. 1995, p. 272, accentuation from original). On the other hand rational
choice theories would have focused too narrowly on the benefits of political partici-
pation without taking costs seriously. By tracing back political participation not on
socio-economic circumstances, but on a shared key category of individually dispos-
able resources, the resource model overcomes the simplification of the SES model’s
assessment of social status and simultaneously abandons methodological issues in
connection to attitudes (measurability and causality). Brady et al. (1995, p. 273)
employ several steps to develop a resource model of political participation. While
most of them are worth reporting, methodical considerations of measurement are
excluded from this review for the sake of briefness.
At first, resources need to be defined. Time and money are named as being the
prime resources. Time is necessary since every action, not only political action, re-
quires time spent by individuals. Whether it is gathering information about political
problems or party manifestos, writing e-mails to political officials or attending com-
munity and/or party meetings, no participation is imaginable without investing a
minimum amount of time. Money can be used in various ways to participate po-
litically. It can be donated to a candidate’s campaign and to a party in general
or numerous other political organizations such as NGOs, think tanks and citizens’
movements.
Besides the relatively easy to measure concepts of time and money, civic skills
build a third category of indispensable resources. Civic skills are defined as “those
communications and organizational capacities that are so essential to political ac-
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tivity” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 273). The idea is based on the assumption that all
political participation is social activity in the end, the intention to get in touch with
other people is compulsory. This can be fellow activists, directly political accounta-
bles or some random observer of political action. Yet, this social interaction requires
essential social skills and profits enormously from further developed civic skills. On a
very basic level, the ability to express information, attitudes or feelings is essential to
any social participation. Basic ways of expression and therefore important resources
for political participation are the abilities to speak and/or to write. This may seam
trivial at first sight. Yet, this impression dwindles with some further considerations.
Political processes often rely on a specific system that enables or organizes par-
ticipation. Moreover, political problems can easily become very complex and often
require contact to official state institutions or knowledge about legal issues. On the
individual level, it is not necessarily the case that people are sufficiently proficient in
the official language of the country or region they live in, or that children have the
ability to learn basic reading and writing in school. Further developing this thought,
it becomes obvious that highly developed civic skills should support political par-
ticipation. The ability to understand or explain complex problems, to organize a
group and to argue sophisticatedly all are civic skills which are expected to boost
political participation, because people have the necessary resources at hand (Brady
et al. 1995, p. 273).
Secondly, Brady et al. (1995, pp. 274) aim to link these resources to SES by show-
ing statistical relationships between the provision of resources and and indicators of
socio-economic status. To the authors of the resource model, it seams obvious and
not worth a second thought that higher status jobs and more education go along
with more money earned. On the other hand, their considerations about the rela-
tionship of free time and socio-economic status are ambivalent. Either the rich might
have more free time since they have the money to pay others to do what others have
to do themselves (e.g. household, childcare etc.), or they might have less free time,
since wealth is accumulated by a lot of work done at their payed jobs. While both
theoretical ideas seam plausible, neither stands bivariate empirical tests. While ed-
ucation and family income are “strongly related” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 274), there
is no such correlation between education and free time. Regardless if civic status
is measured with formal education degrees or an individual’s job skill level, those
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with lower formal education degrees or doing lower skilled work “have almost ex-
actly the same number of hours free time per day as do those in the highest level
jobs” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 274) or those who earned higher educational degrees.
It is rather one’s life circumstances that affect the amount of disposable free time
per day. The authors report that full time jobs (oneself and spouse) and having kids
(especially preschoolers) diminish the availability of time as a resource for political
activity.
Civic skills are also tied to SES strongly. As Brady et al. (1995, p. 275) mention,
“those with higher levels of education are more likely to speak English at home54,
to have better vocabulary skills, and to have taken part in high school government.”
Civic skills specifically acquired as an adult are similarly stratified by education.
Yet, the extent to which these skills are dependent on the educational level varies.
Job skills are affected the most, while skills acquired at church or at a non-political
organization are less dependent on the level of formal education. Moreover, it is
mentioned that the pattern looked the same, no matter if SES is measured using
formal education, income or occupational skill levels.
Finally, Brady et al. (1995, p. 277) present a resource model of political partic-
ipation (figure 4.6 on page 86), in which civic skills, time, family income, political
interest and citizenship status explain the extent of an individual’s overall politi-
cal participation. Ultimately, using two-stage least square regression methods, the
model works very well in explaining an overall political participation measure. All of
the above variables significantly increase political participation. Once adult skill acts
are considered relative to their setting (job, organizational or church) political inter-
est looses its significant meaning for political participation. The model excels even
more, when the overall participation measure is distinguished into three categories:
Voting, Making financial contributions and Executing acts that require time.
Voting is by far most affected by political interest. Resources, civic skills, and free
time to be precise, do add to the amount of explained variation, yet they do so much
less. Money as well as variables that are said to ultimately aggregate into civic skills
do not show significant effects. In summary, the authors conclude that “political in-
54Speaking English is not considered a civic skill per se, but derives from the authors being located
in an English speaking country and relying on data collected in the US. Speaking the language
of an individual’s country of residence would likely be the more general and thus transferable
item.
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terest is much more important than resources, if our main project is to explain voting
turnout” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 283). Equally, the authors can show that financial
contributions do require money, yet not much else in the way of resources. Except for
income, political interest, and years of education, all variables forfeit their statistical
significance once financial contributions is used as the dependent variable. More-
over, family income outruns other variables’ contribution considerably. Progressing
to explicitly time consuming acts of political participation, it is no surprise that the
amount of disposable free time matters significantly as does political interest. Yet,
civic skills reach a standardized coefficient, which is lower than that for political
interest, but also considerably higher than the coefficient for free time.
Finally, the authors conclude that a resource model adds valuable predictors to the
explanation of political participation compared to narrowly focused psychological or
socio-economic approaches. Besides their statistical results, which report significant
effects for other resource variables even when political interest is considered, the
authors argue in favor of their resource model compared to psychological attempts
mainly from a methodical point of view. Additionally, they see themselves to “estab-
lish[es] the mechanisms that link SES to participation” (Brady et al. 1995, p. 285)
by grounding this link on a more general concept of competences and abilities that


















































































Figure 4.6: The resource model of political participation, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995, p. 277)
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4.3 The Ann-Arbor Tradition of Psychological Factors
Within the realm of political action, a third classic concept is, what is commonlyknow as a socio-psychological approach or, with a reference to the University
of Michigan in Ann Arbor, MI, the Ann-Arbor-Model. Originally published in 1954,
Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1971) and its successor, originally from 1960, Campbell,
Converse, Miller and Stokes (1965) try to explain voting behavior in the 1952 and
1956 presidential elections. They admit that motivations of the voters with regard
to casting the vote, and their exact choice can only be inferred using then existing
theoretical and empirically transfered models. Therefore they pursue the question
of “how can we come to a closer account of the motivation of the vote?” (Campbell
et al. 1971, p. 83)
The idea they come up with is a time based account, in which the ultimate voting
decision represents the culmination of events and effects happening prior to election
day. Yet, ruling out detailed records about a significant sample of voters’ individual
circumstances as well as media, and personal influences due to the sheer mass of
information that would need to be recorded and assessed, they concentrate on medi-
ating factors. According to Campbell et al. (1971, p. 85), voting behavior should be
satisfyingly accessible “at the level of attitudes, expectations and group loyalties”.
These psychological factors are expected to intervene between an individual’s ex-
ternal events, meaning everything happening or existing around an individual that
has the ability to possibly affect its ultimate voting decision and the voting decision
itself. With respect to the interfering function of attitudes, the aforementioned SES
model seems to resemble this idea, with its civic orientations mediating between
dedicated socio-economic status and political participation. Although their concept
seems to make sense at first sight, their theoretical explanations of why attitudes, ex-
pectations, and group loyalties should improve the understanding of voting behavior,
does unfortunately not go beyond this simple guess.
While planning their study on the 1952 US presidential election, the authors
come up with six factors that are said to have “sufficient importance to warrant
specific investigations in the interviews.” Campbell et al. (1971, p. 86) All factors
are expected to stimulate the basic decision to cast a vote in general, factors 1 to 4
however, should also affect the direction of the vote casted, as the authors await:
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1. “Personal identification with one of the political parties;
2. Concerns with issues of national government policy;
3. Personal attraction to the presidential candidates;
4. Conformity to the group standards of one’s associates;
5. A sense of personal efficacy in the area of politics;
6. A sense of civic obligation to vote” (Campbell et al. 1971, p. 86).
Although remaining very vague about the process of mediation, Campbell et al.
(1971) do elaborate on the specific meaning of three out of six factors; those of
which they think made the largest contribution to the understanding of the individ-
ual’s voting motivation. Understanding a political party as a special kind of social
group, “an aggregation of individuals who share a sense of common characteristics
or common goals” (Campbell et al. 1971, p. 88), membership to this group shall psy-
chologically be relevant only to the degree to which an individual identifies himself
with the group, and shares common attitudes, or behavioral anomalies. This idea
is especially important and has to be seen in connection to the case of the original
study. Since the authors deal with the case of the US presidential election, character-
istics of US political parties have to be considered. Yet, parties in the US political
system do not know the idea of formal membership in a narrow, i.e. legal sense.
Therefore membership in this case can never be anything beyond identification.
Yet, with their second publication from 1960 (Campbell et al. 1965), the initiators
assess more deeply the question of how attitudes, expectations and group loyalties
come into being. While the theoretical concept is fairly extensive, it is nonetheless
critical for the understanding of how and why attitudinal variables are expected to
affect a voter’s decision. The major theoretical concept behind this is a sequence
of events and effects happening in a “funnel of causality” (Campbell et al. 1971,
see: figure 4.7 (a) on page 90). The vote casted is located at point t on the time
axis. The individual’s decision at this point is neither expected to be random nor
is it shaped merely at this point in time. Rather, it is a product of multiple events
and influences an individual is exposed to over a long time. Yet, not everything an
individual is exposed to, actually influences its decision to vote, or the candidate or
party he choses.
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The shape of a funnel originates from the idea that those factors that do not re-
main relevant are continuously eliminated from the decision process until all relevant
expositions ultimately culminate in the act of voting. The funnel hence represents
everything that happens before the casted vote, no matter of its relevance. There-
fore, since the act of voting is the ultimately necessary culmination of everything
earlier in time, under the assumption of complete measurement and knowledge of
combining laws, a complete slice of time available at any cross section of the funnel
would suffice to explain the vote. Campbell et al. (1965, p. 25) explain: “Each cross
section contains all the elements that will successfully predict the next, and so on,
until we have arrived at the final political act.”
To make this concept clearer and somehow accessible to empirical research, further
ordering dimensions are introduced with respect to the funnel and its cross sections
(see figure 4.8 on page 91): First, any cross section is divided into exogenous factors as
well as personal conditions. Exogenous factors are those causes and effects, which are
causes themselves for everything happening afterwards, that are “so remote in nature
from the content interest of the investigator [the vote casted] that their inclusion
in a system of variables, even if possible, would be undesirable.” (Campbell et al.
1965, pp. 25) The authors use the simple idea of a flat tire to underline exogenous
factors. Having a flat tire on his way to the polling station and therefore missing the
opening hours and failing on one’s intention to vote, clearly leads to an outcome that
is very interesting in the light of voter turnout research. Yet, it is obvious that the
potential voter showed all motivation and also took steps to cast a vote. The reason
why he was not able to vote however, is so “alient to our interest” (Campbell et al.
1965, p. 26) that it would not lead to any insight into the feasibility of the theory,
to consider this event of a flat tire, as related to the outcome. On the other hand,
relevant conditions are those events and causes that, by definition of the researcher,
are considered relevant for the outcome in question, which generally will be decided
on the basis of an underlying theory of voter behavior.
Implications of exogenous factors are complex. The classification of an event can
be both unambiguous as well as very difficult to decide and “there is always room for
choice” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 26) on the part of the investigator. Moreover, given
that every time slice of the funnel of causality will have some degree of exogenous








t = time of event predicted; A, B, C = cross sections
(a) The funnel and its time slices
cross section A cross section B cross section C
exogenous factors personal conditions political conditions
(b) Composition of time slices
Figure 4.7: The Ann-Arbor model’s funnel of causality, authors own depiction in-
spired by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1965)
way to improve a model of prediction is to decrease the share exogenous factors oc-
cupy while approaching the event of investigation at point t. Since exogenous factors
and their causes are eliminated from the model, the shape of a funnel develops.
Secondly, conditions within the funnel are divided into simply relevant conditions
of any nature and core political conditions. This division originates from the assump-
tion that determinants of the behavior in question, which is political itself, are to a
large degree also controlled by political preconditions. While core political conditions
form the “central artery” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 28) of the funnel, non-political
but also relevant conditions build the “shell” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 28) around
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Figure 4.8: The funnel of causality, internal composition of any time slice, author’s
own depiction inspired by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1965)
it. Whether an event is rated political or not, shall be subject to the individual’s
perception. The authors assume that political conditions will continuously increase
prior to the voting decision, until the relevant conditions will almost exclusively be
of political nature at point t.
Thirdly, exogenous factors as well as political and non-political conditions are
categorized into external and personal parts (see: figure 4.8). External portions of
every layer are those factors and conditions an individual is not aware of. Although
a possible cause for later behavior of an individual, external events do not posses an
“individual reality for the individual at a given point in time” (Campbell et al. 1965,
p. 27). Since Campbell et al. (1965) want to understand an individual’s response to
politics by assessing the perception of objects, events and causes by this individual,
most of the external happenings are ruled out, they consider them exogenous to the
system of explanation.
However, it is possible that external factors develop into personal or even political
conditions in the course of time. Figure 4.9 (a) on page 93 shows four possible
status options, an event can be categorized into and the way their status can change
over time. “An event may at some point in time be external and non-political (A);
personal and non-political (B); external and political (C); or personal and political
(D).” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 30) Figure 4.9 (b) underlines, how events have become
more personal and more political just before the act of voting.
To illustrate the process of an event changing its nature from external/non-
political to personal/political Campbell et al. (1965, pp. 30) employ the example
of General Dwight D. Eisenhower developing from an ordinary soldier to a politi-
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cal player. Imagining a time slice of the funnel of the early 1940’s, few Americans
have at all been aware of a Lieutenant Colonel named Dwight D. Eisenhower, and
even if they were, he would not have been an object of political relevance. There-
fore, the object Dwight D. Eisenhower possessed most likely status A or B. Yet, as
time goes by and the 1952 presidential election approaches, Campbell et al. (1965,
pp. 30) describe two routes how the object’s perception developed. One way is that
the external/non-political object develops into a personal/non-political (status B)
object. This would be the case for an individual who first became aware of the per-
son Dwight D. Eisenhower as he climbs the military ladder, very likely in 1944 as
Eisenhower led the Normandy landing of the Allied troops, or as he became Mil-
itary Governor in Germany in 1945. As Eisenhower was recurrently mentioned as
a potential candidate for the 1952 presidential election, the object is likely to have
developed from being a personal/non-political to a personal/political object (sta-
tus D)55. Although the other possible route is less likely, “there were undoubtedly
a number of Americans who were personally unaware of the figure of Eisenhower
until the point at which he broke into their consciousness as a political candidate”
(Campbell et al. 1965, pp. 30). This route is described following the track A→C→D.
Yet, this original figure and its description are not in line with previous explana-
tions of the anatomy of the funnel as a series of quotes emphasizes: At first, Campbell
et al. (1965, p. 25) divide “any single cross section (...) into (1) exogenous factors and
(2) relevant conditions”, which makes for two different portions. Secondly, they find
it “convenient to subdivide relevant and exogenous factors according to whether or
not they enjoy a subjective reality” (external/personal) (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 27),
which results in a total of four sections: exogenous/external, exogenous/personal, rel-
evant/external, relevant/personal. Finally, “conditions [i.e personal elements] in the
funnel may in a rough way be classified into those that are political and those that
are not” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 28) and “if the object or event is not cognized at
all [an external condition], then no such determination can be made. But as soon as
a condition is made personal, then determination of its political or non-political sta-
tus can rest upon the individual’s particular perceptions.” (Campbell et al. 1965, p.
55Due to the nature of the political aspect of an object depending on an individual’s perception,
it is also possible of course, that Eisenhower was regarded as a political object already when he
became Military Governor in Germany.
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Figure 4.9: Change in status of an even within the funnel of causality over time,
(a) The situation at a point in time remote from the behavior; (b) the
situation at a point in time close to the behavior, Campbell, Converse,
Miller and Stokes (1965, p. 30)
29) Hence, the differentiation between political and non-political events only applies
to the combinations of relevant/personal, which makes for five final status.
Figure 4.10 on the following page proposes an adjusted figure that correctly dis-
plays all distinctions the authors make. With this figure, status A, B and D remain
unchanged. Status C (external/non-political) however is no longer part of the model,
since all status in the External-column are out of the individual’s cognition, which
makes a subjective assessment inapplicable, whether an event or object is politi-
cal or non-political. Furthermore, the first basic distinction between exogenous and
relevant conditions, regardless if political or not, is not part of the original model.
Two status are therefore added with status E (exogenous/external) and status F
(exogenous/personal). Of course it can be argued that the authors plan to eliminate
all exogenous factors from the funnel. Yet, they also apply the distinction between
personal and external portions on both relevant conditions and exogenous factors,
which would make no sense, if all exogenous factors could be eliminated from the
model.
Since status C is no longer part of the status change model, a development from
A via C to D is not possible. Yet, this makes perfect sense. Applying this idea to the
original example of the figure of Eisenhower, those individuals, who were not aware of


















Figure 4.10: Adjusted model of status change, author’s own depiction
candidate” (Campbell et al. 1965, pp. 30) never knew this figure outside of the
political context. Therefore, and since the question of an object being political/non-
political cannot be answered on the basis of individual perception, if an individual
is unaware of the object itself, the alternative development of an object necessarily
needs to follow the route directly from A to D as figure 4.10 displays.
Campbell et al. (1965, p. 33) locate their approach in the intellectual roots of
classic field theory, harking back to Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism (devel-
oped between 1861 and 1864) that replaced Newton’s mechanical understanding of
cause and effect. While the latter postulates cause and effect at a distance, field the-
ory, which was adapted to psychology by Kurt Lewin, assumes effects always being
related to a contemporaneous field that it occurs in. This field is understood as “a
product of the field in the immediate neighborhood at a time just passed” (Camp-
bell et al. 1965, p. 33). Each of the funnel’s time slices therefore represent a specific
field of an individual in time that carries all of an individual’s life history up to this
moment. For the socio-psychological approach, measuring attitudinal variables as
close as possible to the action explained, is therefore the logical consequence since
they represent the “distillation” (Campbell et al. 1965, p. 34) of every possible field
situation earlier.
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5 State of Research - Non-Membership
Based Party Affiliation in Political
Science
Until now, the majority of research about volunteer activity in political partieshas been concentrated on questions of formal party membership, as other
scholars point out too (Fisher, Fieldhouse, & Cutts 2014, p. 75). This especially
includes declining membership figures, and approaches to explain the reasons for
joining and being active in a party. Yet, as political parties begin to see themselves
in a persistent development that challenges both their narrative of legitimacy and
their financial provision, they begin to widen their view to unlock new resources.
Political party research follows this trend and starts to assess volunteer party activity
more broadly in the past few years. However, this development of a new strand of
party politics research is still at an embryonic stage. In order to trace out the field
of research this study operates in and to underline the research gap it aims to
fill, this chapter is meant to evaluate the current (meaning November 2019) state
of research. The upcoming review will be twofold. On the one hand, research will
be reported that explicitly makes use of the multi-speed membership model. Since
the model itself is relatively new to the discussion of party membership, and most
scholars only mention the term without adequately operationalizing each affiliation
mode (or having access to corresponding data), a second section additionally unfolds
the broader picture of attempts that have been made to assess party affiliation as
opposed to party membership.
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5.1 Dedicated Multi-Speed Membership Research
In the special case of Germany, Scarrow (2019) puts her own model to the test.Mainly being concerned with the German parties’ membership history (as pre-
sented in chapter 2 on page 13) and their supply of multi-speed affiliation modes, peo-
ple’s demand is also assessed to some degree. Yet, due to the lack of dedicated data,
this assessment deviates somewhat from the the multi-speed membership model and
gives only a poor insight into German parties’ evolution of party affiliation from the
supply side (Scarrow 2019, p. 162).
On the basis of ISSP data56, Scarrow (2019) reviews several modes of political
activity. However, in contrast to the narrow focus of the multi-speed model that
only considers dedicated political party activity with all activity modes, ISSP data
allow for only one activity mode to be linked specifically to parties. Besides having
worked in a political party, ISSP data also asks about the attendance of political
meetings or rallies, the donation or fund raising for political causes, the expression
of views on the internet, the frequency of political discussions, the persuasion of
friends with regards to politics and the wearing of campaign badges.
Unsurprisingly, party members report much more often having recently worked
in a political party. The same holds true for all other items as well. However, since
party members are such a small group of citizenship, the picture shifts, once party
members are considered as a percentage of the activists. While parties still rely
mainly on their membership, other (i.e. not party related) items show something
different. With regards to general political activity, party members only represent
a maximum of 25%. Expressed the other way around, general political activity is
carried out by non-party members at a minimum share of 75%. Hence, the situation
is twofold. On the one hand, Scarrow (2019) shows that party members are much
more likely to be politically active in various ways. On the other hand, the potential
for multi-speed membership parties seems high, since party members are still in the
minority, if general political activity is assessed in absolute numbers.
Gomez, Ramiro, Morales and Aja (2019) pose the question of what it is that makes
some people join a party, while others only remain in the supporter position. Assum-
56International Social Survey Program, The paper is contradictory regarding the specific wave.
Both 2014 and 2016 are reported as years of data collection.
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ing that formal membership in general means accepting a heavier load of obligations
in exchange for a marginal amount of (increased) benefits, the authors want to ex-
plore, how the development of multi-speed membership parties affects the individu-
als’ willingness to still go a step further and accept legal obligations. The authors’
expectations mimic results found to influence the decision to join a party or not,
hence the dichotomy of party members and non-members. However, since their re-
search questions are explicitly meant to explore multi-speed membership parties,
Gomez et al. (2019, p. 4) expect that the possibility to influence a party’s key de-
cisions at a low formal level of relationship is the main diverging factor. Contrary
to that, those candidate selection incentives should play a much smaller part in the
members’ decision since they are in general more willing to invest.
Gomez et al. (2019, pp. 4) employ a sample of members and registered sympa-
thizers of three Spanish parties (Izquierda Uida (IU), Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds
(ICV) and Equo) who actually do not compete in general elections. They rather form
an electoral coalition, Unidas Podemos (Together we can), and work together with
another party (Podemos (We can)) as a joint parliamentary faction. All of these
parties are considered multi-speed parties, albeit this attribute is assigned by the
authors only based on a description of “registered sympathizers” (Gomez et al. 2019,
p. 5) that they find in each party. Those registered sympathizers have the right to
participate in primary elections, internal referendums, manifesto draftings and party
meetings, yet do not have the obligation to pay membership fees. As such, they are
closest to Scarrow’s (2015) light-membership mode.
The authors regress an individual’s affiliation status (members vs. sympathizers)
on nine different incentives items from the general incentives model (GIM).57 Ad-
ditionally, they control for socio-economical status58, internal efficacy, ideological
distance (to the party presumably), length of membership, and the party itself.
It shows that selective incentives (both outcome and process incentives), collec-
tive policy incentives, altruistic incentives and normative incentives all increase the
(log)odds (Gomez et al. (2019) recurrently interpret logit coefficients falsely in terms
of probability) of being a member rather than a registered sympathizer, which sup-
57Incentives include: Selective outcome, selective process, selection incentives, collective policy,
group efficacy, altruism, social norms, expressive benefits and costs.
58Variables include: Sex (reference: male), age, university degree and occupational status (retired
or inactive, unemployed, student; reference: working).
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port the authors hypothesis regarding the GIM. However, regarding group efficacy
and expressive incentives, regression results do not provide any support for the au-
thors’ expectation that these factors favor membership compared to sympathizers.
Additionally, perceived costs of membership do not make a significant difference.
Most importantly however, Gomez et al. (2019, p. 8) find strong evidence for their
hypothesis regarding incentives from selecting candidates. The selection incentives
item measures how important the ability for selecting a party’s election candidate
has been for an individual when deciding to become a member or sympathizer.
Overall results are in line with the authors’ expectation that the general incentives
model is applicable to the distinction of members and sympathizers, and theoret-
ical assumptions regarding this approach can be confirmed empirically. Moreover,
the authors further develop the GIM by introducing an additional incentive that
captures an individual’s willingness to participate in a party via primary elections,
which proved to be a major difference between members and sympathizers.
As one of the few scholars, who actually try to operationalize the multi-speed
model, Gibson, Greffet and Cantijoch (2016) are the first to assess this new theoret-
ical approach empirically. The authors draw information from two election surveys
conducted in 2012. On the one hand, data from the French National Election Study
are used, which is a nationally representative face-to-face survey. An on-line post-
election survey aimed at political activists is used for supplementary data.59
Explicitly building on the work of Scarrow (2015), Gibson et al. (2016, p. 3) de-
fine three modes of party affiliation as their analytical framework. Digital activists
basically refers to the cyber-member category of the original model, yet avoids the
term member in order to underline that formal membership is not a necessary pre-
condition of this way of affiliation. A second group of friends corresponds to the
follower category of the multi-speed model and audience refers to the wider group
of information gathering people, who do consume information, yet refuse to play an
active role.
Addressing the size and scope of their framework categories, the authors find
that around 10% of the National Election Study’s total sample counts as audience,
while 7% belong to the friends category and still 2.3% identify themselves as digital
59The National Election Survey data consist of 2,014 individuals of whom 1,481 were internet users.
The post-election survey reached a sample size of 827 individuals.
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activists. Considering only those respondents with access to the internet, proportions
rise a little bit up to 13% (audience), 9% (friends) and roughly 3% (digital activists).
To further assess the differences between individuals of each group, a multinomial
regression analysis60 is operated and results for contrasting each affiliation group
to the group of non-affiliates are presented. This analysis shows that all affiliation
groups differ remarkably from the average non-affiliate and simultaneously that only
one aspect is shared among all different groups of affiliates. Only an increase in
political interest increases the odds of belonging to each specific affiliation group
compared to belonging to the group of unaffiliated internet users. Party friends are
furthermore better educated and share a greater feel of political efficacy. For digital
activists, greater political trust adds up to the equation as well, while they are
also younger and less satisfied with democracy. The group of audience is shaped by
higher political trust and education as compared to the non-affiliated. Just like the
digital activist, audience-members are younger. However, what really sets audience-
members apart, or maybe the other groups even more, is that audience-members are
more likely to be male compared to the reference group. It is well documented that
males are more likely to be politically active and to be member of a political party.
This gender-determinism however cannot be seen for the group of party friends and
digital activists, at least with this study (Gibson et al. 2016, pp. 7).
As will be seen at a later stage of this study, the question of the overlap of several
affiliation groups is far from being trivial to address. Hence, Gibson et al. (2016, p.
11) employ a rather simple method of merely reporting the overlap of two groups at
a time. According to this, the largest overlap can be seen between digital activists,
who are simultaneously party members by 72%. Friends in contrast, only opt for
party membership by 40% and the audience even by only 19%.
Overlap categories also build for an additional multivariate analysis61 that aims
to determine differences between those affiliates of each category, who joined a party,
and those, who did not. Most interesting is the fact that sociological factors (i.e. age,
gender and education) make no significant differences for each of the three contrast-
ing pairs. What non-party members however have in common, and this comes hardly
60Independent variables include: Age, gender, education, political trust, political efficacy, interest
in politics and satisfaction with democracy. Independent variables are neither explained nor
grounded on any theoretical framework of influencing factors.
61Independent variables include: Age, gender, education, political trust, political efficacy, interest
in politics, satisfaction with democracy, party closeness and party contact.
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as a surprise, is a lower level of party closeness. This is even true for non member
digital activists, the group of cyber members, whose name was changed to under-
line that this affiliation type is also open for non-formal members. Non-member
party friends also feature a lower level of political trust, greater satisfaction with
democracy and more infrequent party contact, compared to those who also opted
for party membership. Audience non-members are fairly close to non-member party
friends. Yet while the former are not significantly more or less satisfied with democ-
racy compared to their member-equivalent, they are significantly less interested in
politics.
Furthermore, the authors can show that on-line campaign efforts rise steadily
by type of affiliation only. Audience members report the largest mean, followed by
friends and digital activists. Within each group, members report a significantly larger
mean compared to non-members. Yet, the members mean of one group is constantly
smaller than the non-members mean of the next higher ranked affiliation group.
This pattern changes however, when it comes to off-line campaign activity. Again,
the same clear order of affiliation types can be seen, yet it is rather the case that the
members’ mean activity level is higher than that of non-members of the next higher
group. This much more mimics the member/non-member distinction as compared
to on-line campaign activity.
Gomez and Ramiro (2017) argue that dissatisfaction with traditional parties not
only brings about the emergence of new forms of party affiliation within well-
established traditional parties, but also supports the development of completely
new parties, employing multi-speed membership right from the start. Yet, while the
development of mainstream parties is said to be well known (which the author of this
study doubts emphatically), the “analysis of new parties’ innovations and their im-
pact is still in progress” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 534). Employing “a membership
survey of Podemos” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 538), the authors aim to contribute
to this analysis by the exploration of an “extreme case” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p.
535). Yet, while giving interesting insights into Podemos’ socio-demographic struc-
ture, their study suffers from stressing the distinctiveness of Podemos way too far,
which negatively influences the interpretation of empirical results.
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One of the defining, if not the most important, features of Scarrow’s multi-speed
model is that it explicitly incorporates people, who chose not to be traditional mem-
bers of a political party. Only this gives room for variations of party affiliation, that
do not hold on to traditional membership as the immovable center of all party ac-
tivity, but allow for individual variation of different activities including traditional
party membership. Gomez and Ramiro (2017) are not clear about how to assess
Podemos’ membership, which is already apparent with the continuous use of the
term membership. On the one hand, they underline the newness of Podemos’ mem-
bership approach, which does resign demanding anything from their members, and
does not make any difference between types of affiliation. On the other hand, the au-
thors do not shy at comparing Podemos’ membership numbers with those of other,
more traditional Spanish parties, without taking into account the (at least by their
perception) very different meaning of the term and thus for the parties themselves
(Gomez & Ramiro 2017, pp. 536).
This latter interpretation, which sees Podemos’ members as normal party members
in the first place, makes much more sense and should have been kept up throughout
the whole paper. Despite Podemos introducing some new features towards a more
inclusive membership approach, survey data employed in this study only consist
of individuals, who chose to officially register with Podemos. This is basically all
that “well-established” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 534) parties demand from their
members as well. Even though hurdles for membership might be lower with Pode-
mos than with other parties, the act of officially giving one’s name, counting as a
member (aside from political science scholars, few people might think about the fine
subtleties of membership vs. affiliation), and appearing on the record, should not be
underestimated. Therefore, the study by Gomez and Ramiro (2017) is rather a tra-
ditional party members survey, than it is an empirical translation of the multi-speed
model.
While Gomez and Ramiro (2017, p. 534) interpret their results as “limits of orga-
nizational innovation”, this study argues that results simply reflect the use of a data
base not applicable to their research interest. At first the authors can show that
Podemos’ members and voters differ remarkably and significantly with regard to
the share of males, educational levels, employment status, and political orientation,
making the members more resourceful and extreme. Additionally, members feature
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higher associational involvement, yet lower political participation. However, voters’
high political participation is described as having used “more forms of political par-
ticipation in the past” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 539), which is not necessarily
equivalent or even similar to intensive or regular participation. This could be a more
interesting information, since using a lot of forms of political participation is not
valuable by itself. Differences between voters and members also stand the test of
multivariate analyses.
Similar to the approach of this study, Gomez and Ramiro (2017) make use of
clustering methods to assess the idea of the multi-speed membership model of vari-
ous overlapping ellipses (figure 3.2 on page 47) in contrast to Duverger’s concentric
circle Model (figure 3.1 on page 40). Their idea is that cluster analysis showed “a
small number of clearly differentiated groups ranging from very active to very inac-
tive members” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 541), if Podemos followed the concentric
circle model. On the contrary, they expect a more fuzzy cluster structure with vari-
ous semi-active groups. On the basis of information about “(internal and external)
partisan activities” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017, p. 539), they identify three clusters62
which they name traditional members (76.2% of the sample), militants (13.2%) and
friends/audience (10.5%).
With this structure, the authors deliver what they have expected and what they
interpret as a confirmation of the Duverger Model. With respect to eight variables
employed for the cluster analysis, Militants show a pattern of widespread internal
and external party activity and substantially contribute to the party’s financial out-
come. On the other hand, Traditional Members only participate in internal party
ballots, while they do neither contribute much to the party’s external representation
nor to their financial provision. Friends/audience contribute even less with regard to
all various party needs. Since the authors do not identify a cluster of “‘inactive’ mil-
itants or activists, who are only loosely linked to the party” (Gomez & Ramiro 2017,
p. 541), they see evidence that Podemos follows the structure of concentric circles
with very active and strongly affiliated members at the core and less active members
in the shell who are only loosely tied to the party. Again it has to be emphasized
that the sample is likely to prevent the identification of a multi-speed structure,
since only Podemos’ members have been questioned, not extra-party sympathizers.
62Final cluster solution is based on BIC scores.
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This critique is fostered even more with the authors’ findings of only small differ-
ences in socio-demographic variables, and only slightly larger differences with regard
to ideological extremism as well as party involvement. Results are however confirmed
via multivariate analysis.
Webb, Poletti and Bale (2017) also address the differences in members and support-
ers activity. They conducted a survey among members and supporters of six UK
parties immediately after the 2015 general election, while supporters were defined
as individuals with a “strong sense of partisan identification” (Webb et al. 2017, p.
65), who were not formal members of a political party.63 Despite explicitly referring
to and drawing inspiration from Scarrow’s (2015) multi-speed membership model,
the authors miss to precisely operationalize this model. Firstly, Scarrow (2015) does
not describe an affiliation mode called ‘party sympathisers’ as Webb et al. (2017, p.
65) state. Secondly, members as well as supporters were questioned regarding several
activities they carried out in the 2015 campaigning. Yet, items must be linked to spe-
cific modes of the multi-speed membership model by the reader himself. Moreover,
if this linkage is performed, it becomes obvious that not all modes were actually
operationalized. These shortcomings are especially unfortunate, since the authors
pride themselves with “specially commissioned survey data.” (Webb et al. 2017, p.
65)
Despite these drawbacks of the research design, the authors’ findings are nev-
ertheless very interesting and give valuable insight into differences and supporters
of British parties. This is especially the case because, Webb et al. (2017) do not
immediately jump into complicated multivariate analyses, but compare their sam-
ples’ political and social characteristics, which itself brings about useful information.
Hence, Webb et al. (2017, p. 66) prove similarities and pronounced differences be-
tween members and supporters across the whole spectrum of British party politics.
Regardless of a specific party, supporters and members feature almost exactly the
same mean age and roughly the same left-right self-placement on an 11-point scale
63Members survey sample: Conservative = 1192, Labour = 1180, Liberal Democrats = 730, UKIP
= 784, GPEW = 895, SNP = 963; Supporters survey sample: Conservative = 1142, Labour =
1136, Liberal Democrats = 1004, UKIP = 1071, GPEW = 1092, SNP = 996; Members sample
has been unweighted for analysis, while the supporters sample has been weighted by age, gender,
social class and region.
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(members 4.44 as opposed to supporters 4.66).64 Interestingly, members of all par-
ties are more extreme according to this self-placement than supporters are, which
reminds of May’s (1973) Law of curvilinear disparity amongst party elites, mem-
bers, and voters. The greatest disparity can be seen with the Scottish National
Party (SNP, .7 scale-points), while the Conservatives are most similar (.2).
Members are also much more likely to be male (65% compared to 48% for sup-
porters, +17%-points). This is especially pronounced with the Greens (Green party
of England and Wales, GPEW), where 58% of the members are male, yet only 36%
of the supporters (+ 22). On the other end of the spectrum of dissimilarity, 56%
of SNP’s members are male, while 52% of the supporters are too (+4). Across all
parties reviewed, UKIP features the greatest share of males with 76% and SNP
features the lowest with only 56% Webb et al. (2017).
Moreover, members are much more likely to be educated to graduate level (+14
%-points), as well as more likely to be members of the middle-class social strata
(ABC1, +13) according to the NRS Social Grade classification65. Greens as well as
Labour members are graduates by 56%, which represents the highest proportion of
graduates among all parties; UKIP members are only graduated by 23%. Equally,
Ukippers show the smallest proportion of middle class members (60%), while more
than three quarters of the Liberal Democrats members belong to the middle class too.
Yet, differences between members and supporters social characteristics, percentage
of graduates and percentage of middle class, are also very pronounced. This holds
especially true for the Labour Party, whose members and supporters at the same
time position themselves the furthest on the left (see above). Around 56% of the
Labour members are graduates, while only 30% of Labour supporters hold some
kind of tertiary education degree (+26%-points). Similarly, the Labour’s middle
class members outrun middle class supporters by 18%-points (70% compared to
52%). On the other hand, the GPEW features the most equal share of graduates
(56% compared to 49%, +7) and the Conservatives show the smallest discrepancy
when it comes to middle class membership (75% compared to 69%, +6) Webb et al.
(2017).
64mean placement on a scale from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing).
65The NRS (National Readership Survey) Social Grade classifies people according to the chief
income earner’s occupation. Grades A, B and C1 are equivalent to the upper, middle and lower
middle class. Grades C2, D and E refer to strata of the working class. Upper class is disregarded.
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Besides individual, political and social characteristics, Webb et al. (2017, pp. 66)
review members and supporters efforts during the 2015 UK general election. Over-
all, members are much more likely to be active for their party with a mean 2.47
points on an 8-point additive scale.66 Supporters on the other hand only achieve a
mean of .51 points, which is equal to only around 20% of the members’ activity
score. In comparison to members, supporters are the least active when it comes to
standing as a candidate. Supporters show an activity level of only 4% compared to
the level of members with regard to be willing to be elected. Equally low are the
supporters’ levels of canvassing (8%) and delivering leaflets (7%). Actions that can
be assigned to Scarrow’s (2015) cyber-membership mode are comparably popular
among supporters. Activity levels of these non-members reach as much as 39% for
liking something on Facebook and still 24% for twitter activity. Considering the
huge burdens, especially timewise, that go along with any kind of office or mandate
and that these burdens do not end with the end of the campaign, this comes hardly
as a surprise. The same holds true for canvassing and delivering leaflets, which both
are activities that demand relatively high timewise investments and link activity
directly to a person and not to a virtual account identity. The same idea is consid-
ered, when the authors additionally group activities by intensity and can show that
the ratio of the supporters activity level is much higher for low-intensity activities
(38%) than it is for high-intensity activities (Webb et al. 2017, p. 69).
In order to determine factors that influence supporters’ and members’ campaign
activity, Webb et al. (2017, pp. 69) regress an individual’s activity score67 against
socio-demographic, ideological and constituency factors.68 Both for supporters and
66Members and supporters were asked whether they: Liked something by party/candidate on Face-
book, tweeted or retweed something by the party, displayed an election poster in a window,
delivered leaflets, attended a public meeting or hustings, canvassed face to face or by phone, and
whether they stood as a candidate for parliament or locally.
67The index for multivariate analysis only considers low and medium-intensity activities due to sup-
porters hardly showing any interest in high-intensity activity and maps the breadth of activities
an individual performs.
68Socio-demographic factors include: Sex, education, middle class, age, age squared and previous
party membership. Ideological factors include: Ideological incongruence (between positioning
oneself and one’s party), additive liberty-authority index, post-materialism index and the ques-
tion of having a clear view on Brexit. The constituency factor is represented by a measure of
marginality that considers the winning majority of the local MP in the 2010 general election.
Additionally, variables were controlled for the specific party of membership/supportership and,
in case of supporters, whether an individual has previously been member of a political party.
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members, separate models are estimated and coefficients as well as levels of signifi-
cance are compared.
The analysis of socio-demographic variables reveals that those members, who fea-
ture the broadest range of campaign activity are on average older, more likely to be
female, less educated and of lower social grade (Webb et al. 2017, p. 71). Consider-
ing supporters, however, only sex and age feature levels of significance below p<0.1.
While also supporters are more likely to be female if a broader range of activities is
performed, highly active supporters tend to be significantly younger than their more
focused mates. Previous party members are also less likely to engage in a party than
supporters without membership experience (Webb et al. 2017, pp. 71).
With regard to ideological beliefs, both members and supporters are more likely
to be active, if they tend to stand more on the libertarian side, are more convinced
about post-materialist values, and have a clear view of future EU-UK relations.
Ideological incongruence however, shows contrary results for both affiliation types.
While party members’ activity level is decreased by a greater ideological gap between
individuals and the party, party supporters apparently feel motivated by this type
of disagreement and increase their efforts. Webb et al. (2017, p. 71) see the latter
effect as a kind of lesser evil strategy. Supporters, although not in line with the
party leadership, do support the party since they value party politics and see the
need for participation. This brings them to chose the best option available, despite
having conflicting opinions of some sort. Finally, a safe seat hinders both members
and supporters from being more active in the campaign, which intuitively makes
sense, since the need for activity is lower when a race is less close.
5.2 The Broader Picture of the Changing Nature of Party
Affiliation
With much the same arguments as they are brought forward in the introduc-tion to Scarrow’s (2015) Beyond Party Members, Scarrow and Gezgor (2010)
introduce a cross-national study on party members’ socio-economic profile. The au-
thors state that party membership figures all across Europe have shrunk in recent
years, while at the same time parties have granted new powers to control policies
and party leadership. Both aspects of recent membership parties’ development are
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not entirely coincidental. Rather political parties try to maintain their attractive-
ness and react towards declining memberships by admitting greater participation
possibilities for ordinary members. Scarrow and Gezgor (2010) ask, whether this
assumed development gives rise to a shift of party members’ profiles being less that
of other (i.e. non-party members) citizens. Despite specific results, this study only
considers party members and asks about their development, instead of going beyond
this point, like the later 2015 study does.
Gauja and Grömping (2019) draw inspiration from Duverger’s (1959) concentric
circles model, albeit employing party identification as the ordering characteristic.
Although the authors can show significant differences between non-committed, reg-
ular supporters and strong supporters in the UK and Australia, their research suffers
from several methodical problems and an unhandy application of the concentric cir-
cles model.
According to this study, women are both “slightly underrepresented among regular
(...) and strong supporters” (Gauja & Grömping 2019, p. 5) as well as overrepre-
sented among the non-committed. Moreover, party supporters (regular and strong)
are older on average and are born in the country of investigation respectively to a
greater share as are the non-committed. Strong supporters are also most likely to be
either in full-time employment and retirees are more prominent among strong and
regular supporters. However, the latter is very likely to be an effect of age that cor-
relates strongly with the retiree status. Also the level of university alumni is higher
among strong supporters Gauja and Grömping (2019).
Besides socio-demographic characteristics, different groups of supporters (accord-
ing to party identification) also differ with regard to political engagement. Party
membership increases with the level of support, as does membership with other
group organizations such as trade unions or local community groups. The same holds
true for political participation as well as for different party activism variations (visit
websites, social media activity, donate money etc.). Strangely, the authors wonder
at the high levels of party membership of 6% they achieve among all respondents
and compare it to other scholars’ findings regarding membership-electorate-ratios
in the specific countries. Unfortunately, they do not take into account that their
sample only consist of voters, which are likely to be more interested in politics and
107
Chapter 5
therefore in party membership, while traditional M/E-ratios are calculated among
the electorate (i.e. eligible voter) not the actual voters Gauja and Grömping (2019).
Moreover, respondents had been asked about future party activism, which con-
firms prior insight that the level of (future) activism correlates positively with the
level of party identification. While this “battery of questions was designed to inves-
tigate respondents’ attitudes to a sample of organizational reforms that are char-
acteristic of the trend towards ‘opening up’ political parties” (Gauja & Grömping
2019, p. 8), validity of this instrument is questionable, since respondents are likely to
answer not according to future activism (which is itself hypothetical) but according
to their preferred picture of themselves. Hence, there is a massive problem of social
desirability associated with this item battery if not controlled for a general tendency
of compliance. Moreover, even when personal future engagement is assessed reliably,
the conclusion towards attitudes is hasty at best.
Gauja and Grömping (2019) also state that their findings hold up to multivariate
regression analysis. Based on their binomial hurdle model, political engagement is
significantly dependent on party identification, sex and age. Yet, the authors miss to
control for party membership, which is likely to negatively affect levels of significance
of these variables.
Besides bare results, this paper also suffers from a crude adaption of Duverger’s
concentric circle model. With the original model, the overlap of different categories
of party affiliates is an important characteristic and makes sense with regard to the
contextual meaning of different groups. It makes perfect sense for example that Du-
verger assumes an overlap of party activists and members. However, while (Gauja
& Grömping 2019, p. 4) also display their categories with an overlapping concentric
circle model, an overlap makes no sense for their categories of non-committed, reg-
ular supporters and strong supporters. A simple stacked bar chart would be much
more appropriate, despite abandoning the Duverger reference of course.
Faucher and Boy (2018) investigate a sample of members, official affiliates and lapsed
identifiers of the French Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV), product of the 2010
merger of a political party (Les Verts) and a coalition of associations and supporters
(Europe Ecologie). The sample itself consists of formal members, registered affili-
ates and so called “lapsed party members or lapsed coopérateurs” (Faucher & Boy
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2018, p. 168). This sample provides a very interesting research subject regarding two
aspects. On the one hand, EELV stems from a merger of a regular political party
and a more loosely linked network of associations and individuals. This includes
very different kinds of affiliates within one organization, who found their way into
party politics via two very different ways: Traditional political party membership
and a citizens’ movement. Consequently, although all individuals are now gathered
under the common term membership, a very heterogeneous membership can be ex-
pected. On the other hand, lapsed identifiers provide access to information from
individuals, who did actually not register with EELV and hence are furthest away
from traditional membership as any subsample of this review before. Since access to
supporters is mostly gained via party records, there is always a bias towards some
kind of official registration process involved. This sample explicitly distinguishes
between affiliated supporters and those, who left their details but in the end did
not register with the party, it provides access to a wider variety of affiliates. The
authors build their research on the classic May’s law approach, expecting “a linear
function between supporters and elected/core party elites on values and policies”
(H1), “a linear function on items relating to the adoption of green lifestyles” (H2)
and “middle-level elites (...) to take more radical positions on issues of intra-party
democracy.” (Faucher & Boy 2018, p. 171)
Principal component analysis is used to construct a synthetic index consider-
ing values, policies, pro-environmental behavior, and democracy items. Comparing
group69 factor scorings, Faucher and Boy (2018, p. 173) find that affiliates score
higher on values and environmental policies, the closer they are to the core party.
Elected officials outrun regular party members, which outrun lapsed affiliates. With
regard to pro-environmental behavior and the agreement on democracy supporting
items, differences are much smaller and not addressed in detail.
Regressing the individuals’ scores of each factor on the affiliation position and sup-
plemental control variables, it can be shown that the category of affiliation makes
a significant difference with regard to the values dimension. Sympathizers are the
least radical while party officers do not differ significantly from elected representa-
tives (reference category). The issue factor loading is equally explained by affiliation
position. Elected representatives hold the most radical view on environmental poli-
69Groups include: Elected representatives, party officers, party members, coop members, lapsed
party members, lapsed coop members, and sympathisers.
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cies, while other groups feature coefficients indicating growing negative evaluations
the further away they are positioned from the pinnacle of the party. Contrary to this
pattern, party elites do not excel when it comes to pro-environmental behavior that
is in fact not at all significantly predicted by affiliation type. Finally, intra-party
democracy is where May’s law can be verified empirically. “Those dependent on in-
ternal elections to maintain their positions, and the powers associated with them,
appear to be keenest to preserve intra-party democracy.” (Faucher & Boy 2018, p.
176)
While also making use of the new go-to term of the “multi-speed party” (Scarrow
2015), Hooghe and Kölln (2018) assess this phenomenon with a distinction of only
two groups. Distinguishing between party members and party supporters, the au-
thors try to answer the question whether “informally organized party supporters
could be regarded as functionally equivalent to party members” (Hooghe & Kölln
2018, p. 2). This assumption however, is limited to contexts, which are not directly
related to a party’s core organizational structure, but rather to the “democratic
linkage function” (Hooghe & Kölln 2018, p. 2).
On the basis of longitudinal data for all parties from the Dutch political system
from 2011 to 2015, they can show that stability of group membership is much higher
for party members than it is for party supporters. Correlations coefficients70 for
party supporters range between .74 and .82 across two survey waves, which already
represents a very solid correlation. However, for party members, coefficients show a
nearly perfect correlation between membership of two separate years, meaning there
is almost no fluctuation among party members.
Moreover, the authors compare groups of supporters and members with a third
group of independents. This comparison reveals strong differences with respect to
an array of characteristics. Party supporters are generally less often women, they
are older, better educated, more confident in parties as well as more satisfied with
parties. Additionally, external efficacy is higher for party supporters compared to
independents, supporters are more satisfied with democracy, and they are more ac-
tively involved in politics. The only aspect where no differences can be observed is
70Hooghe and Kölln (2018) use tetrachoric coefficients, which are specifically designed to be em-




satisfaction with recent governmental performance. All these mean differences also
stand the ANOVA test, which reveals p-values < .01 in the vast majority of compar-
isons. Almost exclusively it is comparisons of governmental performance satisfaction
that are not significant on the 5%-level. This pattern, described for the comparison
of independents and supporters, remains stable for the comparison of independents
with members and also between supporters and members (Hooghe & Kölln 2018,
pp. 6).
Once party preferences in an election are considered, this stability among different
groups of party affiliates begins to erode. The authors conduct a logistic regression
analysis on stable party preference. While belonging to all groups of supporters (not
convinced, convinced and very convinced) and to the group of members shows pos-
itive effects for party loyalty, the size of effects differs remarkably. In line with their
expectations, not convinced supporters are the group of affiliates, which is least
likely to feature a stable preference in elections, followed by convinced supporters.
However, belonging to the group of party members does not go hand in hand with
being the most loyal voters. This position is reserved for the very convinced party
supporters. Yet, since confidence intervals of convinced and very convinced support-
ers as well as members overlap, one cannot rely on these differences (Hooghe & Kölln
2018, pp. 7).
With reference to their introductory research goal, Hooghe and Kölln (2018) need
to admit, that a major part of their initial expectations regarding functional equiva-
lence cannot be affirmed. Party members differ from party supporters with regard to
various socio-structural variables and therefore do not represent members convinc-
ingly. However, both groups of affiliates also do not represent independents either,
which shows that a broader scope of party adherents still does not substantially
deal with the voters-members gap. Furthermore, members show stronger party com-
mitment as indicated by the party activity scale. Yet, supporters can mimic party
members’ electoral loyalty as long as they belong to the group of very convinced sup-
porters. This finding suggests the importance not to asses extra-membership party
supporters as a uniform group of affiliates, but rather distinguish according to their
level of commitment.
With regard to the major theoretical inspiration of this paper it has to be acknowl-
edged that it much more supports the idea of concentric circles as a fundamental
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party structure, since vital one directional differences can be observed in accordance
with the level of party commitment
Bernardi, Sandri and Seddone (2017) chose a fairly distant approach to the topic
of beyond-membership participation. Rather than assessing party affiliation of non-
members from either the parties’ supply side or the individuals’ demand side, they
focus on a third stakeholder within this process: Traditional party members. Con-
sidering the adoption of open primary elections in Italy as “one of the main devel-
opments in Italian party politics in the last 10 years” (Bernardi et al. 2017, p. 222),
the authors of this paper deal with the question of organizational consequences on
the traditional membership side. A more inclusive approach of intra-party democ-
racy, rooted in the US political system, is said to be adapted among European
parties, which is expected to “influence the relationship among parties, members
and supporters” (Bernardi et al. 2017, p. 221). According to Bernardi et al. (2017)
a challenge lies in the equal participation of not formally enrolled party supporters
and traditional members since both share the same participative incentives, while
simultaneously supporters do not provide the same amount of activism to the party.
The implementation of open primaries in fact can lead to an unbalance of the give-
and-take basis membership parties rely on until now. Yet, the authors of this paper
could have diversified their theoretical argument. In fact, not all party members
contribute to the well-being of their party, be it financial endowment, campaign work
or simply by promoting and discussing party positions with friends and family. On
the other hand, party members, mostly via representative institutions, do always,
regardless of their activity/support level, take the opportunity to vote in inner-
party elections. This of course, looks different, once an actual members’ ballot is
held without the mediating institution of e.g. branch delegates. Vice versa party
supporters can take a very active role in a party and participate just like very
active traditional members do, yet they would never get the chance to vote in inner-
party elections. However, in some European countries, open primaries have been
introduced in recent years, which allow even non-members to vote in formerly party-
exclusive matters. Thus, the situation of dedication and activity amongst formal
members and supporters is much more complex than Bernardi et al. (2017) admit.
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The empirical assessment of the role of traditional party members is based on a
survey, conducted amongst members of the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party,
PD) in 2013. This database provides an interesting anomaly, which allows for a sim-
ple consideration of traditional party members’ perception of greater inclusiveness
and the changes this development might bring for traditional party membership:
The Democratic Party has only existed since 2007 and features what Bernardi et al.
(2017) call old and new-style members. The PD came into being as a merger of the
Democratici di Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left) and the La Margherita (The
Daisy). All PD members of these predecessors are considered old-style members,
while people who joined the party in 2007 or later are named new-style members.
Since the PD, right from the foundation in 2007, employed inclusive elements in
their manifesto, the authors consider both member-styles to be socialized differently
with regard to the idea of party membership and thus to feature different attitudes
towards the opening of previously member-exclusive opportunities Bernardi et al.
(2017, p. 220).
Coming from these theoretical assumptions (Bernardi et al. 2017) propose that
new-style members show a more positive opinion of primary elections than old-style
members (H1), and that the members’ degree of participation correlates negatively
with their approval of primary elections (H2) Bernardi et al. (2017, pp. 225).
Employing both bivariate and multivariate methods, the authors can show that it
is in fact the case, that new-style members have a more positive opinion towards the
implementation of primary elections. Moreover, the more active party members are,
the worse their judgment about primaries was. Thus both hypotheses can be con-
firmed, even if controlled for basic socio-demographic variables and the individuals’
perception of the previous 2012 primaries for selecting the Prime Ministerial can-
didate. Based on these findings, the authors suggest that democratization of party
life should be considered carefully. While the majority of both styles of members
basically evaluate primaries positively, this study implies that members’ willingness
to invest in the party by means of active hours is decreased, if active members are
disentitled of distinct members rights. Hence, political parties face the challenge to
balance between an inclusiveness that attracts people to participate, and the risk of
intimidating activists by making activism arbitrary.
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Just like Faucher and Boy (2018), Gauja and Jackson (2016) employ a sample of both
members and supporters of a party in the environmental tradition: The Australian
Greens. The sample originates from two independent surveys conducted amongst
members in December 2012 and amongst supporters in July 2013. Members were
divided into active and inactive members, based on self-description. The supporters
subsample consisted of two separate groups, which were both contacted via email:
On the one hand, active supporters, who had engaged in any activity with the party
since the 2010 Australian federal election and on the other hand inactive supporters,
who had provided not only their email address but also a valid residential address to
the party, though had not been active in any recorded way. This sample consequently
ignores individuals, who may be invisible for a party’s records, yet might provide
essential resources as well.
Turning towards results, Gauja and Jackson (2016, pp. 365) show that active and
inactive members as well as supporters were motivated equally with regard to po-
litical goals.71 On the contrary, active members and, although to a lesser extent,
even inactive members more than active supporters report that Becoming active,
Volunteering, Meeting people and Learning more played an important or rather im-
portant role for their decision to join. Financial support is mentioned to a higher
degree by inactive members (very likely to balance their inactivity compared to
active members) and about equally by active members and active supporters.
Asking active and inactive supporters about the importance of certain activities72
to show support for the party reveals consistency across both groups. Only financial
support is seen as important much more by active supporters than by their inactive
counterparts (Gauja & Jackson 2016, p. 366).
Moreover, a comparison of activity profiles of each group shows that a low-intensity
activity like Sign a petition is undertaken frequently, even by inactive supporters,
although active members, active supporters and inactive members (in decreasing
order) feature higher numbers. When it comes to high-intensity activities (i.e. fund-
raising and participating in action) however, active members do participate fre-
71Political goals include: Wanting to realize the aims of the party, Dissatisfied with other parties
and Impressed with the Greens performance.
72Activities include: Voting for the party, receiving information about the party and policies, do-
nating to the party, sharing messages on social media, wearing or displaying the Greens logo
and displaying the Greens’ logo on social media.
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quently to a much large portion than any other group (Gauja & Jackson 2016, p.
367).
Only small differences are found regarding ideological self-positioning on an 11-
point scale (1 (left) to 11 (right)). Although a shift from left to less left is clearly
visible starting with active members (2.4) over inactive members, active supporters
and ending with inactive supporters (2.75), the difference in the mean score is only
15% (Gauja & Jackson 2016, pp. 370).
Supporters are also much more similar to members than the authors expected.
Notable differences were to be seen regarding the share of women, which was higher
among inactive supporters (57%), albeit women are not underrepresented in any
of the affiliation groups (active members: 50%, inactive members: 50%, active sup-
porters: 52%). Furthermore, active members and supporters feature lower shares
of TAFE/secondary73 graduates and higher rates of PhD graduates than inactive
groups. With a mean age of 49 years, inactive supporters are on average a lit-
tle younger too (active members: 53, inactive members: 53, active supporters: 55)
(Gauja & Jackson 2016, pp. 372).
Sandri and Seddone (2015) explore a sample of external voters, supporters and
members of the Italian Partito Democratico (PD), who voted in the 2012 Italian
center-left coalition’s primary elections. As explained with regard to Bernardi et al.
(2017) (see p. 112), the PD is a unique case, due to its history and the correspond-
ing distinction between old and new-style members. External voters are defined as
individuals, who are neither formally enrolled in the party, nor voted for the party
in the previous general election. Those, who actually did vote for the PD in previous
elections, yet until now refused to join the party formally, are termed Supporters,
while Members represent formally registered affiliates, who are also identified as
being loyal voters (Sandri & Seddone 2015, pp. 10).
The authors aim to shed light on political profiles and motivational differences for
the vote choice amongst members, supporters and externals. Hypotheses, however,
only address primary voters’ motivations and read as follows: Enrolled members’
motivations are expected to be based on a “feeling of belonging” (Sandri & Sed-
73Technical and Further Education: Institutions providing predominantly vocational courses under
the head of Australian state/territory governments.
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done 2015, p. 13) due to a higher emotional attachment to the party.74 On the
contrary, supporters’ and externals’ motivation is assumed to be driven by strategic
considerations, related to specific issues.75
A first look at the respondents’ political profiles does not disclose revolutionary or
unexpected anomalies. Members are both more interested in politics and positioned
further on the left of the political spectrum. Around 92% of the PD’s members
subsample specify to be interested in politics at least at an average level. This
characteristic decreases for supporters to around 85% and down to 76% for external
voters. Moreover, members report to be positioned on the left or center-left of the
political left-right spectrum by 89%. While externals do again deviate from members
with only 63%, the supporters subsample features a share of dedicated left-wingers
equal to that of members.
Describing the respondents’ motivational characteristics on a bivariate basis, San-
dri and Seddone (2015, pp. 15) identify the electoral campaign as only playing a
marginal role for most of the respondents in every group. Yet, it cannot be denied,
that external voters explain to be affected by the campaign the most. Moreover, 27%
of the members explain that a candidate’s ability to lead the country (strategy) was
crucial for their specific vote choice. External voters demand this aspect by only
10% and reveal the greatest portion of agreement regarding the representation of
the renewal of party elites (23%, strategy) and even the ideological closeness to the
candidate (20%, feeling). The latter is mentioned by party members by only 12%.
The supporters’ subsample shows an almost equal modus among both items (renewal
of party elites: 17.6%, ability to lead: 16.1%; both strategy). Unfortunately, Sandri
and Seddone (2015) refuse to explicitly position themselves regarding their hypothe-
sis on the basis of bivariate assessment. In fact, all groups (members, supporters and
externals) show the greatest amount of agreement regarding strategy-items. More-
over, the representation of ideological values, as such an item of the feelings-category,
is only mentioned by members by 12%, while externals consider this a motive for
74The concept of a Feeling of belonging includes: (a) she/he represents my ideological values; (b)
she/he is formally supported by my party; (c) I like the outcomes of her/ his past political
activities; (d) I like primaries and participation in general.
75The concept of Strategic motivations includes: (a) she/he represents the renewal of party elites;
(b) she/he is the most fit to lead Italy; (c) I like her/his political program; (d) she/he is the
most fit to win against the center-right coalition; (e) she/he is the least bad choice; (f) I like the
candidate’s personal profile; (g) she/he has been recommended to me by friends/family.
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their choice by almost 20% (supporters: 14%). Simultaneously, other items con-
cerning a feeling of belonging, are chosen much more often by members than by
supporters and externals. Overall, a clear distinction between members, supporters
and externals regarding their motivation for their vote choice, either strategic or
driven by a feeling of belonging, cannot be confirmed. What can be seen however,
is that supporters’ motives much more resemble the pattern of the members than
that of externals.
Lastly, causes for a feelings-based motivation in contrast to a strategic motivation
are explored using logistic regression. Unfortunately, the authors are not clear about
what they actually report. Reported numbers are named both logit coefficients and
odds ratios, albeit the numbers themselves and their interpretation point undoubt-
edly towards odds ratios. Sandri and Seddone (2015, pp. 17) explain that “being a
supporter decreases the odds of voting following ‘feeling of belonging’ motivations
by a factor of 0.7”. While this interpretation is true, the authors apply the same
argument on the factor of .8 that arises from being an external voter. The difference
however is that the later result is not significant according to the chosen p-value.
Regarding other variables, i.e. interest in politics, and ideological left-right position,
the lack of significance is acknowledged, however coefficients are interpreted and
considered none the less.
What actually significantly increases the odds of voting on the basis of motivations
associated with a feeling of belonging are most candidates. If respondents predict
candidates Bersani, Tabacci and Vendola to be the primaries winner, the odds in-
crease in contrast to those, who expect candidate Renzi to succeed. Yet, these results
are not clearly interpreted with regard to the dependent variable, but are explained
with a high level of competitiveness previous to the election Sandri and Seddone
(2015, p. 18).
In contrast to surveys among party members, affiliates or the general public, Fisher
et al. (2014) make use of survey data conducted among election agents in Britain
in 2010. Election agents in the British electoral system are compulsory for every
candidate and take responsibility for the candidate’s campaign and communication
with officials. In Britain, a candidate can serve as his or her own election agent. Right
after the general election, all election agents of candidates standing in seats from
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five major parties76 were asked to answer a questionnaire. Additionally, extensive
qualitative interviews were conducted with a smaller number of election agents in
the weeks following the election.
Fisher et al. (2014, pp. 80) found that around 78% of Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrat constituencies recruited supporters, as opposed to members, to
help in campaign activity77 and on average 18 supporters per constituency were
successfully recruited. Simultaneously, the mean number of total campaign workers
at the end of the campaign was 28. Although these numbers cannot be put in direct
comparison, since one figure’s basis is the campaign as a whole and the other figure
refers explicitly to the end of the campaign, the average number of supporters is
to some extent put into perspective. With 86% of the constituencies, the Liberal
Democrats employed supporters more often than Conservatives and Labour, yet
Conservatives hired more supporters on average per local branch (22 as opposed to
19 in Liberal Democrats and 13 in Labour branches).
Moreover, on the basis of the idea of low and high level political participation,
members’ and supporters’ efforts in five different campaign activities were compared.
The authors expected members to be more active in high intensity activities such as
contacting voters and supporters to focus more on low level activities like delivering
leaflets. However, while Fisher et al. (2014, p. 83) can show that a greater share of
every parties’ members participated in either of the campaign activities, supporters
and members both were concentrated on low level activity. For example, 97% of
Liberal Democrats’ members participated in delivering leaflets, while only 94% of
recruited supporters carried out this task. Yet, since only between 52 and 79% of the
members took the chance to help with other tasks, members, too, were concentrated
on low level activities. In the light of these numbers, it is problematic, how Fisher et
al. (2014, p. 82) come to conclude that supporters were “quite likely to staff polling
stations relative to members” (Democrats: 76% of members vs. 65% of supporters,
Labour: 56% members vs. 33% supporters, Liberal Democrats: 63% members vs.
47% supporters).78
76Conservative and the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party and from
Plaid Cymru though only data of the first three parties are used throughout this paper.
77Questioned activities include delivering leaflets, telephoning electors, polling station number tak-
ers, doorstep canvassing and helping at campaign office.
78Party members’ percentage refers to members of local branches, where also supporters were
recruited, which allows for the fairest comparison as the authors suggest themselves.
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In order to further compare the members’ and supporters’ activity pattern, Fisher
et al. (2014, pp. 82) employ Phi coefficients. For all parties, most similarity in activity
is seen for polling station number takers, while doorstep canvassing reveals most
dissimilarity. Moreover, an additive six-step activity index is built to measure an
individual’s number of activities (0 = no activities to 5 = all activities). This index
ranges from 3.6 for Liberal Democrats’ members to 4.1 for Conservative members
with Labour members in between (3.9). Comparing only the supporters’ activity
shows the same order of parties, yet numbers of activity that range between 1.3
and 1.5 scale segments lower than members’ activity, which cumulates in supporters
being only between 63 and 68% as active as party members.
Hence, the authors can prove that British party members are more active than
supporters, although supporters played an important role in campaign activity and
“significantly enhanced all parties’ election efforts.” (Fisher et al. 2014, p. 84) How-
ever, they further aim to answer the question of what it is that drives supporter
activity. Assuming that existing party membership strength is the important factor
here, a linear regression model is estimated for two measures of party membership
strength: The overall number of party members and the percentage of a party’s local
branch members that are covered by an active party organization. The estimation
reveals that the portion of covered members is a significant predictor of supporter
engagement for Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats. On the other hand,
the number of party members only predicts supporter activity for the latter.
Furthermore, the authors can also show that predictors both for supporter and
for membership activity differ in the majority. Controlling for demographic79, polit-
ical and party factors, only the level of campaign preparation significantly predicts
activity of supporters and members significantly across the aforementioned parties.
An overlap of significant predictors is also seen for the question whether a seat was
targeted, yet this is only true for Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Other than
that, variables can be found that predict both member and supporter activity, al-
79Demographic variables include: Percentage of White, % manual workers, % prof & manage-
rial, % no qualifications, % students, % with degree, % owner occupiers, % council / housing
association tenants and persons per hectare. Politics variables include: Con/Lib Dem seat (Con-
servatives and Liberal Democrats are considered the two main parties in a constituency and
Conservatives are the incumbent), Lib Dem/Con seat, Con/Lab seat, Lab/Con seat, Lab/Lib
Dem seat, Lib Dem/Lab seat, Lab/Nat seat, candidate sex and candidate race. Party variables
include: Level of preparation (measured according to the authors own scale (Fisher et al. 2014,
p. 93, endnote no. 5)) and target seat (question if a seat was targeted or not).
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beit all these patterns are party specific and therefore do not contribute to a general
understanding of supporters’ engagement.
Finally, Fisher et al. (2014, p. 89) want to find out, whether the supporters’ activ-
ity level had an effect on overall campaigning efforts, independently of the members’
efforts. To answer this question, the authors regress a campaign intensity measure80
against both the supporters’ as well as the members’ activity level on a constituency
basis. This model reveals similar patterns for all parties: Members’ activity level im-
pact campaign intensity much more, than supporters’ efforts do81. Yet, supporters
do significantly contribute to campaign intensity, even if controlled for the level of
activity supplied by formal party members. While the strongest impact of supporter
activity can be seen with the Liberal Democrats, followed by Labour and Conserva-
tives, the order of the members’ activity impact is exactly the opposite.
Fisher, Cutts, Fieldhouse and Rottweiler (2018) try to further explain party sup-
portership and pose two main questions, their 2018 article aims to shed light on:
(a) What explains supporter recruitment and (b) what explains levels of supporter
activity. At first, the authors put two suggestions to the test that both aim to answer
those questions in general. On the one hand, focusing on the party structure and
its position within the party system, hypothesis 1 states that supporter recruitment
was more extensive in outsider parties than in mainstream ones. While cases are
clearly assigned to either of the two types of parties82, the concept is not based on
a solid, unmistakable and reproducible idea. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 builds
upon electoral preconditions on a constituency basis. According to this alternative
hypothesis, supporter recruitment would be dependent on electoral popularity and
linked to this positively (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 745).
Using data collected at the 2015 British general election, Fisher et al. (2018) extent
the data basis gathered by questioning British election agents in 2010 (Fisher et al.
2014). The 2015 data shows that evidence does not support hypothesis 1, whereby
80The campaign intensity measure includes: Preparation, organization, manpower, use of comput-
ers, polling day activity, use of telephones, use of direct mail, canvassing, leaflets and the use of
e-campaigning. See Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse (2011, pp. 820) for further information.
81Although regression coefficients are unstandardized, they are comparable since members’ and
supporters’ activity level are measured identically.
82The study employs data, derived from the British party system. Mainstream parties include:
Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats. Outsider parties include: Scottish National Party,
Plaid Cymru and UKIP.
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outsider parties should recruit supporters more extensively than mainstream parties.
Both with respect to the share of constituencies, who recruited supporters in 2015
and with regard to the mean number of supporters, mainstream parties outperform
outsider parties.
On the one hand, there is no unambiguous pattern to be seen pointing in either di-
rection regarding the proportion of supporter recruiting constituencies. Mainstream
parties Labour and Conservatives feature the highest share of supporter recruiting
constituencies with 74 and 65%. Yet, the Scottish SNP (58%) and UKIP (51%, both
outsider parties) show larger numbers than a third mainstream party, the Liberal
Democrats with only 45%. Plaid Cymru (PC) ranges at the bottom end with only
43% of constituencies recruiting supporters during the 2015 election campaigns.
On the other hand, the pattern seen for the mean number of supporters recruited,
favors mainstream parties and therefore challenges hypothesis 1. With only one ex-
ception, mainstream parties attracted more supporters per constituency than out-
sider parties. Conservatives and Liberal Democrats recruited 22 and 24 supporters
respectively, while SNP, PC and UKIP only recruited 18, 12 and 6 respectively.
Labour, a mainstream party, unfortunately breaks the clear distinction with a mean
of only 15 supporters per constituency Fisher et al. (2018, p. 747).
Comparing recent data to the 2010 data of recruiting constituencies and support-
ers recruited per constituency, Fisher et al. (2018, pp. 747) show that hypothesis 2
”fares better”. According to this hypothesis, supporter recruitment is expected to be
a function of electoral popularity. Unfortunately, nothing is said about what electoral
popularity means and how it is measured. Based on the authors review, the Liberal
Democrat’s unpopularity after the 2010 elections is interpreted to be the reason for
only 45% of all constituencies being able to recruit supporters in 2015. With 86%
in 2010, the share of supporters recruiting districts has been much higher previous
to the 2010 elections. However, taking the second measure into account, the Lib-
eral Democrats were nonetheless able to recruit more supporters per constituency in
2015 (24) than in 2010 (19). Equally unambiguous is the picture drawn by the SNP.
The Scottish National Party, which is said to have gained in popularity, multiplied
the mean number of recruited supporters from 6 in 2010 to 18 supporters in 2015.
Yet, the number of supporter recruiting party districts dropped from 67% to only
58%. Results for the Conservatives as well as for the Labour Party are interpreted
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as roughly stable between 2010 and 2015, without addressing the parties’ electoral
popularity however. Overall, it remains unclear, why Fisher et al. (2018) see evi-
dence for their electoral-fortunes-argument, especially since the authors hypotheses
are not addressed with multivariate methods.
Furthermore, the paper shows that on-line recruitment of supporters played only
a marginal role for all parties reviewed. Much more important were direct human
contact, off-line interactions and even self-starters. The later way was especially im-
portant for Nationalists parties (SNP and PC), who did not recruit 38% of their
supporters, but relied on self-starters. With regard to modes of supporter recruit-
ment, Fisher et al. (2018) also expect modes to be distinguished according to the
parties’ structure (mainstream vs. outsider). This actually seams to be supported
by data. Supporters recruited via human contact and off-line interaction are more
prevalent for mainstream parties, whereas outsider parties are more likely to attract
self-starters and especially nationalist parties more likely to rely on prior activists.
A party’s structure or a party’s electoral popularity is also said to make a dif-
ference when it comes to certain activities83 of supporters. Though the authors see
“some support for the party structure thesis” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 748), the SNP
(an outsider party) resembles supporter activity of mainstream parties to a “much
greater degree” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 748). Since SNP supporters engaged in all ac-
tivities more than in 2010, the paper sees support for the hypothesis that electoral
popularity increases supporter recruitment. This interpretation however is quickly
contested by the review of other parties. Lastly, Fisher et al. (2018, pp. 749) address
supporter activity with regard to existing party strength and the level of electoral
competition. Yet, once more, no clear evidence can be found for either of these
assumptions.
Overall, Fisher et al. (2018) report interesting and extensive data with regard to
supporter recruitment at the 2015 British general election and even compare these
data to numbers from the 2010 general election. Yet, none of the many hypotheses
can either be clearly supported or refuted. Rather, the paper suffers from address-
ing too many hypotheses without explaining and operationalizing a wrapping idea.
Neither the distinction between mainstream and outsider parties nor the concept
of electoral fortunes is sufficiently elaborated on. Moreover, theses constructions are
83Activities include: Delivering leaflets, polling station number takers, helping at campaign office,
telephoning electors ans doorstep canvassing.
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not used as dedicated variables in the empirical analysis, but only referred to in the
interpretation of empirical results. Rather than by independent variables, the data
are assessed on the basis of parties. This makes following the paper rather strenu-
ous. Additionally, all but two out of nine hypotheses are addressed using bivariate
crosstabulations only, which does not propose robust results. The switch to multi-
variate methods for hypotheses 8 and 9 is equally not explained as is the question,
why only data of Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats are used at this
stage. To make it even more confusing, tables for the multivariate analyses report
logit coefficients, while the corresponding text uses the incidence rate ratio.
As can be summarized, academic research until now has covered a lot of ground
regarding the development and diversification of party membership and affiliation.
In general, non-membership support of political parties is definitely a phenomenon
of the masses, at least in comparison to traditional party membership. Yet, tra-
ditional party members still provide distinct and dependable resources, since they
proved to be much more active than non-members and much more likely to engage
in high-intensity activities. However, the sheer mass of non-members, mostly called
supporters, assigns a crucial weight to this more loose relationship. If party mem-
bership numbers are expected to decline even further during the next decades, the
balance between traditional members and supporters is likely to tilt in favor of the
latter. Moreover, studies have found mostly coherent results regarding characteris-
tics of supporters in contrast to traditional members. The group of non-membership
affiliates differs remarkably from traditional party members in most studies. Equal
gender distribution is much more approached among non-members. Supporters also
tend to be younger than formal party members and education seems not to play
that crucial a role. From a theoretical standpoint, Duverger’s model of concentric
circles still seems to provide the most appropriate understanding of political parties’
sociological architecture. Yet, only very few studies really consider something else
in the first place and assign different roles already at the stage of data collection.
As important and insightful as socio-economic characteristics, motivations and
other independent variables are, the question of the dependent variable is even more
important. This question is rooted deep in a study’s research design and answers
the question of what it actually is, that is investigated. Especially in a new field of
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research, clarification regarding the object of interest is very important and should
be treated with greater emphasis.
Although studies until now made considerable progress to reevaluate the relation-
ship between individuals and political parties and widen the scope of this relation,
there are still gaps to be filled: Most studies have only investigated one party at a
time. Results are therefore prone to be party specific. Since non-members of what-
ever kind, need to be contacted somehow, most studies rely on contact details, pro-
vided by the parties. This brings about a major bias, since non-membership samples
necessarily exclude people, who never provided their details to a party. Since this
provision however is not at all required for most affiliation modes, studies do rely
on inadequate data that exclude many supporters systematically. Additionally, dif-
ferent ways of non-membership support are limited to a small number and do not
cover the whole picture of possibilities, especially not of the multi-speed membership
model. Even more importantly, no study until now either really tried to reproduce
a coherent theoretical approach in it’s entirety or investigated the contemporane-
ous occurrence of traditional party membership, and new ways of party affiliation
sufficiently.
This study aims to overcome these shortcomings and fill the corresponding gaps of
knowledge. It displays the whole picture of party affiliation in the major European
democracy’s party system, it is strictly based on an extensively laid out theoretical
approach, it covers a number of different ways, individuals can link to a political
party, it addresses the congruence of traditional and modern party affiliation with
multivariate analyses, and it explores party affiliation without the prerequisite of a
member/supporter-duality. In doing so, this study provides a holistic and empirically
grounded typology of party affiliation for political parties’ linkage in the 21st century.
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Part II - Data & Empirical Work

6 The German Party Members Survey as an
Empirical Basis
In order to find answers to all questions posed in this study, the 2017 GermanParty Members Survey is used. Initiated by Prof. Markus Klein and Prof. Tim
Spier (†), this survey is, to the author’s best knowledge, by far the largest survey
questioning traditional party members worldwide. In the following sections, framing
information will be given regarding the study itself, its predecessors of 1998 and
2009 as well as data collection and samples.
6.1 The evolution from 1998 to the 2017 Survey
The tradition of German Party Members Surveys started in 1998 with the firstsurvey conducted by Prof. Wilhelm Bürklin at the University of Potsdam.
Driven by decreasing membership numbers since the 1970s, this study was built
around the question of citizens’ motivations to register with a political party and to
serve in public offices, filled by the party. Due to a constitutional order that defines
parties as the main agencies of power within the state’s organizational architec-
ture, eroding bonds between parties and the people can mean a major challenge for
German Democracy (Bürklin 2013).
To unravel the mystery of why people are joining a party - or why not - and what
it is that separates active party members from inactive members, the 1998 survey
concentrates on the general incentives model by Seyd & Whiteley as described in
section 4.1 on page 62. In order to make this model work within the German political
and societal context, it was modified based on empirical results as well as theoretical
assumptions to evaluate party members’ participation.
The core hypotheses of this model, that individuals are basically rational actors,
whose actions derive from a calculation of costs and benefits, had not been confirmed
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within the German context until then. This hypothesis suggests that selective incen-
tives are what makes people join a party. Instead, a party’s political goals, which lead
to collective benefits, are the major factor to explain German party membership.
This again proves to be true based on the 1998 survey (Bürklin 2013, p. 35).
Major motives for German party members were to support the party and its goals,
an emotional bond to their party as well as a perceived civic duty. Accordingly,
selective incentives as a whole did not play this great a role as assumed by general
incentives theory, whereas especially outcome oriented benefits proofed not to be
relevant, when it comes to party membership.
Using exploratory factor analysis (i.e. principal component analysis) Bürklin (2013,
p. 37) additionally identified four major underlying (latent) variables or factors
that shape membership decisions of German party members: Ideal-political, social-
integrating, position seeking, and factional aspects.
Regarding intra-party commitment, Bürklin (2013) confirms former numbers, which
identify only a fraction of party members to carry the major workload. Unsurpris-
ingly, it is especially cost intensive tasks such as holding a political office or writing
for a party’s newspaper that attract only a minor share of a party’s members pool.
Moreover, the 1998 survey argues to reveal a structural duality of intra-party
activity. One dimension is said to combine activities in need of constant work, such
as bureaucratic organization or policy formulation, which are integrated in a concept
called office seeking participation. On the contrary, folksy participation merges social
ways of participation. This can sometimes be nothing more than attending party
meetings or festive events. On the other hand, additional financial donations and
canvassing in order to recruit new members are located here too.
Based on this intra-party activity structure (dependent variable) as well as the
aforementioned motivations derived from principal component analysis (independent
variables), a modified incentives hypothesis was estimated and compared to two pop-
ular alternative approaches: The socio-economic standard model, which focuses on
resources as preconditions of political participation, as well as the socio-psychological
model that is based on the assumption of predetermined attitudes as the major driv-
ing force. It had turned out that the modified incentives model is able to explain
31% of the variance of position seeking participation and 15% of folksy participa-
128
The German Party Members Survey as an Empirical Basis
tion, which means a much higher causal explanation compared to alternative models
(Bürklin 2013, p. 41).
From the start on, the 2009 German Party Members Survey was set out to pursue
the 1998 study in order to deliver not longitudinal data, but at least continuing cross
sectional data, which allows to track changes over time at least on the aggregate
basis. That is why motivations of party membership, as well as party activity, were
again a key aspect of the 2009 survey design. Additional data such as socio-economic
variables, attitudes, values and activities allow further investigation of German party
members’ structure and characteristics and can serve as valuable control variables.
However, the 2009 survey also introduced a new aspect of research. While moti-
vations were considered mainly in connection to membership decisions, this study
expands the view and was set out to provide additional data on party exit. In the
light of an ongoing trend of decreasing membership numbers, a complex rational
choice model was operationalized. Yet, in order to model party exit statistically, for-
mer party members were to be questioned as well. This of course cannot be provided
by a survey that relies strictly on the parties’ membership records. An additional
survey was therefore conducted that consulted three distinct groups of people with
regard to their party membership status and experience84: Non-members, recent
members and former members. With the 2009 German Party Members Survey, 827
non-members, 800 recent members, regardless of their actual party, and 800 former
party members were interviewed (Klein 2013). Since a lot of screening interviews
are necessary to reach people with these characteristics, willing to be interviewed,
this accompanying disproportionately stratified population survey was based on tele-
phone interviews.
6.2 The 2017 Survey in Detail
6.2.1 General Information
Just as the 2009 survey, the 2017 German Party Membership Survey primarily aims
to update the previously collected data from 1998 and 2009 and to monitor the devel-
opment of the German party membership with regard to characteristics commonly




used in party membership research. This is why most of the 2009 questionnaire was
transfered to allow for strict comparability of the data wherever feasible. However,
the fairly complex rational choice model was abandoned from the questionnaire since
it had proved to be overly complicated and therefore tiring to respondents. This is
not only likely to lead to problems with the data itself, due to unmotivated comple-
tion, but also lowers response rates. Alternatively, the aforementioned multi-speed
membership model by (Scarrow 2015) had been operationalized (see table 7.1 on
page 137) as closely to the concept as possible and allows for the first coherent
empirical review of this theoretical approach.
6.2.2 Data Collection
Main Paper-and-Pencil Survey
The 2017 paper-and-pencil party members survey was conducted along the follow-
ing guidelines (see: Klein et al. (2019, pp. 81)): All parties represented in the first
chamber of the national parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) were included. For the
18th German Bundestag, elected in September 2013 and still in power by the time
of data collection, this includes the CDU, CSU, The Greens, The Left and the SPD.
The liberal FDP failed to match the necessary threshold of 5% or three directly
elected representatives for the party in 2013 and accordingly was not part of this
legislation. Yet, in order to sustain the party samples from 1998 and 2009 and with
the expectation of a future reelection of the party, the FDP is part of the 2017
membership survey. On the other hand, the AfD is not part of the 2017 membership
survey, since it did not hold any seats in the legislation at the time of data collection.
However, since it had been foreseeable already in Spring 2017 that the party would
match the 5% threshold in autumn 2017 with ease, there would have been good
reasons to include the party nonetheless.
Apart from the CSU, which is only eligible for election in Bavaria, all parties
represented in the sample account for a gross sample of exactly 3,000 cases. The
CSU accounts for 2,000. Additionally, for all nation-wide operating parties, an east-
west-bias was also incorporated into the subsamples. For the CDU, The Greens,
and the SPD, this leads to 2,000 interviews conducted in the Western and 1,000
interviews conducted in the Eastern part of Germany. The Left, due to its distinct
East German history and having a surplus of its members in the Eastern states,
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this ratio is inverted and 2,000 party members from the Eastern territories had been
interviewed as well as 1,000 members from the Western part of Germany. All in all,
this amounts to a total gross sample of 17,000 party members. Specific members to
be questioned were randomly drawn from an alphabetical members list.
The actual questionnaires had been printed on A4-paper format as a brochure of
24 pages. The questionnaire, like all other corresponding documents, were sent to
the interviewees of the CSU, the FDP, The Greens, and The Left from the parties’
headquarters. Only the CDU instructed its party-own communications operator to
carry out the mailing process.
The specific mailing procedure followed the Total Design Method by Dillman
(1978) as close as possible: At first, members received a cover letter signed by the
secretary general or the general manager of the party, explaining the purpose of the
data collection and the aim of the study, as well as asking for contribution to the
research. The questionnaire itself, including a prepaid and self-addressed envelope,
followed one week later. Another week later, all sample members received a combined
postcard to either remember recipients to fill in the questionnaire or to thank for
participation in the survey. Those sample members, who had not responded after
another two weeks, received another questionnaire, again including a prepaid and
self-addressed envelope. Identification of members, who had not responded yet, was
possible on the basis of unique identification numbers that had been assigned to
all sample members. Those numbers had been provided to the parties, which could
then identify specific member details. That way, personal data of sample members
could never be accessed by anybody outside of the party respectively. Finally, to all
recipients of the second reach-out a second postcard was sent after additional two
weeks, again both asking or thanking for participation, whatever was applicable.
All in all, 9,748 questionnaires were filled in in 2017, which is equal to a response
rate of 59.8%. A comparison of all sample numbers of all three studies since 1998 is
available with table 6.2 on page 133.
Accompanying Telephone Survey
For the accompanying population survey, a sample of 1,001 recent party members,
1,001 former party members and 1,000 non-members was aimed for. A comparison of
sample numbers for previous telephone surveys related to the German Party Mem-
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Table 6.1: Sample comparison of 1998, 2009 and 2017 German Party Members Sur-
veys, telephone survey
Year Members1 Former Members1 Non-members
1998 general population survey2, N=2,012
2009 800 800 827
2017 1,001 1,001 1,000
All numbers are net interviews.
1 Regardless of the actual party.
2 General random population survey. No disproportion-
ately stratified sample.
bers Survey is available with table 6.1. To achieve this disproportionately stratified
sample of individuals, clearly separated with regard to their membership status,
screening interviews had been necessary. Those were conducted between October
4th 2016 and March 10th 2017 as part of an ongoing multi-topic telephone survey
held by a private research institute.
Final interviews were held by the research institute, based on a standardized
questionnaire. Questionnaires were adjusted to one of three status groups where
necessary. The interviews were conducted between March 20th and May 5th 2017.
This time period is important, since it was approximately half a year before the
2017 general elections to the German Bundestag, a special characteristic which is
likely to precipitate in the actual media exposure and perception of, as well as
attitudes towards, (party) politically relevant topics. This time-lag with regard to the
upcoming general election was also carried forward since the 1998 study and matches
the timing of the paper-and-pencil party members survey. Telephone interviews took


















Table 6.2: Sample comparison of 1998, 2009 and 2017 German Party Members Surveys, paper-and-pencil survey
CDU CSU FDP Green Left1 SPD Total
19982
gross 3, 008 2, 000 3, 076 3, 009 2, 0033 3, 008 16, 104
net 2, 929 1, 949 3, 008 2, 916 1, 888 2, 936 15, 626
non-neutral failures 1, 206 813 1, 172 669 450 940 5, 250
filled in questionnaires 1, 723 1, 136 1, 836 2, 247 1, 438 1, 996 10, 376
response rate, % 58.83 58.29 61.04 77.06 76.17 67.98 66.40
20094
gross 3, 008 2, 000 3, 000 3, 000 3, 000 3, 000 17, 000
net 2, 939 1, 979 2, 907 2, 801 2, 795 2, 912 16, 333
non-neutral failures 1, 485 1, 028 1, 345 986 940 1, 290 7, 074
filled in questionnaires 1, 454 951 1, 562 1, 815 1, 855 1, 622 9, 259
response rate, % 49.47 48.05 53.73 64.80 66.37 55.70 56.69
20175
members total 430, 838 140, 691 53, 751 61, 596 58, 953 439, 065 1, 184, 894
gross 3, 000 2, 000 3, 000 3, 000 3, 000 3, 000 17, 000
gross % 0.70 1.42 5.58 4.87 5.09 0.68 1.43
net 2, 892 1, 971 2, 853 2, 869 2, 816 2, 891 16, 292
non-neutral failures 1, 401 881 1, 192 962 1, 015 1, 093 6, 544
filled in questionnaires 1, 491 1, 090 1, 661 1, 907 1, 801 1, 798 9, 748
response rate, % 51.56 55.30 58.22 66.47 63.96 62.19 59.83
1 PDS until 2007.
2 German Party Members Survey 1998. See also: Bürklin (2013, p. 32).
3 By the time of the 1998 data collection, The Left, by then still named PDS, had still been a regional party of the former
GDR-territory, which is why the gross sample was only around 2,000 members compared to 3,000 members of all other parties.
4 German Party Members Survey 2009.
5 German Party Members Survey 2017.133

7 Modes of Party Affiliation in Germany -
Basic Findings
7.1 Overall Relevance of Non-Membership Based Party
Affiliation
This section is meant to present basic findings regarding the relevance of Scar-row’s proposed affiliation modes and what constitutes these in terms of basic
socio-demographic variables.
Moreover, these findings will be compared to the respective values of both tradi-
tional party members as well as the survey’s total weighted sample. That way, by the
end of this chapter, it will be clear, whether Scarrow’s affiliation modes do actually
play a role in the German party landscape. Additionally, the reader will know in
detail, whether members of each affiliate group differ in terms of socio-demographic
variables relative to one another, traditional party members, and the overall weighted
sample. Note, that in some cases, the data presented in the following do not add up
to 100 percent. This is due to answers, which cannot be interpreted purposefully,
such as Don’t know or No answer, or categories of very marginal relevance across
all affiliation modes. These categories are not considered in order to better visualize
relevant data. On the other hand, these answers are not necessarily missing values,
and in consequence are part of valid percentages.
Table 7.1 on page 137 shows, how all different modes have been operationalized
in the survey. Where applicable, both party members as well as non-members were
asked the exact same question, in order to achieve the most comparable data across
different subsamples. Moreover, operationalization is as much as possible based on
the terminology Scarrow (2015, pp. 30) uses when explaining each mode. On the
other hand, question stems for light-membership are party specific. Each party of-
fers different variations of a scaled down membership where a cutback in member-
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ship rights and privileges corresponds to similarly reduced obligations. Moreover,
there is no consensual use of terminologies when it comes to a lighter variation of
enrollment. Hence, referring to the question answered earlier, asking simply about
party membership as such, people are asked about their party specific specimen of
light-membership. The exact terminology of each party, such as light, trial, or guest
membership, was drawn from the parties’ membership statutes.
In the first place, it can be seen according to table 7.2 on page 138 that all of
the affiliation types do exist in the weighted sample and are quite relevant in com-
parison to traditional party membership. With 2%, the latter is roughly equivalent
to the party records based M/E-ratio as reported in figure 2.3 on page 30. How-
ever, all modes of party affiliation are only relevant for a small part of the overall
population. Only two modes break this consistency, although in different directions.
Light-membership plays a very marginal role in party affiliation with only .03%.
In consequence, this affiliation type will be excluded in the following data analysis,
since a number that small cannot be further divided reasonably.
On the other hand, voting clearly stands out from the crowd of affiliation modes.
Not less than 86.5% of the total population claim to be sure to vote in the next
elections to the German Bundestag. This indicates a fairly large interest for federal
level politics, which is consistent with replies to the actual question on political
interest. Figure 7.1 on page 138 shows, that federal level politics gain the highest
overall interest with 68% expressing at least high interest in federal level politics.
Nonetheless, this high proportion of electors is even higher than voter turnout in
Germany has ever been since 1983, which is very likely to be a bias from the survey’s
overall topic.
Nonetheless, only 2% of the weighted sample are actually traditional party mem-
bers. This mismatch between interest on the one hand, still 37% claim to have high
or very high interest in community level politics, and the willingness to participate
in a political party on the other hand, is commonly known. An even more dramatic
imbalance surfaces, when the level of activity of party members is taken into consid-
eration. It is by far not the case, that party membership is the equivalent to being
an active part and resource within the party. Asked about their level of activity with
their party, more than 60% of party members admit to be less active or not active
at all. This discrepancy between political interest/elections participation and tradi-
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Table 7.1: Questionnaire items to asses different modes of multi-speed membership
Mode Party Member Item Non-Party Member Item
Electors If it would be Federal Election next Sunday, would you be sure to vote,
likely to vote, likely not to vote or sure not to vote?
Social media followers Do you follow a political party on-line via Facebook, Twitter or similar
services? Yes/No
News audience1 Do you regularly visit a political party’s website? Yes/No
Did you subscribe to a party’s on-line newsletter? Yes/No
Activists How would you estimate
your recent activity with the
[party]? How active do you
personally think you are?
Are you very active, relatively
active, less active or not active
at all?
Even if you are not a party
member, do you sometimes
work with a party? Yes/No
Financial sustainers Besides your membership fees,
did you donate money to a po-
litical party within the last five
years? Yes/No
Did you donate money to a po-
litical party within the last five
years? Yes/No
Traditional members Are you member of a party
right now? Yes/No
N/A
Cyber-members Have you registered on-line as a partisan on a party’s own website?
Yes/No
Light-members Two-step question design: Re-
spondents, who reported to be
a party member, have been
asked:
And is this a regular member-
ship or is it2
• a) a guest membership?
• b) a guest membership
or the status of a sup-
porter?
• c) a guest or proof mem-
bership?
• d) a trial membership?
• e) the status of a spon-
sor?
• f) a guest, proof or trial
membership?
N/A
1 A Yes to either or both questions has been sufficient to count as part of the news audience.
2 Question stimulus has been matched to party membership and exact terminology of each
party according to their membership regulations.
Bold text indicates options that actually have been considered to assign the respective label
to a case.
See table A.5 on page 295 for the original German wording.
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Table 7.2: Parts of weighted sample
Rank Part of weighted sample Abbr. N % of weighted sample
Total sample TS 3,002 100
1. Electors EL 2,597 86.5
2. Social media followers FO 271 9.0
3. News audience NA 254 8.5
4. Activists AC 178 5.9
5. Financial sustainers FS 139 4.6
6. Traditional members TM 59 2.0
7. Cyber-members CM 54 1.8
8. Light-members – 1 .03
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Figure 7.1: Total sample’s political interest by administrative level, in %
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tional (active) party membership is known in literature as participation paradox and
will be dealt with in a later section of this study, when it comes to motivations for
political participation. For now, it can be stated that traditional party membership
ranges at the very bottom end of affiliation modes. Except for the aforementioned
mode of light-membership, all other modes attract a much bigger portion of the
overall sample.
Even financial sustaining, which is ranked 5th according to percentage of the to-
tal sample, recruits more than twice as many people compared to traditional party
membership or 4.6%. Financial sustainers in this understanding are those respon-
dents, who answered Yes to the question whether they have donated money to a
political party in the last five years. For the subsample of party members, people
were asked to ignore member fees when answering.
Ranked 7th, cyber-members count 1.8% of the total sample. Those are the people,
who responded Yes to the question whether they have registered with a political
party on a party’s website. In this respect, cyber-members differ from social media
followers. The latter only connect to a party’s account with a third player’s website
(i.e. Facebook or Twitter) which is considered to be less mandatory.
Only slightly larger than cyber-members is the portion of people who are counted
as being activists. For this affiliation mode, non-members are included if they claim
to actively participate in a party. Party members are considered activists, if they
claim to be very active or relatively active according to the question on party activity.
Altogether, 5.9% of the total weighted sample can be subsumed under the label
activist.
Next are two affiliation modes which are somewhat more attractive to people
according to the survey data. On the one hand, 8.5% are considered news audience.
These respondents do either receive an on-line newsletter from one party minimum
or regularly visit a party’s website. On the other hand, 9% of the people responded
to follow a political party on Facebook, Twitter or another social on-line network.
Since these findings are all based on aggregate data, it is not clear, which portion
of each affiliation mode is made up by party members. Figure 7.2 on the following
page answers this question and gives a first impression regarding an issue that shall
be investigated at a later stage in further detail. It is the question of congruency be-








































Figure 7.2: Proportion of party members within affiliation mode, in %
whether proposed affiliation modes are actually new ways of people-party-relations
or merely other means for traditional members to carry out their party activities.
According to figure 7.2, the part of non-members is very large for all affiliation
modes. Interestingly, the portion of party members is nearly reciprocal to the overall
relevance of modes shown before (table 7.2 on page 138). That means, the more
attractive the affiliation mode to the overall sample, the lower the portion of party
members within this affiliation mode. The only exception are cyber-members and
financial-sustainers. Cyber-members show a proportion of 1/3 party members to 2/3
non-party members. In contrast, financial sustainers show a proportion of 1/5 party
members to 4/5 non-party members. These are followed by activists (13% party
members), news audience (12%), social media followers (6%) and electors (2%),
whereas the portion of party members constantly decreases. It should be noted here,
that neither a correlation between affiliation mode attractiveness and party member
portion, nor a direction of a correlation is stated. It is only on this very basic level
of analysis that this inversion of affiliation modes can be observed.
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7.2 Basic Socio-demographic and Economic Variables
After the overall relevance of party affiliation modes has been shown, basicsocio-demographic and economic characteristics shall be investigated in detail,
considering each mode on its own.
Sex
Starting with the respondents’ sex (figure 7.3 on the next page), a great imbalance
must be recognized for five affiliation modes. Cyber-members (72%), traditional
members (69%), financial sustainers (67%), social media followers (65%) and news
audience (61%) all contain a much larger proportion of males compared to females.
On the other hand, females are more prominent in the group of electors (51%) and
activists (52%). However, female prevalence in these affiliation modes is by far not
as dominant as male prevalence in the aforementioned other modes and deviates
only very slightly from a 50/50 spreading by a maximum of two percentage points.
In the end it is fair to say, that male/female-distribution for electors and activists is
equal to the total sample’s sex distribution.
Age
To practically deal with age information of the respondents, they have been divided
into four groups. A subsample of younger respondents is aged between 18 and 29 and
a subsample of older respondents is aged 60 years or more. Between those groups,
two medium-age groups have been formed. Respondents ranging from 30 to 44 years
of age are merged as well as respondents between 45 and 59 years of age. This results
in four distinct groups of fairly similar age.
Figure 7.4 on page 143 shows the distribution of age according to these groups for
each affiliation mode. Additionally table 2 shows the mean, median and standard
deviation for each mode in the same order from left to right as figure 7.4 on page 143.
At once the most striking and the least surprising finding is that traditional party
members are to a large extent the oldest of all affiliation modes. It is nearly 2/3 (65%)
of traditional party members, that are 60 years or older. Additionally, traditional
party members make up for the smallest proportion in both medium-age groups
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Figure 7.3: Sex by affiliation mode, in %
agers (2%). On average, traditional German party members are 61.7 years of age
and more than ten years older than the average respondent in the overall weighted
sample (50.7 years). Moreover, traditional party members show the smallest standard
deviation, meaning that on average, individual values deviate to the least extent from
the group’s mean value. For other affiliation modes as well as comparison groups,
the proportion of older respondents of 60+ years ranges between 46.9% (financial
sustainers) and 20.7% (social media followers).
On the other end of the scale, the respective proportion of younger people is
similarly imbalanced. Traditional party members only consist of 2% of respondents
aged between 18 and 29, which is only undercut by financial sustainers (1%). With
3% young respondents, activists are also found on the very bottom end. Electors,
cyber-members, news audience, and the total sample share a fairly similar structure
with young people between ten and 17%. Unsurprisingly, social media followers
not only have the smallest proportion of older respondents, but also the largest
proportion of young respondents. With 37%, more than 1/3 of people claiming to
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Figure 7.4: Age groups by affiliation mode, in %
be social media followers of political parties are aged between 18 and 29. Except
traditional party members and social media followers, which are shaped by a very
distinct proportion of old or young respondents, at least half of each sample and
comparing groups is aged at a medium level.
On average (see table 7.3 on the following page), financial sustainers are the second
oldest group with 56.8 years of age, followed by activists (53.9), electors (52.1) cyber-
members (51.8) and news audience (48.7). Still remarkably younger by an average
of nearly seven years are social media followers with 41.9 years of age.
Civil status
Overall, the affiliates’ civil status allocation (figure 7.5 on page 145) is relatively
stable, no matter what affiliation mode is considered. The majority of almost every
affiliation mode is married or lives in registered partnership85. Only social media
85Between 2001 and 2017, couples of the same sex were given the opportunity to register their
partnership, which lead to legal rights, similar to that of an officially married couple. Since
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Mean 62.0 56.8 53.9 52.1 51.8 50.7 48.7 41.9
Median 65.0 57.0 53.0 52.0 54.0 51.0 48.0 41.0
Std. deviation 15.3 16.2 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.5 17.5 17.7
N 1001 139 175 2597 54 2999 254 271
followers see a predominance of singles with 47% compared to 36%, who are married.
Other affiliation modes are married by 68% (financial sustainers) to 53% (electors).
The followers’ unique position can be an effect of both their age or their cohort.
Social media followers are a relatively young cluster, which decreases the likelihood
of being married, especially, since the mean age of marriage has increased in the last
30 years for both men and women (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019b, 2019c). Similarly,
it can be an effect of certain younger cohorts, who might get married less frequently.
The affiliation modes’ proportion of divorced and widowed is fairly stable. Num-
bers range from 15% for activists (6% divorced, 9% widowed) to 22% for traditional
party members (10% divorced and 12% widowed). In general, a small to medium
overhang of divorced can be seen, except for traditional party members.
According to this relatively stable portion of divorced and widowed affiliates,
the majority of variance of married affiliates is mirrored by the portion of singles.
Traditional party members feature the smallest share of singles with only 14%. Only
financial sustainers achieve a similar result with 15% singles. Across other affiliation
modes, the portion of singles increases steadily until 47% is reached for social media
followers.
Education
In order to show the respondents’ formal education86, the data is divided into four
groups of educational levels. Figures on low education level represent respondents
2017, gay couples can officially get married and registered partnerships can be converted into
marriage. In order to ensure easy phrasing, only the words married/marriage will be used.
86Unfortunately, according to collected data on tertiary education level, an educational classification
consistent with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97) cannot be
provided.
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Figure 7.5: Civil status by affiliation mode, in %
who completed 4th grade secondary school maximum (Hauptschule). Hence, people
who left school without any degree are also included here. A fifth year secondary
school certificate qualifies for a medium level education (Mittlere Reife). Those re-
spondents with a high maximum level are allowed to enter technical college or uni-
versity (Fachgebundene/Allgemeine Hochschulreife) whereas those considered very
highly educated actually do hold a technical college or university degree.
As figure 7.6 on the following page shows, in comparison with the overall weighted
sample, all but two affiliation modes share a higher rate of technical college or
university graduates. But for each affiliation mode, university education level is by
far the most common status regarding formal education. This is of course very likely
to be a consequence of the survey method and the actual topic of this survey, since
political surveys tend to attract especially well educated individuals. Ranging on
the top end, 63% of financial sustainers are university graduates. On the other end,
followers only hold a university degree by 39%, which is still 12 percentage points
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Figure 7.6: Educational level by affiliation mode, in %
Cyber-members have 56% of university graduates or 14 percentage points more
than the total weighted sample. Interestingly, at the same time, cyber-members show
the highest rate of low educated respondents as well, which results in a fairly small
portion for the two intermediate categories.
In addition to cyber-members, traditional members, news audience and activists
feature university graduates of around half of the subsample’s size, yet in decreasing
order from 55% to 49%.
For the group of electors as well as the total sample, a higher portion of medium
educated goes along with decreasing numbers of university graduates. With 27%
each, electors and the total sample feature above one quarter of affiliates within this
second lowest educational category.
Followers do only hold a technical college or university degree by 39%. Yet, this
affiliates’ portion of highly educated members, meaning those, who do hold the
corresponding entrance degree that provides the right to enter a technical college or
university, is fairly high in contrast to other affiliate groups. This is again likely to
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be an effect of the followers’ age structure with 37% between 18 and 29 years of age.
At this age, it is very common that a number of people has not completed tertiary
education yet.
Employment
Although different aspects of employment have been asked in much more detail to
differentiate according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO)87, for the purposes of this study, a simpler classification is sufficient. In a
later part however, ISCO-scores will be considered as an independent variable in
logistic regression models. Additionally, the relatively low number of respondents
within each affiliation mode makes it inappropriate to differentiate even ten ma-
jor groups proposed by the ISCO-coding-system88. Hence, a three-step employment
classification according to expenditure of time is used here. Note that Neither in this
case does not necessarily mean people are unemployed, i.e. seeking a job. For now,
people are only considered to be simply not employed, regardless of what they do
or would like to do in their everyday life. This group of not employed respondents
will be further investigated later.
As can be seen in figure 7.7 on the next page, traditional members are the group
of respondents who are working full-time by only around 1/3 (35%). On the other
hand, financial sustainers and cyber-members are working full-time by 58% and news
audience by 55%. Those are the only affiliation modes, who’s respondents claim to
be full-time employees by more than the half of it. What differentiates these modes
is the proportion of part-time workers and not-employed people. Financial sustain-
ers and cyber-members show around ten percentage points more for not-employed
respondents (35/38% vs. 26%), whereas news audience has this overbalance with
part-time workers (4% vs 13%).
A fairly similar allocation of employment categories as with news audience affili-
ates can be seen with social media followers as well as the total sample and electors.
In each of these groups, full-time employees still make for the largest group with
50% and 44%. As part-time workers range between 13 and 14%, the steady loss
87For complete operationalization of ISCO-Codes see table A.12 on page 303 or table A.13 on
page 304 for the original German wording.
88According to the International Labor Organization, occupations can be further divided into 43

















































Figure 7.7: Employment type by affiliation mode, in %
of full-time employees within these groups goes along with rising proportions of not
employed people up to around 39%.
For activists and traditional members, non-employment rises remarkably and
makes for the most prominent employment category. Especially traditional mem-
bers stand out in this respect, since over the half of them specify to be currently not
employed. Simultaneously, part-time employment shrinks by four percentage points
relative to the total sample ranging at 9%.
Not full-time employed status groups
As mentioned earlier, respondents who are considered not to be employed can have
various reasons to be classified in that manner and do not necessarily have to be
unemployed in a meaning of not finding a job. Sure, there are people who are un-
employed in the very meaning, but, as can be learned from figure 7.8 on the facing
page, this is only a fraction of not employed respondents. Note, that respondents
without a job add up to more percentage points than non-employed people in fig-
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Figure 7.8: Not full-time employed status groups by affiliation mode, in %
ure 7.7 on the preceding page on employment. This is a consequence of the fact that
also part-time workers had been asked about their status group of non-employment,
since these do not exclude each other necessarily.
In each affiliation group, pensioners are by far the largest group of not full-time
employed people. Even with social media followers, an affiliation mode which is
occupied by young people as no other mode (see: figure 7.4 on page 143 and table 7.3
on page 144), pensioners make for 42% of all part-time or not employed respondents.
Especially interesting is that with the group of social media followers, pensioners
even rule out students, which add up to only 31%.
Overall, three distinct groups can me made out regarding this variable. Both fi-
nancial sustainers’ and traditional members’ subset is almost entirely shaped by
pensioners as these make for 95% (financial sustainers) and 85% (traditional mem-
bers) of the subsamples respectively. Accordingly, other possibilities only account
for fractional amounts of part-time or unemployed respondents.
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A second group contains cyber-members, electors, activists and news audience as
well as the total sample. This groups is still shaped by pensioners to a great ex-
tent. Between 73% (cyber-members) and 54% (news audience) of all respondents
within these groups are pensioners. Besides pensioners, various other groups ac-
count for the remaining 35 to 45%. Students range from 5% (activists) to 17%
(cyber-members). Another status that is relatively prominent within these affilia-
tion modes is to be a housewife or househusband. A total of four affiliation modes
as well as the total sample share between 11% (electors) and 18% (activists) for
this status out of part-time or not-employed respondents, with news audience (15%)
ranging between these poles. Only cyber-members show a remarkably different level
for housewife/househusband with only 3%.
A third status group which is very vague but quite pronounced are respondents
who claim to belong to a status group not listed here. Especially news audience
stands proud with 21% of respondents choosing this answer, which represents ag-
gregation of three possible answers (Others, None of these and No answer).
The group of followers is both common and odd. Common in the sense, as pen-
sioners make for the largest group of not employed respondents, odd in the sense
that students can, to some extent, counterbalance pensioners’ prevalence. With 31%
being students, followers exceed other affiliation modes in this respect by at least
200%.
In order to bring all this information on employment together, figure 7.9 on the
facing page is laid out to present an overarching view on employment status groups
for all affiliation modes. For this purpose, specific answers on two question on em-
ployment have been gathered in one figure. Yet, respondents who claim to be em-
ployed full-time with regard to the first question have only been included regarding
their answer to question one. Only people who work part-time or see none of these
categories to be appropriate have been asked a second question about their status.
In the end, this brings information loss at another end, since it is not possible to
determine, whether for example students are employed part-time or not employed
at all. What this figure can serve for, is to present the balance between full-time
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Figure 7.9: Full-time employed and other status groups by affiliation mode, in %151
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Class Self-Assessment
For class self-assessment according to figure 7.10 on the next page, respondents
were asked to choose from a five-point scale, what class they assign themselves to.
Options were lower class at the very bottom end to upper class at the very top end,
with a three step middle class in between. As can be seen, all comparing groups
are clearly shaped by middle class self-assessment. Except for financial sustainers
and cyber-members, more than 50% of all affiliation modes and the total sample
see themselves as part of a middle-middle class. Building a three step model by
adding up all three middle class options, at least 94% (financial sustainers) of each
affiliation mode assess themselves to a middle class. Accordingly, there is very little
room for lower or upper class self-assessment and variation in the lower and upper
register.
Nonetheless, interesting differences can be seen. A group of activists, news audi-
ence and electors show very similar figures for all three middle class options. Addi-
tionally all three of these show slightly more lower-class assessments than upper-class
assessments. On the other hand, with only 1%, traditional members and social me-
dia followers show very few lower-class assessments. Financial sustainers even lack
lower-class self-assessments completely. But, whereas traditional members and finan-
cial sustainers exceed other modes with upper-class figures, social media followers
miss this very top category entirely. Accordingly, social media followers do almost
completely consist of middle-class respondents with 99%.
Both financial sustainers as well as traditional members push their class assess-
ment remarkably higher than other modes with over 1/3 belonging to the upper-
middle or upper class.
Disposable income
Traditionally, private income is an issue with surveys. Especially in Germany, money
and income information is something, most people are very reserved about. Either
people do not want to give the impression to show off, are ashamed of lower income
levels, or simply consider money a private topic. This is even true in a telephone
survey situation, where anonymity is promised.
Still, to gain information about disposable income, two questions were applied
that build upon each other. Firstly, survey respondents were directly asked about
152
Modes of Party Affiliation in Germany
Cyber-
Members

















N=54 N=2986 N=174 N=254 N=2573 N=990 N=271 N=139
1 1 1 2 1 3 4
26








22 18 16 16 17
10
16 14














low lower middle middle upper middle upper
Figure 7.10: Class self-assessment by affiliation mode, in %
their household net income. Moreover, they were reminded to consider all kinds
of income, such as wages, pensions, public aid, and rental income of all household
members after taxes and social security contributions.
If respondents refused to answer anyway, or said they did not know, a second
question was asked. This time, respondents were again assured that all gathered
information would be treated absolutely confidential, so that it was not possible to
determine specific identities or households based on the answers provided. Addition-
ally, respondents were asked to answer in categories, rather than to provide exact
figures to further depersonalize given information and to simplify the answer.
Based on these question, disposable income is allocated according to figure 7.11
on the following page. It can also be seen, that the two-step question design serves
fairly well in gathering sensitive income information. Overall, only 9% did not give
any information on household income, even after having been asked twice.
To present information on income, categories applied during data collection were
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Figure 7.11: Disposable household income groups by affiliation mode, in %
€1,500. Income between €1,500 and under €4,000 is jointed to a group of middle
income level. More than €4,000 of net income is considered high income level.
Due to the fact that information on income was collected in terms of total house-
hold income, the information, regardless of jointed groups or not, is rather hard to
interpret. It surely makes a difference, whether one has to make a living out of €3,000
of disposable income living alone, or married with three children. Both situations are
considered a household. Additionally, it is not clear, how much of a portion actually
is available for a household. Things like debt or relatives in need of home care, can
significantly alter the income actually available. To compensate for this at least a
little, where appropriate, income information was divided by the reported number
of household members, to achieve figures somewhat more reliable.
However, this procedure assumes, that all household members have equal access
to the total income, which is not necessarily the case. Nonetheless, based on the as-
sumption that household income serves each member equally, this approach provides
figures which are more reasonably comparable.
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At first figure 7.11 on the preceding page shows disposable household income in
groups of low, medium and high level for each affiliation mode. Affiliation modes
have been sorted in order of decreasing percentage of the lowest income category
which is up to under €1,500 per household from left to right.
In terms of total household income categories, cyber-members stand out for hav-
ing the largest proportion of low income respondents (14%) as well as the largest
proportion of high income respondents (54%). Accordingly, cyber-members’ subset
of medium income respondents shows the smallest value with only 30%.
Followers, electors as well as activists show levels of income, which are still shaped
by mid-level incomes being the largest group and low income rates slightly but con-
stantly decreasing. This is also the case for traditional party members. Whereas the
latter show a much smaller portion of low income respondents (6%), both compared
to most other affiliation modes and compared to the total weighted sample (13%).
With news audience and financial sustainers, high income levels reach the top and
represent the largest of three income levels, only left behind by cyber-members as
mentioned earlier. Nearly half of the respondents within these affiliation modes have
to be considered high income respondents. Consistently, financial sustainers show
only 5% of low income respondents.
Additionally, figure 7.12 on the following page reports figures on household net
income and visualizes these figures’ development across affiliation modes. However,
these figures only contain those respondents, who admitted to share information
on disposable household income in response to the initial question. Since the second
question on income asked respondents to answer in categories, this information could
not be taken into account for figure 7.12.
Cyber-members gain the highest average income of €3,852 per month, followed by
financial sustainers (€3,714). News audience with €3,481 each month are just slightly
ahead of traditional party members (€3,429). Activists (€2,956), followers (€2,895),
and electors (€2,815) reach just under €3,000 of disposable household income. Far
behind, the total sample’s average net income is only €2,683, which represents the
lowest average income of all compared subsets.
As mentioned above, in order to compensate for household size and especially for

































































































mean median standard deviation
Figure 7.12: Absolute disposable household income by affiliation mode, key measures
by the number of household members where both information was provided. This
results in figure 7.13 on the next page which provides corresponding data.
Weighted by the number of household members, financial sustainers gain the high-
est disposable income with €2,183 a month. These are followed by traditional party
members, cyber-members and activists, which all achieve slightly above or slightly
below the threshold of €2,000 per household member and month. On the other hand,
activists, electors and followers fall between €300 and €400 short.
7.3 Comparing Affiliation Types’ Profiles
Although information on socio-economic variables is valuable information, theabove description according to different variables makes it rather hard to ac-
tually get an exact understanding of the modes’ socio-economic profiles. In order to
gain from all detailed information given above and to enhance the readers under-
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Figure 7.13: Relative disposable household income by affiliation mode, key measures
standing for socio-economic characteristics of each affiliation mode, a summary in
tabular form shall be given. While the detailed information above serves to exactly
describe all affiliation modes with all variables, the following section’s differentiation
is given by the modes themselves. This is a handy and easily accessible way to high-
light the main differences between traditional party members and other affiliation
modes of the multi-speed model.
Showing traditional members’ values in the second column, a comparison group is
set out, in order to serve as a baseline for all other affiliation modes to be compared
to. Each of the following columns represents one affiliation mode, which are presented
in order of their relevance according to percentage of the total weighted sample.
For the purpose of this table, every first row represents the modes’ specific value
according to the first column’s variable respectively. Additionally, every second row
specifies each modes’ deviation from the traditional members’ value in percent. For
example, 64% of traditional party members are married. Electors, are only married
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by 53%, which makes for a deviation of 17%, i.e. electors are 17% less frequently
married as traditional party members are. Equally, with 54 years of age, activists
are 13% younger than traditional members, and so on.
According to the data, traditional party members are a group of people, which is
by 2/3 dominated by males. On average, traditional party members are 62 years of
age. 64% of them are married and only 14% are single. 55% of traditional party
members are very highly educated in terms of a technical college or university degree
and 12% hold the relative entrance school degree. Full-time employment is a fair
category to describe everyday life of 35% of traditional party members. Those, who
do not work full-time are pensioners by 85% and students by only 1%. 32% of
traditional party members assess themselves to an upper-middle or upper class,
while only 11% assess themselves to a lower-middle or lower class. Traditional party
members gain an average disposable income of €2,096 per household member.
As has been shown so far there are basic socio-economic differences between new
affiliation modes. What is rather more striking, is that on the basis of positive or
negative deviations, the differences between new affiliation modes and traditional
members are very much homogeneous. Except for financial sustainers, all affiliation
modes differ from traditional party members, either in the same direction or mostly
negligibly in the other direction.
Electors
Electors on the other hand feature a balanced allocation of male and female affiliates.
With 52 years of age, electors are on average ten years younger than traditional party
members and they are less likely to be married. University degrees are 20% less com-
mon for electors, while upper secondary education is more pronounced. With regard
to their everyday life, electors are about 25% more often full-time employees and
much more likely to be students. While pensioners are less common among electors,
still 64% of them are regarded as retirees. Only 23% of the electors see themselves
as being part of an upper or upper-middle class, whereas 19% classify themselves as
associated to a lower or lower-middle class. The relative mean net income of electors
amounts to €1,709 which is about 1/5 below the traditional members’ earnings.
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Social Media Followers
The group of social media followers shows a comparable amount of males compared
to females. But, social media followers are much younger than traditional party
members. This is very likely to determine aggregate values of other variables, since
socio-economic development is often bound tightly to years of age. Accordingly,
social media followers are likely to be married to a much smaller extent, and to
be single to a much greater. Social media followers are also not as well educated as
traditional members are. While over half of the latter are in possession of a technical
college or university degree, social media followers count only 39%, which is also the
lowest value amongst all different affiliates. Full-time employment or studying are
much more pronounced for social media followers, while the group contains a much
smaller number of pensioners. Again, employment as well as educational values are
very likely to be effects, mainly driven by age distribution of the respective subsets.
Class self-assessment shows a downwards tendency, since respondents chose upper
class categories not as often as traditional party members and simultaneously, lower
class categories were chosen to a greater extent. Accordingly, income ranges 23%
lower than the average relative income of party members.
News Audience
The group of news audience affiliates shows a fairly similar profile as social media
followers do. The distribution of males and females is more balanced with news
audience affiliates but still far from an equal rate. Just like social media followers,
news audience are much younger and less likely to be married, although, over half
of them actually are married. Singles on the other hand can be seen much more in-
frequently. In terms of educational levels, news audience differs negatively regarding
university graduates, but positively regarding entrance degrees. As with all other
affiliation modes, full-time employment is much more common for news audience as
is being a student and self-assessment to a lower social class. And while the average
income is very similar to traditional party members, the proportion of pensioners




Activists are one of two comparing groups that do reach an almost fifty-fifty balance
of sex. With a mean age of 54 years, activists range below traditional party members.
Tertiary education degrees seem to be somewhat less attractive to activists, with
only 49% of respondents holding a degree of a technical college or university. Since
on the other hand, activists show a much larger proportion of highly educated in
terms of school education and are younger than traditional party members, this
might qualify as an age effect. However, cyber-member affiliates are even younger
than activists and show opposite algebraic signs with regard to educational deviance
from traditional members. In the opposite direction from traditional party members,
activists are both more likely to be single and to be employed full-time. Yet, the
average income ranges below that of traditional members. Students as well are more
prominent in the group of activists, while the proportion of pensioners and the
distribution of class assessment show very similar values as modes presented so far.
Financial Sustainers
With financial sustainers, an affiliation mode can be observed, which is in many
respects very similar to traditional members. For sex distribution, age, civil status
and income, financial sustainers do not deviate more than ±10 % from traditional
party members’ values. This aside, full-time employment and even the amount of
pensioners are higher than with traditional members as is the proportion of univer-
sity graduates. Also class self-assessment is special. Financial sustainers, as could
have been expected, assess themselves considerably more often to one of two upper
classes, which distinguishes them from all other affiliation modes. But at the same
time, financial sustainers assess themselves more often to one of two lower social
classes too. This leads to a fairly small group of middle class assessments.
Cyber-Members
Cyber-members, much like the aforementioned group of financial sustainers, do share
some similarities with traditional party members. Cyber-members range on a similar
level as party members when it comes to male-female-balance, university graduates,
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and income. Regarding these criteria, cyber-members are a maximum of only 4%
above or below traditional party members.
On the other hand, cyber-members are much younger than traditional members,
just like most other affiliates are. Additionally, as mentioned above, upper secondary
education is much less present with cyber-members. Although they younger than
traditional members by an average of 10 years and feature a comparable share of
university graduates, only 6% of all cyber-membership affiliates hold a technical
college or university entrance degree (-50%). This anomaly becomes even more in-
teresting when the proportion of students is taken into account. No less than 17% of
all not full-time employed cyber-members are students, who all must be in possession
of any kind of the above mentioned higher education entrance degrees.
Equally disconcerting is the fact that 26% of cyber-members consider themselves
to belong to either the lower or lower-middle class, which represents the largest pro-
portion of lower class members among all affiliation modes. At first sight, this seems
contradictory to a relatively high income, which is only 2% below the traditional
members’ mean income, a large share of full-time employed and a share of university
graduates, equal to that among traditional members.
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Male in% 69 49 65 61 48 67 72
deviation in % -29 -6 -12 -30 -3 +4
Age, Ø in years 62 52 42 49 54 57 52
deviation in % -16 -32 -21 -13 -8 -16
Married in% 64 53 36 56 63 68 57
deviation in % -17 -44 -13 -2 +6 -11
Single in % 14 27 47 28 20 15 23
deviation in % +93 +236 +100 +43 +7 +64
University degree in %1 55 44 39 49 49 63 56
deviation in % -20 -29 -11 -11 +15 +2
Upper secondary education in%2 12 15 27 19 18 8 6
deviation in % +25 +125 +58 +50 -33 -50
Full-time employed, in % 35 44 50 55 40 58 58
deviation in % +26 +43 +57 +14 +66 +66
Pensioner in %3 85 64 42 54 58 95 73
deviation in % -25 -51 -36 -32 +12 -14
Student in %4 1 10 31 5 5 0 17
deviation in % +900 +3,000 +400 +400 -100 +1,600
High Class in %5 32 23 23 23 23 38 27
deviation in % -28 -28 -28 -28 +19 -16
Low Class in %6 11 19 17 18 19 14 26
deviation in % +73 +55 +64 +73 +27 +136
Income, Ø in Euro7 2, 096 1, 709 1, 613 1, 948 1, 713 2, 183 2, 054
deviation in % -18 -23 -7 -18 +4 -2
Table reads as follows:
For traditional party members and the corresponding (upper) figure of each affiliation mode, the following footnotes
no. 1 to 7 apply. Lower figures for affiliation modes indicate deviation in % compared to the traditional party
members’ value.
1 Percentage with very high formal (i.e. university level) education.
2 Percentage with high formal (i.e. university entrance level) education.
3 Percentage of pensioners within set of not full-time employed.
4 Percentage of students within set of not full-time employed.
5 Percentage of self-assessed upper and upper-middle class.
6 Percentage of self-assessed lower and lower-middle class.
7 Mean net household income divided by number of household members in Euro.
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8 Identifying Empiric Patterns of Party
Affiliation
The consequence of Scarrow’s Euler diagram model (figure 8.1 on the followingpage) is that certain types of affiliates can be identified, distinguished by
the kind of affiliation modes applicable in special cases. For example, right in the
upper middle section is a set of traditional members, which is not occupied by any
other circle/ellipse of the model. In this case, affiliates located in this section, only
belong to the group of traditional party members and do not participate in any
other affiliation mode. On the other hand, right in the middle of figure 8.1 on the
next page, there is one section that is enclosed not only by the circle of traditional
members, but also shows intersections with electors, followers, news audience, cyber-
members, activists and financial sustainers. Consequently, affiliates who participate
in all possible modes, except light-membership, are located in this part of the model.
Evolved from Duverger’s model of concentric circles (figure 3.1 on page 40), the
multi-speed model does provide some important enhancements as describe earlier
in this study. Just to recapture the goals of Scarrow’s rethinking, the proposed
enhancements of 21st century updates are listed once again:
1. Multiple ways of party affiliation, providing alternatives to traditional party
membership, without being too far away from the national level party organi-
zation or chasing non-political ends.
2. Imperfect overlap of affiliation modes, giving room for highly individual and
dynamic patterns of party affiliation.
3. Considering the required level of commitment via the size of the circles. It
is not necessarily the case, that low-contribution affiliation modes recruit a















Figure 8.1: Scarrow’s multi-speed membership parties model (Scarrow 2015, p. 33)
However, the model derived from these considerations is highly subjective and
not empirically grounded, at least not on individual affiliation data. Additionally,
Scarrow does not provide any explanation of how 34 combinations have derived from
eight different party affiliation modes. Eight different variables, all coded binary, give
a total number of 256 combinations. Since Scarrow’s model does ignore the empty
space around the circles, where individuals would be situated who do not carry out
a single one of the participation variants, 255 combinations are feasible. It is quite
likely though, that not all mathematical combinations make sense on a theoretical or
empirical basis. Nonetheless, a selection, based on either of these approaches, should
be elaborated in further detail.
Considering that Scarrow mentions the imperfect overlap as an improvement of
her model, it is not clear, why there actually are perfect overlaps within this model.
According to the multi-speed membership parties model, it is not possible, to fi-
nancially support a party, without simultaneously being a cyber-member, follower
and elector. Additionally, light-membership does only exist as an affiliation mode
for electors. Whereas this is at least theoretically sensible, the same should be ap-
plied a fortiori to traditional members. Traditional members can be expected to
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vote for their party much more certainly, because of their high contribution affilia-
tion mode of registered membership. However, aside from individual combinations
and the question whether certain combinations can be explained in a satisfactory
manner, the aim of this chapter is to provide a real world, survey based structure of
party affiliation considering all modes of affiliation.
A great way to do so was a graphical approach on set theory, just like Scarrow
does with her illustration of the multi-speed membership model. Venn and Euler
diagrams are set out to display certain (Euler) or all (Venn) combinations of an
N-number of sets. The crucial part here is the N. For N=3, even a Venn diagram
can be easily drawn with three overlapping circles, just like traditional members,
activists, and financial sustainers are arranged in Scarrow’s model illustration. For
higher N, diagrams can be drawn as well, but they suffer from either one or more
shortcomings.
At first, there is the question whether a way to draw a Venn diagram actually
exists or has been discovered yet. This is not the case for certain numbers of sets.
Secondly, rotationally symmetric diagrams are much easier to understand. However
their illustration is limited by the necessity of having a prime number of sets. Thirdly,
the number of set combinations grows exponentially with each additional set that is
to be incorporated into the model. That makes interpretation rather complex, since
only seven sets already produce 128 possible subsets. Lastly, the graphical approach
has to be questioned in general, if the correct relative size of each subset is not
ensured. This is yet a problem for computed three set Venn diagrams (Luana &
Rodgers 2014). In essence, an empirically based Venn- or Euler-version of Scarrow’s
theoretical model cannot be provided in such a way, as it would help to understand
modern day party affiliation.
However, putting the cart before the horse, the goal of Venn diagrams is to identify
cases, which share the exact same set of features, and to differentiate those from
another group (or several other groups), whose cases share a different set of features
compared to the first group. Applying this outline to Scarrow’s model of party
affiliation, leads to different sets of respondents that execute the same set of affiliation




A typical discipline to use Venn diagrams is genomics. In genomics, it is very
important, to differentiate every possible case from other cases, since all cases, i.e.
all combinations of nucleic acid, must be considered as equally important. However,
in social sciences, not all cases are equally important. Before applying a method to
data, that is complex to execute and produces results maybe even more complex to
interpret, possible advantages and disadvantages of each method have to be consid-
ered. In this particular case, it is simply not very illuminative to know the specific
number or relative proportion of all possible combinations. In fact, the goal in social
sciences must be to identify general patterns that provide reasonable interpretations
for most cases, not the specific structure of every single case. This however, can be
achieved by other means than set theory and its graphical illustration.
In order to identify types of affiliation that are applicable to statistically incorpo-
rate most cases, a case related cluster analysis was computed, the results of which
are presented in this chapter. Applying cluster analysis to the German Party Mem-
bers Survey data, the hidden structure across multiple affiliation modes, i.e. relevant
combinations, will be uncovered.
8.1 Cluster Analysis - Methodical Considerations
Computing a cluster analysis is very much a straight forward process done bysoftware with very few clicks. However, a handful of very crucial decisions must
be made prior to the computing process, which can affect the final outcome quite
drastically. Therefore, with clustering methods one always has to take into account
these specific decisions. Moreover decisions on clustering methodology are rarely
right or wrong, but rather different and depend heavily on the research interest.
Consequently, the results of cluster analysis are equally not right or wrong, but
rather one of many possible approaches to uncover hidden structures within data.89
Hence, the more important it is, to accurately describe any decisions made, in order
to follow the clustering process precisely.
89von Luxburg, Williamson and Guyon (2012) put it even more provocative when asking the ques-
tion, whether clustering can be considered science at all or should be better described as an
art.
166
Identifying Empiric Patterns of Party Affiliation
During the cluster analysis described here, five important decisions have been
made that shape the clustering process and finally the outcome. All of these decisions
will be further explained in detail in the following and apply to:
1. The relevant variables, cases are clustered along.
2. The choice of relevant cases considered in the clustering process.
3. The proximity measure that is chosen to determine the equivalence of two
cases.
4. The algorithm, which specifies the way, in which values are determined for
cases already merged to a cluster and how the clustering in a narrower sense
works.
5. The way of deciding, which cluster solution (how many clusters) is chosen.
Considered variables
An object related cluster analysis will be applied to the data, including all variables
that indicate, whether a respondent is taking part in an affiliation mode or not. De-
spite voting not being exactly a way of people taking over traditional party members’
functions, it is included in the clustering process. This is because voting is not only
the most popular way of individual political participation, but at the same time, tra-
ditional party members are expected to be reliable voters for their particular party;
a resource, a party can count on. Thus, when traditional party membership erodes,
consequences for a party’s electorate are likely to occur as well, and the question of
voting in connection to new ways of party affiliation arises. Accordingly, voting is a
viable part of both, Duverger’s as well as Scarrow’s conception of party affiliation.
Light-membership has already been dismissed from this analysis which, leads to







• Social media following,
• News audience and
• Voting.
Relevant cases
Moreover, an important modification is made to Scarrow’s conception at this stage.
The aforementioned empty space of inactive people is considered within the model.
The idea behind that is methodological in nature. As described above, in order to
conduct a sample containing sufficient numbers of (former) party members, the sam-
ple was stratified disproportionately. In general, this is later corrected by weighting
coefficients, assigning a specific weight to each of the sample’s cases for statistical
analysis. But cluster analysis works differently. The idea behind cluster analysis is
based on proximity between objects alone and not on specific relevance of single
objects within a sample. Accordingly, weights cannot be considered during cluster
analysis. What can be done instead however, is to determine cluster relevance af-
terwards according to cluster members’ weights. By considering inactive people, the
clustering process is working with the complete sample. That way, the originally
generated weighting variable can be used to determine original cluster size.
The idea to exclude inactive people and generate an additional weighting variable
is not feasible, since this requires information about data collection, which is not
accessible.
Proximity measure
The simple matching coefficient has been chosen as a proximity measure. The impor-
tant thing to consider with binary data is symmetry. Since all proximity coefficients
somehow rely on the number of matches and mismatches between two cases, it is
very important, what match and mismatch actually mean with regard to content
(Kaufman & Rousseuw 1991, p. 23). Binary data is considered symmetric, when
matches between two variables are equally important for clustering as mismatches
are. The easiest examples for this kind of binary data is sex, as it is mostly consid-
ered in survey data.90 The variable sex can have two simple states: Male and female.
90The binary consideration of sex might be two simple in other applications though.
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In consequence, the state male carries the same value as the state female, since the
existence of male is equivalent to the non-existence of female and vice versa.
On the other hand, blood type AB negative can be considered a good example for
asymmetric binary data. This variable can have more than two values theoretically.
Sure, since it is all about binary data here, in fact a variable like blood type must be
coded as precisely as possible, meaning it must state a certain type in the variable
itself, not in the possible values. Only that way, there are only two possible values,
e.g. AB negative yes/no. But, the interesting difference is, that even when a variable
on blood type AB negative indicates non-existence, the information is very vague,
since there is more than one other possible value. In essence, the non-existence of
the status does not carry the same amount of information, as the existence does. On
the one hand, it can be said that people with matching values for an asymmetric
variable indicating presence of a criterion do have something in common. On the
other hand, if a match occurs on the non-existence of a criterion, it is still unknown,
whether people share the same blood type or not (Kaufman & Rousseuw 1991, pp.
25).
However, one important restriction must be noted here, which is the reason, why
the question on variable symmetry cannot be answered in general without knowing
the specific research interest. There might be situations, when other possible states of
a wider concept are simply not of any interest. To stick to the above mentioned exam-
ple, when researching for incidents of diseases, there can be research designs, where
it is not the blood type in general that needs to be translated in binary data, but
the specific blood type AB negative. In both cases, a match of non-existence would
state that two cases do have something in common (the absence of A/B negative
blood type). But whereas in the situation mentioned first, a match of non-existence
does not indicate, if two survey cases share the same blood type (since more than
one alternative exists), the match of non-existence in the second situation indicates
clearly, that two cases do share the non-existence of blood type AB negative, which
is the only information relevant in this situation. If this specific blood type, is the
only information of interest, the variable should be considered symmetric as well. It
is therefore not only the variable itself, which should be considered when deciding










Figure 8.2: Example of a basic match/mismatch-table
And this exactly is the case here. When searching for specific clusters of affiliates,
sharing the same ways of political participation, people who do not participate in
one specific mode, do actually share something in common. Even in the extreme
case of two cases, participating in no single one of the affiliation modes, these cases
can be considered equal in this very isolated field. But, since this isolated field is the
only thing that is of interest for defining the affiliation clusters, it is important to
consider the data as symmetric binary data.
In consequence a match of existence and a match of non-existence must be con-
sidered equally important to measure the proximity between two cases. That is why
a proximity measure is chosen that includes a match of non-existence in the numer-
ator of the formula. As an example, the measures of two random cases are written
in two-by-two-table format (figure 8.2).
In this table the matches/mismatches for two cases (Object A and Object B)
amongst five variables are filled in, whereas 1 indicates existence and 0 indicates
non-existence of a criterion. Brackets in specific cells only serve for referencing. The
two cases show a match of existence for two variables as indicated by the number 2 in
cell (a), as well as a match of non-existence for two variables (cell (d). Additionally,
regarding one variable, a mismatch occurs, since object A does show this criterion
but object B does not (cell (c). The chosen simple matching coefficient (SMC) is
calculated by:
SMC = a+ d
a+ b+ c+ d .
In the end, the amount of matches (a+d) is set in proportion to the overall amount
of variables (a+b+c+d), which gives the share of matches in all relevant variables.
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For the example from figure 8.2 on the facing page, the simple matching coefficient
for objects A and B is calculated by:
SMC = 2 + 22 + 0 + 1 + 2 =
4
5 = 0.8.
However, although a lot of other proximity measures have been developed, there
are no reasonable guidelines to help choosing one specific measure (Wiedenbeck &
Züll 2010, p. 531). Two rather popular alternatives to the simple matching coefficient
are Rogers and Tanimoto (1960, p. 1117) as well as Sokal & Sneath II (Choi, Cha,
& Tappert 2010, p. 44). The first one alternates the simple matching coefficient by
doubly weighting the mismatches of two objects, whereas the latter one assesses
double weight to the matches of two objects. As a result, Rogers and Tanimoto
decrease the relative meaning of matches, whereas Sokal and Sneath II increase the
relative meaning of matches.
The simple matching coefficient is simple and intuitive when proximity of two cases
with symmetric variables shall be calculated. Additionally, there is no obvious reason,
why this parsimony shall be discarded. In the light of the specific research design and
interest, both other proximity measures mentioned above, do not offer a reasonable
momentum, why they shall be applied in favor of the simple matching coefficient.
Hence, in order to keep things simple and hopefully more easily comprehensible,
with the simple matching coefficient, a conservative measure is chosen that considers
matches and mismatches equally important to determine proximity.
Clustering algorithm
In addition to a proximity measure, the specific clustering algorithm, applied on the
data has to be chosen as well. The function of a clustering algorithm is fairly similar
to the function of proximity measures, though on another scale. Whereas proxim-
ity measures determine the distance between objects, this is no longer applicable
when at least two objects are merged in one cluster. To proceed with the cluster-
ing process, it is necessary to identify the distance between the cluster, which was
merged in a previous step and other objects, which have not been merged yet (or
between two clusters). Hence, a measure has to be introduced, that determines the
values of a whole cluster in order to compare these values to those of other objects




















Relocating Iterating Minimal Distance
Optimizing
Methods
Figure 8.3: Taxonomy of selected clustering algorithms, applied algorithm high-
lighted
steps. This is, where clustering algorithms come into play. Moreover clustering al-
gorithms not only determine, how to measure cluster-to-object distances, but the
actual proceeding of clustering itself.
Figure 8.3 gives an overview of some different clustering algorithms. However, the
purpose of this study is to work with the data and not to dig too deep into methodical
possibilities that are not actually applied. This is why only a selection of clustering
methods will be explained in further detail. Moreover, there is no such thing as
one valid taxonomy of clustering methods, which makes providing an overview even
more complex.
Two of the most common clustering methods on first level differentiation are
hierarchical and partitioning methods. Partitioning methods can be further divided
into iterating and relocating techniques. Partitioning methods approach clustering
with a predetermined number of clusters and, in the case of the relocating approach,
with predetermined membership of all objects in one cluster. This is called the
starting partition.
In case of the relocating technique, clustering happens via constant rearrangement
of objects amongst the predetermined number of clusters. The measure leading this
process is variance, which has to be calculated again for two clusters, after one
object has been rearranged, the emitting cluster and the receiving cluster. On each
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step the one object is rearranged, that leads to the maximum cutback of variance.
This process is continued, until no improvement of variance criterion is achieved
via rearrangement of an object, i.e. the optimum of the target function is reached
(Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, & Weiber 2011, p. 419).
In case of approaching clustering with iterating techniques, k clusters (by defi-
nition) have to be determined. According to this, k objects are chosen as starting
points of cluster centers, which provide the maximum distance between objects. In
the next step, remaining objects are assigned to the starting points, based on the
criterion of minimal distance, which results in k clusters. For all of these first-step-
clusters, a mean-vector (centroid) is calculated (therefore the term k-means). Then
again all cases are assigned using not the predetermined starting objects, but the
centroids’ values. A mean-vector is calculated for each cluster and everything starts
over again. This process is continued until either the centroids’ values do not change
with an iteration, a threshold for the centroids’ values is reached, or a predetermined
number of iterations is reached (Schendera 2010, pp. 117).
On the other hand, hierarchical clustering methods are probably the approaches
on classification of objects mostly used. Hierarchical methods are basically distin-
guished according to the way, the clustering algorithm works its way through data.
However, there must be one shared characteristic, that distinguishes agglomerative
and divisive procedures from partitioning techniques.
This characteristic is the fact that with partitioning methods, items can be moved
from one cluster to another, even if they have already been merged with another
item or another cluster, i.e. clustering steps are not necessarily ultimate. But that
exactly is the case, when either of the hierarchical methods is applied. In this case,
every clustering step builds up on the steps that happened before (therefore the
term hierarchical) and once items (or one item and one cluster) have been merged
or split up, they stay put together or apart for the rest of the clustering process.
This is, as Kaufman and Rousseuw (1991, pp. 45) put it, “both the key to their
success (because it leads to small computation times) and their main disadvantage
(the inability to correct erroneous decisions)”91.
Now the difference between agglomerative and divisive algorithms is, as mentioned
earlier, the direction they work their way through data. Agglomerative algorithms
91Parentheses from original text.
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start with a number of clusters equal to the number of objects (k=n), which means
that every cluster consist of only one item. In the next step, similarities or dissimilar-
ities of all possible pairs are calculated according to the measure chosen (see above).
Consequently, in the first step, two items with the greatest similarity or smallest
dissimilarity are merged together forming the first cluster. After this first step, n-1
objects are left to be clustered in further steps (n-2 items and one cluster). Now
the distance between all objects, items as well as clusters, is calculated again, which
leads to the second step in clustering the data. These steps are repeated until all
items are merged within one cluster (one cluster solution) (Backhaus et al. 2011, p.
420).
Divisive clustering simply works the other way round. The starting partition in
this case is not the n-cluster solution, but the one-cluster solution. In the first step
of divisive clustering, the starting partition is split up into two clusters, using the
same proximity measures as with agglomerative clustering. Similarly, these clustering
steps are repeated until divisive clustering reaches the n-cluster solution, where all
items represent one cluster respectively (Kaufman & Rousseuw 1991, p. 49).
One of the main advantages of divisive clustering is that most scholars are inter-
ested in clustering solutions with rather few clusters. Comparing divisive cluster-
ing with agglomerative clustering, these preferred solutions are reached relatively
early in the chain of clustering steps and therefore are less likely to suffer from ear-
lier steps. However, agglomerative algorithms had the big advantage of perceptibly
faster computation times (Kaufman & Rousseuw 1991, p. 49), which has been a ma-
jor factor, especially in the early days of electronic data processing. Despite the fact
that information technology developed at the speed of light over the last decades,
poor literature coverage of divisive methods suggests that these techniques still suf-
fer from this path chosen earlier.92 On the other hand, Everitt et al. (2011) admit
that computational capacities still do play a role nowadays, at least when actually
polythetic methods are used.
According to figure 8.3 on page 172, agglomerative clustering can be further di-
vided. This division is now based on the way, different algorithms determine the
92Wiedenbeck and Züll (2010) ignore divisive methods completely. Backhaus et al. (2011), Bacher,
Pöge and Wenzig (2010) as well as Schendera (2010) at least mention the existence of divisive
methods, whilst Everitt, Landau, Leese and Stahl (2011) seem to be the only authors, who
actually provide processing content.
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relevant measures of one cluster and accordingly, the distance between one item and
one cluster.
For the purpose of this study, it is neither possible nor helpful to provide detailed
explanations of all algorithms. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that
all algorithms have been developed according to specific needs, which are generally
determined by data characteristics and research interests. This means, every single
algorithm produces some kind of bias that has to be taken into account, at least at
the stage of interpretation.93 Moreover, as Wiedenbeck and Züll (2010, p. 531) point
out with good cause, the fact that all combinations of data, proximity measures
and clustering algorithms provide some kind of result, makes application of cluster
analysis even more complex. In essence, it should always be borne in mind, that
there is no right or wrong with cluster analysis. What cluster analysis produces is
not the one and only truth, but one attempt to artificially structure data, so that it is
possible to grasp the overarching general information from individual characteristics.
As mentioned before with decision no. 3 on page 168 (Proximity measure), the
simple matching coefficient has been chosen as a measure of proximity. Since cen-
troid, median and Ward algorithms require proximity to be measured in squared
euclidean distance, these methods are ruled out.
Single-linkage tends to construct large clusters by merging objects, which are
relatively far away from each other. Due to this chaining effect, single-linkage can
very well be used to identify outliers (Schendera 2010, p. 25). On the other hand,
complete-linkage, determines relevant cluster values by the largest distance of two
objects within one cluster. This leads to producing a fairly large number of small
clusters. Neither seems desirable in this actual case, which is why average-linkage-
within-groups is chosen as the algorithm applied; the bias of which lies between
single- and complete-linkage.
Cluster solution
Finally, it must be decided which cluster solution is chosen. As mentioned earlier,
hierarchical clustering methods produce output for all possible solutions from the
n-cluster solution, where every single object represents a cluster of it’s own, to the
93Schendera (2010, pp. 25) and Everitt et al. (2011, p. 79) provide more or less detailed comparison
charts of different agglomerative algorithms.
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one-cluster solution, where all objects are merged in only one group. Hence, it is
necessary to decide, which cluster solution is the most reasonable to gain the desired
information. This decision is shaped by a conflict of aims between a parsimonious
and therefore viable solution on the one hand, and homogeneous clusters on the
other hand.
To solve this conflict, the analysis of the agglomeration schedule produced by the
software is a first step that can help with an evaluation. Due to the large number of
clustered objects, table A.8 on page 297 only contains those stages that are crucial
for the decision on the number of clusters. Here it becomes visible, that not before
stage 2922, objects are merged that do not share equal values for all variables. This is
indicated by the above chosen simple matching coefficient for those objects (cases or
clusters) that are merged on the respective agglomeration stage. From stage 2922,
the algorithm starts to merge objects, which are not completely equal in respect
to the relevant variables, which results in the simple matching coefficient being
smaller than 1. Via these tables, it is now possible to identify the stage, where the
simple matching coefficient drops suddenly, indicating an immediate loss in cluster
homogeneity from one solution to the other. Additionally it can be very helpful to
draw a scree plot of cluster homogeneity and clustering stage/number of clusters as
figure 8.4 on page 178 shows.
This scree plot provides a graphical approach to determine the correct number
of clusters via the elbow-criterion. The elbow, meaning a pronounced kink in the
plotted line, shows exactly that loss in homogeneity that has been mentioned above.
According to Backhaus et al. (2011, p. 437) the one-cluster-solution should be ig-
nored when interpreting the scree plot, since it is always the transition from two
clusters to only one, where the largest decrease in homogeneity occurs. That is why,
with almost any data, an elbow will show in exactly that position.
Unfortunately, applying this idea to figure 8.4 on page 178 does not clearly sug-
gest one distinct cluster solution. Although after agglomeration stages for a 14- and
12-cluster solution, a kink can be observed, an eight cluster solution is favored here.
Both, neither a 14- nor a 12-cluster-solution, provide information on affiliation pat-
terns in an economical way that helps to easily examine both inter-cluster differences
as well as the cluster solution as a whole. Albeit giving up the aforementioned path
to pick that agglomeration stage, where the coefficient drops suddenly for the first
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time, none of these solutions is chosen to proceed here. With only eight clusters
however, a fairly parsimonious solution is favored, to keep track of the different
clusters as well as to make interpretation and comprehension of the entire cluster
solution easier. Moreover, cluster homogeneity is not undermined too heavily from
a 14- to an 8-cluster-solution and the decrease is much more pronounced after the
8-cluster-agglomeration-stage, which indicates objects of much more heterogeneous
patterns being merged after this stage.
Since the elbow-criterion is a very subjective decision, a lot of effort has been made
to provide some kind of objective criterion, which helps to identify a true solution.
However, there are a number of serious challenges involved when it comes to the so
called stopping rules. Milligan and Cooper (1985) made the attempt to evaluate per-
formances of up to 30 different stopping rules. Specific rules aside, they admit that
the performances are very likely to be data dependent. Moreover, when it comes to
the Mojena-I and Mojena-II criterion, which seem to be the most popular stopping
rule, scholars’ opinions differ on which values to chose. In the end, it is regularly the
case that cluster solutions for different criterion values are evaluated content related
compared to one cluster solution determined by a mathematical criterion. This how-
ever, is just as feasible without determining indistinct values of vague criteria. To
underline this argument against stopping rules even further, it shall be emphasized
that cluster analysis does not uncover the one and only hidden structure within
data. As mentioned earlier, it is one of many possible attempts to structure data
based on logically sequenced steps and at the same time, it is a process dependent
on many personal decisions. But then, it is ineligible to dismiss content related con-
siderations and hide personal considerations behind mathematical equations. This is
why stopping rules have not been applied on the data and the decisions on a specific
cluster solution is based on methodical considerations of cluster homogeneity and a
parsimonious solution.
8.2 Results and Interpretation
According to the methodical considerations and decisions made in the previouspart, the eight-cluster solution determined by the goal to balance both, cluster
homogeneity as well as a parsimonious solution, has been the starting point for a
content-related analysis of the clustering process.
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Figure 8.4: Scree plot of decreasing cluster homogeneity
Final clusters are distributed according to table 8.1 on the facing page. Obviously,
the algorithm produced one very large cluster (1) and seven clusters of small to
medium size (2-8). This however is not at all a problem or bias. As the following
review of each cluster and the eight cluster solution as a whole will show, this
distribution can be interpreted very well and is coherent with research on high-
/low-cost political participation.
Moreover it should be noted, clusters interpreted here are weighted in order to
equiilibrate the intentionally highly biased sample data. Within the clustering pro-
cess weighting is not applicable, since the idea of clustering is based on inter-object
proximity within the actual sample, rather than determining population balanced
relevance of a phenomenon. Of course, this is not an argument against weighting at
all when using clustering methods. Especially with sample data, which are in general
biased in one or another direction, weighting is a crucial factor to produce reasonable
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and resilient research outcomes. This necessity is not overruled by simple technical
information. However, due to technical restraints using cluster analysis, weighting is
applied afterwards, when analyzing cluster membership as a newly introduced case
variable.
As can be taken from table 8.1, weighting results in very low numbers of cases for
clusters 2 to 7, which cannot be investigated in further detail, since distinguishing
within clusters that small resulted in very high proportions for even fewer cases.
Despite being first introduced here, the question of weighting will be treated in
further detail, when the internal structure of each cluster is examined and the low
number of cases is actually relevant. At this point of the study, weighting does indeed
result in virtually low numbers of cases, but it does not change affiliation patterns
that will be examined in the next subsection.
Table 8.1: Cluster size, absolute and relative
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N* 2060 132 74 295 152 91 65 133
Percentage 68.6 4.4 2.5 9.8 5.1 3.0 2.2 4.4
Weighted N* 2936 13 4 18 8 5 10 8
Weighted Percentage 97.8 .4 .1 .6 .3 .2 .3 .3
* 3002 total
8.2.1 Individual Clusters
The radar charts in figures 8.5 to 8.8 on page 185-186 show, how different affiliation
variables are distributed within each of the clusters. With this illustration, a
clear operational pattern is given, which highlights each cluster’s own way of
party affiliation. The chart’s lines represent steps of 10 percentage points each.
Additionally, each chart also displays the representation of affiliation modes within
the whole (weighted) sample. To compare precise values for each cluster, exact
figures of party affiliation can be taken from table 8.2 on the following page as well.
Since all individuals belonging to a specific cluster can carry out more than one
affiliation mode, the numbers add up to more than 100%. Please note that Inactive




Table 8.2: Representation of affiliation modes within clusters
Cluster TM CM FS NA AC FO EL Inactive
1 .1 1.1 3.5 7.3 4.9 8.6 86.2 12.3
2 66.7 91.7 75.0 100 100 100 100 −
3 100 100 75 100 100 − 100 −
4 100 − − − 16.7 11.1 100 −
5 100 11.1 100 − 44.4 − 100 −
6 100 40.0 100 100 − − 100 −
7 36.4 − 100 100 100 10.0 100 −
8 100 37.5 − 100 − 25 100 −
Total sample 1.9 1.8 4.6 8.5 5.9 9.0 86.5 12.0
TM: Traditional members, CM: Cyber-members, FS: Financial sustainers,
NA: News audience, AC: Activists, FO: Social media followers, EL: Electors
1. Cluster 1
Starting with the first cluster, cases merged in cluster 1 are electors by 86.2%.
All other affiliation modes are fairly unpopular within this cluster and do not
add to a distinct affiliation pattern. Cases of cluster 1 are traditional members
by .1%, cyber-members by 1.1%, financial sustainers by 3.5%, news audience
by 7.3%, activists by 4.9% and social media followers by 8.6%.
Hence, voting clearly stands out for this cluster as the main affiliation mode.
Besides voting, individuals of cluster 1 are rather not participating in political
parties. With news audience and social media followers, only two rather low-
cost affiliation modes reach a threshold of 10%. Additionally, all respondents
who are inactive in relation to party politics are merged within this first cluster.
Keeping that distribution in mind, it is no wonder that cluster 1 is by far the
largest cluster, and very much resembles the distribution of affiliation modes
within the population. It is very likely, and will be tested at a latter stage, that
individuals within this cluster mainly fulfill their perceived civic duty when
attending elections. Not very surprisingly, this Cluster is given the description
“Voters”.
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2. Cluster 2
Cluster 2 shows a very different pattern. Cases of this cluster are fairly active in
every single affiliation mode investigated here. Except for financial sustaining
and traditional membership, members of cluster 2 reach more than 90% of af-
filiation with each mode. Additionally, sustaining and traditional membership
do not fall behind too much, since at least two thirds of the cluster 2 members
are still carrying out either of these modes. However, the lower relevance of
traditional membership, compared to most other clusters, is a distinguishing
characteristic and very relevant in regard to the overall approach of this study,
which is to determine party affiliation without traditional membership. This
aspect of cluster 2 will be examined in more detail with the examination of the
overall cluster solution and its implications. All in all, cluster 2 can, of course
somewhat cynically be described as the “Hyperactives”.
3. Cluster 3
Next in line is cluster no. 3, the members of which are, just like those of cluster
no. 2, very active in many different affiliation modes. That is why cluster 3
is described primarily in contradiction to the previous cluster of hyperactives.
Cluster 3 lacks social media followers completely and scores comparable figures
when it comes to other affiliation modes. This holds true except for traditional
party membership, which for the first time rises to 100% with cluster no.
3. To be clearer, all individuals of cluster 3 are traditional party members.
Consequently high proportions assigned to other affiliation modes are carried
out only by respondents, who are traditional party members simultaneously.
Using this narrow point of view, Scarrow’s hypothesis of the development of
new ways of party affiliation replacing traditional party membership does not
hold true. But again, this question has to be investigated with a holistic review
of the overall cluster solution.
In summary, cluster 3 is clearly dominated by the absence of social media fol-
lowers, whilst at the same time, being a highly affiliated cluster. The complete
absence of social media followers might be a hint at cluster 3 representing an
older part of the sample, since social media websites are relatively new tech-
nology, which is adopted by young people first and develops into older layers
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of society as these early adopters grow older. However, at this point there is
no evidence that this is actually the case and the goal is to characterize affili-
ation clusters solely on the basis of their affiliation pattern respectively. Thus,
cluster 3 is named “Social Media Opposers”
4. Cluster 4
Cluster 4 differs remarkably from clusters 2 and 3, but much more resembles
cluster 1, the voters. Members of cluster 4 are electors by 100% and rather
inactive regarding other affiliation modes. This is true except for being a tra-
ditional party member. In this respect, members of cluster 4 are also affiliated
by 100%. In essence, cluster 4 represents traditional party members, who are
in no way actively or passively affiliated to their party. No matter what kind
of affiliation is investigated, cluster 4 members are neither participating in the
inner-party member structures, nor are they following party related informa-
tional content, nor are they contributing to the party’s success financially or
voluntarily. The only thing distinguishing cluster 4 from completely inactive
party members is one out of ten members, who is following party related so-
cial media content or 1.6 out of ten cluster members, who are following the
news regularly. These figures however do not depart too far from indicating
completely inactive party members.
Anyhow, somewhat black-hearted, those traditional party members are de-
scribed as dead records. Making use of a more scientific and respectful ap-
proach, at this point, this cluster is named “Apathetic Members”.
5. Cluster 5
In parts, cluster 5 mirrors cluster 4 structures of apathetic members. However,
just as cluster analysis is intended to do, cluster 5 shows a distinct differ-
ence, which separates its members from those of cluster 4. That is supporting
the party financially. This way of affiliation is chosen by cluster 5 members
by 100%, whereas this affiliation mode is in fact not existent for cluster 4
members. Moreover, around 45% of cluster 5 are considered activists.
On the one hand, this affiliation structure could be interpreted as dead records
with remorse. However, this does not appreciate adequately those 45% being
active with a party, which means choosing a rather high-cost way of affiliation.
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Nonetheless, the focus for cluster 5 lies on the financial aspect of party affili-
ation. But since, at least a medium share of cluster 5 members is active with
a political party, this is recognized by assigning the term “Financiers” rather
than underlining the aspect of remorse.
6. Cluster 6
Cluster 6 again shows a shape of its own. On the one hand this cluster resembles
clusters 3, 4 and 5 when it comes to electors and traditional members (100% for
each mode). On the other hand, cluster 6 members score high on categories of
financial sustaining and news audience. While rejecting both affiliation modes
that can be considered to demand a not negligible amount of time, these
specific traditional party members show high interest in their party by regularly
following the news and financially supporting their party too. Hence, cluster
6 is considered to contain critical, information-based party supporters, who
are very well informed and support their party financially on a policy based
conviction. On the other hand, this cluster’s members do not seem to be willing
to invest too much time in their party relation. Accordingly, cluster 6 is named
“Interested Sustainers”.
7. Cluster 7
Finally, with cluster no. 7, traditional party membership plays the least impor-
tant role amongst all clusters. Together with cluster no. 2 (the hyperactives),
cluster 7 contains people not being a traditional party member and affiliated
via other modes at the same time. Despite being highly affiliated via finan-
cial sustaining, news following, activism, and electing (100% all), only slightly
more than one third of these are actually traditional party members on the
aggregate level. Moreover, the distinction between traditional membership and
alternative affiliation becomes even more pronounced, when cyber-membership
is added to the equation. This way of party affiliation is not present at all for
cluster 7. On the other hand, this pronounced rejection of official membership
goes along with only 10% of cluster 7 being social media followers. Hence both
affiliation modes carried out necessarily on-line, don’t play a relevant role for
cluster 7’s operational pattern as well. Having said that, cluster 7 is very much
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determined by the absence of both on-line and traditional affiliation, and thus
is described as being the “Analog Activists”.
8. Cluster 8
Coming to an end with individual cluster’s affiliation patterns, cluster no. 8
seems like an extension of cluster 4 members. Affiliates of cluster 8 are best
described with high scores for traditional party membership, news audience
and electors, each reaching 100%. These modes shape the distinct operational
pattern. Additionally, 37.5% of cluster 8 are cyber-members and every fourth
of them is following the party via social media networks. From a negative
point of view, the absence of financial sustaining as well as activism add to
the completion of the picture.
This, as mentioned earlier, somehow resembles the pattern of apathetic mem-
bers merged in cluster 4. However, cluster 8 members are not apathetic in a
general sense but rather inactive with regard to supporting the party. They
much more keep themselves informed via following the news and on-line activ-
ities, but do not seem to be keen on actually helping the party with their own
resources. Sure, they have to pay membership fees and invest time to gather
information. However, membership fees are very low in general and coupled to
the income of members. Moreover, this connection between income and dues
payed is merely a suggestion and not monitored by party bureaucracies. On
the other hand, additional donations to the party do not play a role here. Time
on the other hand is invested for information gathering only, not in activism,
which is much more an investment in oneself rather than in the party. This
interpretation leads to assigning the label “Informed Members” to cluster 8.
8.2.2 A Remark on Affiliation Intensity
The above section (8.2.1) aims to describe individual clusters along their distinct
way, members are affiliated with a party on average. Although giving some informa-
tion about the affiliation characteristics of a cluster, the operational pattern is not
the only aspect of distinct affiliation. A rather imprecise value of affiliation intensity
goes along with differently developed operational modes as well. This assumption
connects to the rational choice idea that individuals choose their actions according
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Figure 8.5: Affiliation pattern for clusters 1 and 2
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(b) The Apathetic Members (4)
Figure 8.6: Affiliation pattern for clusters 3 and 4
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Figure 8.7: Affiliation pattern for clusters 5 and 6
20 40 60 80 100













(a) The Analog Activists (7)
20 40 60 80 100













(b) The Informed Members (8)
Figure 8.8: Affiliation pattern for clusters 7 and 8
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to individually perceived costs and benefits that are inherent to every decision. Com-
paring for example clusters 5 and 6 (figure 8.7 on the preceding page), the differences
between these is the relative occurrence of cyber-membership, news audience and ac-
tivism. For traditional membership, financial sustainers, social media followers and
electors, both clusters show the same share of affiliates. Simply adding values from
table 8.2 on page 180, that reports the size of each mode within clusters, for both
clusters identifies cluster 6 being more affiliated than cluster 5 (440% versus 355%).
However, affiliation modes of cyber-membership, news audience, and activism, as
well as any other variation of political participation, can carry very different values
regarding commitment that is needed to fulfill these modes. In general, the higher
the cost of one affiliation mode, the higher the commitment needed to get people to
participate in this special way. Hence, each operational pattern goes along with an
amount of commitment, that can be measured in costs, specific to each affiliation
mode. At least that is the theory behind the characteristic of affiliation intensity.
However, costs might be estimated along general assumptions, or can be very differ-
ent according to individual needs, situations, and constraints. Additionally, which
scales should be used to measure the costs of affiliation modes?
In general, party activism (regardless of party membership) can be considered
a higher cost affiliation than cyber-membership or news audience. Firstly, party
activism is the only affiliation mode that depends on actually doing something for a
not so small amount of time. All other modes can be accomplished, even regularly,
in a very short amount of time. Sticking to the comparison of clusters 5 and 6,
cyber-membership is strictly speaking nothing more than a registering process with
a website that normally takes only a couple of minutes. Cyber-membership does not
depend on actually using an on-line account, taking part in on-line discussion groups,
or any other possibility that is granted access via registration. On the other hand,
regularly following the news takes more time than just a couple of minutes. Activism
in contrast sounds like people are investing quite a lot of time. Yet, activism as well
can be estimated very differently by individuals.
Moreover, party activism is mostly an activity spent in public. This adds social
costs to the equation, since party activity, either with certain parties or with parties
in general, can be regarded as negative by friends, colleagues or superiors. On the
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other hand, there might be social aspects, for instance certain jobs or access to
certain people, that are highly dependent to party membership or party activity.
Besides time and social costs, financial costs are to be considered. This is most
obvious when it comes to financial sustaining. Despite not being connected to a
certain amount of money, this affiliation mode is strictly dependent on people’s
hard earned money, which is normally a severe resource.
Additionally, every decision made, simultaneously is also a decision against an-
other opportunity. These opportunity costs are determined not only by the decision
itself, but also by perceived costs and benefits of other possible activities.
Making cost assessment even more complex, all costs imaginable can be very dif-
ferent. Not only may individuals have a different perception of what it actually
means to be fairly active with a party or to regularly follow the news in terms of
minutes spent. Additionally, individual’s constraints can make a huge difference.
Personal disabilities as well as perceived threats, considered opportunity costs, in-
dividual legal duties and other factors can alter the structure of affiliation costs and
benefits remarkably. Even though time may be equally distributed, obligations and
constraints are not.
Besides these thoughts on assessing general assumptions about costs and individ-
ual contexts, another hurdle makes measuring affiliation intensity impossible. This is
the fact, that there is no general scale that can be used to compare costs. Whereas
time and money can be measured along minutes and currency, this is not appli-
cable for social or opportunity costs. Although and because these restraint cannot
be assessed arithmetically in a satisfactory way, they have to be considered in the
interpretation of each clusters’ operational pattern.
8.2.3 Basic Socio-demographic and Economic Variables
In order to learn more about prototypical ways of party affiliation, found in sec-
tion 8.2.1 on page 179, similar to the investigation of different affiliation modes,
basic socio-demographic characteristics of cluster members shall be evaluated at
this point. Due to the intentionally biased sample, it is very important to consider
the weight variable here to assign to each case the relevance, it possess within the
population. Unfortunately, as mentioned above under section 7.2 on page 141, this
happens to result in very little numbers for each affiliation mode, simply because
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pronounced party affiliation, besides voting, is not very common in the population.
However, total numbers of cluster members are virtual only. In fact, each cluster
contains a lot more cases than a software would show as a result of weighting and
it would be gratuitous to pass on these cases. That is why a second factor is deter-
mined to achieve unweighted numbers for each cluster, and simultaneously consider
the weight of each case within the biased sample.
To accomplish this task, each cluster’s number of unweighted cases is divided by
the corresponding number of cases after the original weight variable has been applied.
That way, a second weighting factor is constructed that contains specific information
for each cluster, on how much it has been altered by the original weight variable
applied on cluster members. As a next step, all cases are assigned this cluster-weight-
factor according to cluster membership respectively. The original case-specific weight
variable is then multiplied by the new cluster-weight-factor, which gives a variable
that considers both the sample weight as well as the cluster weight factor for each
of the sample’s cases. The process is visualized by figure 8.9.
unweighted number of cases within cluster
weighted number of cases within cluster
(using the original weight variable)
= cluster weight factor
cluster weight factor * original weight variable = double weight variable
Considers the factor, by which the
weight of each case within a spe-
cific cluster of the unweighted sam-
ple deviates from the real weight
within the weighted sample.
Considers original case specific
weight and weight parameters.
Figure 8.9: Construction of a cluster weight variable
Applying this new global weight variable on the bare sample data leads to cluster
sizes according to table 8.3 on the following page. This table shows that the pro-
cedure described above results in the exact same cluster sizes (double weighted N)
compared to the unweighted data (N), although the original weight variable has been
considered in the weighting process. Although it seems this double weighted data
would not make any difference, since plain numbers of cases and shares of differ-
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Table 8.3: Cluster size (unweighted, weighted and double weighted)
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N* 2060 132 74 295 152 91 65 133
% 68.6 4.4 2.5 9.8 5.1 3.0 2.2 4.4
Weighted N* 2936 13 4 18 8 5 10 8
Weighted % 97.8 .4 .1 .6 .3 .2 .3 .3
Double weighted N* 2060 132 74 295 152 91 65 133
Double weighted % 68.6 4.4 2.5 9.8 5.1 3.0 2.2 4.4
* 3002 total
ent clusters are the same compared to unweighted (i.e stratified) data, the weight of
each case within the double weighted data set is not the same anymore. Rather, each
case gets assigned a new weight factor that considers both, the population relevance
of each case, balanced by the weight, each cluster suffers from, when this original
weight variable is applied. This leads to a data set, where cluster subgroups feature
the same size as with unweighted data. Yet, the weight of each case compared to
each other case is matched to the ratio that is seen with the weighted sample.
This procedure allows for a much more detailed and accurate insight into each clus-
ter, because original case numbers are reproduced, and simultaneously the weight of
each case is considered as well. Of course, population related statements, or state-
ments regarding the relevance of clusters among each other, are not permissible once
this factor is applied. Nonetheless, it appears to be an appropriate way of granting
access to valuable information at this stage of the study and for this very specific
purpose only. Alternatives were, either to deal with unweighted data, which is a
major bias, especially in the case of using intentionally stratified data samples, or
to use the original weight variable and pass up variance due to marginal case num-
bers. Total sample’s values reported as a reference point in this section derive from
applying the original weight variable only.
Sex
Regarding sex, almost all affiliation clusters deviate from the total sample’s values
(figure 8.10 on the next page). Only voters, who resemble very much the overall
population, show an allocation of males and females, which is slightly shifted in
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the other direction, hence containing more females than males. For other clusters,
a pronounced shift in favor of males can be observed. The least shift in favor of
males can be seen with apathetic members, with only 52% of males, which is still
very close to the almost balanced allocation of the total sample. Financiers (62%
males) and social media opposers follow (70%). With informed members (75%) and
hyperactives (76%), yet around three quarters of the subgroup is made up by males.
However, the peak of sex related disproportion is reached with analog activists, who








































Figure 8.10: Sex by cluster, in %
How can this allocation of sex be interpreted? One thing that stands out is that
an allocation resembling the total sample’s values can be seen with fairly inactive
clusters. Both, voters and apathetic members, show not more than two pronounced
affiliation modes, distinct for their specific affiliation pattern as represented by radar
charts of figures 8.5 (a) and 8.6 (b). Moreover, clusters showing the most distinct
disproportion of sex, hyperactives and analog activists, have previously been identi-
fied being those, where traditional party membership plays the least important role
(except for the cluster of voters of course). In essence, it can be seen that being
active in alternative affiliation modes seems more likely for men than for women.
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Additionally, this is even more the case, when characteristics of different affiliation
clusters are considered, which represent a renunciation of party membership based
affiliation.
Age
Figure 8.11 on the facing page as well as figure 8.12 on page 194 underline a pro-
nounced disparity of age structures within different affiliation clusters. Figure 8.11
reports the age of each clusters’ members in four groups, whereas one group con-
tains young respondents between 18 and 29 years of age. Medium age respondents
are separated in two groups: One containing members of 30 to 44 years of age and
one group with members between 45 and 59 years. Finally, older respondents are
merged in a group of 60+ years.
Overall, cluster members of 60+ years of age make up the largest group with 33%
within the total sample, followed by continuously decreasing proportions of the two
medium aged groups (28 and 22%). With only 17%, respondents in their late teens
and twenties are responsible for less than one fifth of the sample. However, within
clusters, age structure looks very different and compared to most clusters, the total
sample reveals to be fairly young, as figure 8.12 on page 194 shows.
Again, voters are almost exactly resembling the total population’s characteristics.
Given that voters are essentially the vast majority of society, this is no surprise.
Similarly, hyperactives and informed members show a fairly balanced proportion
of different age groups compared to the total population. However, young affiliates
are even more frequent in those clusters (5% each), than with voters or the total
sample. Although the structures looks a little different, the mean age of voters (50.5),
hyperactives (53.1), and informed members (55.1) ranges within less than five years,
compared to the population’s mean of 50.7 years of age.
Cluster 7, the analog activists, is shaped by a very small number of young party
affiliates with only 2%. This minimal share of individuals aged between 18 and 29
years is even less than with the hyperactives and informed members. Nonetheless,
analog activists are still the youngest of all clusters based on the mean age, which is
only 44.5 years and thus, analog activists are on average 9 years younger than the
total sample. This is due to the overall cluster being based on a very large share
of first category medium-agers between 30 and 44 years (67%). At the expense of
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18-29 30-44 45-59 60+
Figure 8.11: Age groups by cluster, in %
young and old (60+) cluster members, members of both medium aged categories
make up 79% of the analog activists.
On the other end of the scale, financiers and interested sustainers mark the oldest
affiliation groups with an average age of at least 67 years and a minimum of three
quarters of members aged 60 or older. Apathetic members (mean of 67.1 years) as
well as social media opposers (63.4) are a few years younger on average, though
more than ten years older than the total sample. Social media opposers, interested
sustainers and financiers even lack members younger than 30 years completely.
Surprisingly, the youngest overall cluster is cluster 7, the analog activists. While
this could have been expected due to a low portion of traditional party members,
the characteristic of even lower rates of necessarily digital ways of party affiliation,
points in another direction.
Just like the findings from the allocation of sex, hyperactives as well as analog



















































mean median standard deviation
Figure 8.12: Age by cluster, key measures in years
Apart from the voters, these are the overall youngest clusters with analog activists
being especially salient.
Civil Status
Figure 8.13 on the next page shows each cluster’s allocation of different social status
groups in decreasing order of the married percentage. For all clusters, being married
is the most common civil status option and shares of married exceed at least the half
of each subgroup in all but one case. With the social media opposers, almost three
quarter of the affiliation cluster are married (72%). This share decreases steadily
between two and four percentage-points across hyperactives (70%), interested sus-
tainers (68%), financiers (64%), informed members (60%), and apathetic members
(57%), before a larger drop marks the 50%-threshold of voters and the total sam-
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married single divorced widowed
Figure 8.13: Civil status by cluster, in %
ple. For analog activists, being married still makes for the most popular option with
49%.
Much larger differences between clusters can be seen with other civil status op-
tions, namely being single, widowed, and divorced. While only 7% of the social media
opposers label themselves as being single, 43% of the analog activists claim this op-
tion as well. Being divorced shows the smallest share for analog activists with only
3% and the largest share for social media opposers (15%). Only 2% of the hyperac-
tives belong to the group of widowed, while with the financiers, almost one quarter
(23%) of all affiliates took this option.
Overall, most cluster affiliates are much more likely to be married and less likely to
be single compared to the total sample. Noticeable anomalies occur only sporadically.
The group of analog activists however, shows a very different pattern in comparison
to all other clusters and the total sample. Not only is it the case that they are less
likely to be married and more likely to be single. These two options also account for




A similar picture is drawn with education levels as provided by figure 8.14 on the
facing page. Analog activists show by far the largest relative portion of very highly
educated affiliates with nearly 80%. At first sight, this seems rather odd since analog
activists are also the youngest of all clusters. However, although the youngest on
average, members of the analog activists are younger than 30 years by only 2%.
An age, where formal tertiary education is generally completed, which means in
terms of education, cluster 7 is not biased by members too young to have completed
their educational career. Moreover, a relatively young cluster is more likely to gain
from the wider spread of high educational degrees, which has occurred since the
17th century and especially after World War II94, while the latter period is more
important for the comparison to other affiliation clusters of course. Additionally, all
other educational levels are the lowest with analog activists, no matter if numbers
are assessed separately (3%, 12% and 6% respectively) or added (21%).
Other clusters can legitimately be viewed as being separated into two distinct
groups. One of these groups is formed by clusters of hyperactives, social media op-
posers, financiers, interested sustainers and informed members, which all show a
rather similar distribution of educational categories. For all of the aforementioned
affiliation clusters, low education is applicable for not more than one tenth of the
affiliates and medium level education for around one quarter. Similarly, high edu-
cation shares deviate between 8% (hyperactives) and 12% (interested sustainers).
Only the subgroup of informed members breaks this rule with 17% of highly ed-
ucated affiliates. Very highly educated individuals, meaning those, who do hold a
technical college or university degree, are distributed within this group of clusters
from 56% (informed members) to 64% (hyperactives). Hence, still more than half
of each of these clusters is situated in the highest educational category.
A second group of clusters is located on the other end of the scale, while it would
be far fetched to describe these as being badly educated. Both apathetic members
and voters feature an allocation of educational levels, that almost exactly mirrors
the total population’s educational structure. With voters and apathetic members,
still slightly over 40% are very highly educated according to the applied definition.
94The phenomenon of young people achieving higher educational levels as previous cohorts at
an aggregate level is known as Bildungsexpansion. For further reading see: Hadjar and Becker
(2009).
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low medium high very high
Figure 8.14: Educational level by cluster, in %
The remaining roughly 60% are very evenly spread across other categories, while
medium education stands proud by six to eleven percentage points in all of the
aforementioned subgroups.
All in all, it can be seen that most of the clusters’ affiliates are educated rather
well in a formal sense. This characteristic is coherent with up to date research on
determinations of political and party related participation, no matter if education
is seen as a first level determinant that is expected to directly lead to political
participation, or as a second level variable, that facilitates the effect of civic resources
(see section 4.2 on page 76).
Employment
The cluster members’ employment status is accessible by figure 8.15 on the following
page. This figure reveals great differences with regard to the affiliates’ professional




























































Figure 8.15: Employment type by cluster, in %
are working full-time, and only 13% are part-time employed. The rest makes up
for 43% and is employed neither full- nor part-time. This may include students,
housewives or househusbands, and retirees.
Only three out of seven affiliation clusters (excluding the voters, which feature
almost the same characteristics as the total sample) show higher portions of full-
time employed respondents than the total sample. Analog activists are full-time
employed by 80%. Hyperactives and informed members follow with 73% and 53%
respectively.
In contrast to clusters dominated by full-time employed respondents, apathetic
members, social media opposers, interested sustainers, and financiers are mainly
made up by affiliates who belong to neither of the two basic employment categories.
Theses add up to 54% for the apathetic members and steadily increase until 67%
are reached for the financiers. The next paragraph will inform about the status of
not full-time employed respondents.
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unemployed unable to work other/none
Figure 8.16: Not full-time employed status groups by cluster, in %
Not full-time employed respondents
Figure 8.16 shows that the great majority of every subsample’s (each cluster and the
total sample) not full-time employed respondents is made up by pensioners. Yet, all
affiliation clusters, except for the voters, feature a larger proportion of pensioners
than the total sample. This exceeds up to 91% of pensioners for the interested
sustainers and the financiers. Consequently, others status groups account for only
marginal shares among affiliates in these two clusters; if for any at all.
Class Self-Assessment
Each cluster’s inner allocation among social classes can be reviewed with figure 8.17
on the following page. Clusters are arranged in decreasing order of lower class affil-



























N=129 N=2015 N=2986 N=288 N=150 N=132 N=65 N=72 N=89

































lower lower middle middle upper middle upper
Figure 8.17: Class self-assessment by cluster, in %
all, remaining clusters follow the decreasing order of the next higher category (lower
middle class).
Among all identified affiliation clusters, only three groups feature lower class af-
filiates. Voters, who basically represent the average citizen, informed members, and
apathetic members are the only subgroups, the members of which assign themselves
to the lower class category. Shares of these range between 4% of the informed mem-
bers to 1% of the apathetic members.
Similarly frequent is the assignment to the highest category, the upper class, al-
beit each subgroup at least features some respondents in this stratum. The greatest
proportions of upper class affiliates can be seen with the financiers and the hyper-
actives, the members of which claim to be members of the upper class by 5% each.
Other clusters, as well as the total sample, range between 1% and 2% only.
Unsurprisingly, the middle classes account for the vast majority of affiliates within
each subgroup. Across all clusters, between 94% and 99% see themselves as part of
a larger middle class, including its edges of a lower and an upper middle class.
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Income
Data on disposable household income (figure 8.18 on the next page) support pre-
vious findings. Again, analog activists stand out from the crowd with 84% of high
income affiliates and 0% of low income affiliates, leaving 16% of respondents with
medium income. Additionally, hyperactives and interested sustainers show a similar
distribution, while the ratio between high and medium income affiliates constantly
shifts towards a 50/50-distribution. Moreover, a very small share of only 2% of these
affiliation clusters belongs to the subgroup of low household income respondents.
With social media opposers, medium income represents the modal category with
just over 50%. This shift towards a supremacy of medium income continues to
develop over clusters of financiers as well as apathetic members and goes along with
low income respondents between 5% (financiers) and 11% (informed members).
Finally, the cluster of voters arrives at a high income rate of just under one third
and 15% of low income affiliates. Interestingly, the share of medium income affiliates
does hardly change amongst voters, social media opposers, apathetic members, and
financiers. Instead, most of the alteration of the clusters’ monetary structure is based
on different shares of high and low income cluster members.
Key measures of disposable household income can be reviewed with figure 8.19 on
page 203. This figure states a continuous increase in household income amongst af-
filiation clusters. Mean household income of the voters is €2,657, which is the lowest
income of all affiliation clusters. From this starting point, mean income grows quite
steadily until it reaches €3,660 with the social media opposers. Clusters of hyper-
actives and analog activists however set themselves apart with regard to disposable
income. With €4,576 and €4,790 respectively, both subsamples’ income exceeds the
next lower income of social media opposers by at least one quarter. Moreover, with
hyperactives and analog activists, it is those clusters that stand out, where tradi-
tional party membership is the least common, as figure 8.5 on page 185 (b) and
figure 8.8 on page 186 (a) point out.
Measured against household size (figure 8.20 on page 204), the order of clusters
almost exactly mirrors the one that has been seen from absolute income figures.
Analog activists relative income however drops quite drastically. From an initial
€4,790/month, only €1,203/month are left once the income is divided by the num-
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Figure 8.18: Disposable household income groups by cluster, in %
decreases to only 25%, whereas income of all other clusters is roughly cut in half
(between 50% for informed members and 58% for financiers). This is very likely to
be an age effect. Given that analog activists are only on average 44.5 years of age,
it is much more common for them to have kids still living with their parents. Voters
on the other hand are on average five years older than analog activists, which might
exactly be those five years that teenagers need, until they move out.
Comparison of cluster characteristics
All the aforementioned socio-demographic variables show only weak correlations
based on Cramer’s V. However, chi-square tests for all variables give reason to re-
ject the null hypothesis that cluster membership and the respective variable are
independent. Moreover, all results are highly significant on an α-level of .001 (see
table 8.4 on page 204). In addition to the detailed description of social, demographic,
and economic characteristics, table 8.5 on page 205 provides a compact yet complete
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mean median standard deviation
Figure 8.19: Absolute disposable household income, by cluster
overview of distinct values of all variables. Beyond each cluster’s values, as described
in the first column, this tables also reports the clusters’ deviation from the total sam-











































































































mean median standard deviation
Figure 8.20: Relative disposable household income, by cluster
Table 8.4: Chi square for selected socio-demographic variables within clusters
Variable Cramer’s V1 Chi-square α=.001 Chi-square df p-value2
Sex .204 24.322 125.525 7 .000
Age3 .189 56.892 429.057 28 .000
Civil status .094 85.351 183.825 49 .000
Education .112 46.797 111.285 21 .000
Employment status .108 84.879 208.458 42 .000
Not full-time employed .112 84.879 121.798 42 .000
Class self-assessment .101 74.926 150.235 35 .000
Income .175 36.123 168.711 14 .000
1 weak effect: 0 < V < .3, medium effect: .3 ≤ V < .5, strong effect: .5 ≤ V .
2 In general, values of p < .05 is recognized as being significant, p < .01 as highly signifi-
cant, and p < .001 as very highly significant.
3 Asymptotic chi-squared test results in eight cells containing expected frequencies < 5.










Table 8.5: Socio-economic description of affiliation clusters
Characteristic Total
Sample










Male in% 49 48 76 69 52 62 70 88 75
deviation in % -2 +55 +41 +6 +27 +43 +80 +53
Age, Ø in years 51 51 53 63 61 69 67 45 55
deviation in % 0 +4 +24 +20 +35 +31 -12 +8
Married in% 50 50 70 72 57 64 68 49 60
deviation in % 0 +40 +44 +14 +28 +36 -2 +20
Single in % 30 30 21 7 14 9 14 21 24
deviation in % 0 -30 -77 -53 -70 -53 -30 -20
University degree in %1 42 41 64 60 44 57 60 79 56
deviation in % -2 +52 +43 +5 +36 +43 +88 +33
Upper secondary education in%2 15 16 8 10 17 9 12 6 17
deviation in % +7 -47 -33 +13 -40 -20 -60 +13
Full-time employed, in 44 45 73 28 34 23 28 80 53
deviation in % 0 +66 -36 -23 -48 -38 +82 +21
Pensioner in %3 61 61 67 87 80 91 91 69 70
deviation in % 0 +9 +43 +31 +49 +49 +13 +16
Student in %4 9 10 3 0 2 0 0 0 10
deviation in % +7 -69 -100 -83 -100 -100 -100 + 9
High Class in %5 23 21 44 33 25 40 38 33 36
deviation in % -9 +91 +43 +9 +74 +65 +43 +57
Low Class in %6 21 3 7 5 14 8 4 5 14
deviation in % -86 -67 -76 -33 -62 -81 -76 -33
Income, Ø in Euro3 1, 664 1, 361 2, 285 1, 988 1, 753 1, 877 1, 909 1, 203 1, 784
deviation in % -18 +37 +19 +5 +13 +15 -28 +7
Table reads as follows:
For the total sample and the corresponding (upper) figure of each cluster, the following footnotes no. 1 to 3 apply. Lower figures for clusters
indicate deviation in % compared to the total sample’s value.
1 Percentage with very high formal (i.e. university level) education.
2 Percentage with high formal (i.e. university entrance level) education.
3 Percentage of pensioners within set of not full-time employed.
4 Percentage of students within set of not full-time employed.
5 Percentage of self-assessed upper and upper-middle class.
6 Percentage of self-assessed lower and lower-middle class.
7 Mean net household income divided by number of household members in Euro.205
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8.2.4 Overall Cluster Solution
Reviewing all clusters together, there are several interesting findings, which deserve
to be discussed in further detail.
First of all, as mentioned previously, the clusters’ sizes are very different. Espe-
cially cluster 1, the voters, stands out in this respect. This however, makes a lot of
sense. The first cluster’s affiliation structure almost completely resembles the affilia-
tion pattern, found for the total sample. That means, all cases, not differing too much
from the aggregate, are merged in cluster 1. All other cases are divided over seven
different clusters that can be considered affiliates beyond average. These clusters are
especially interesting, since this is, where the gist of the matter is hidden. How the
overall cluster solution draws a picture of recent German political party affiliation in
its various kinds, can be reviewed with figure 8.21 on the facing page. Around 12%
of the population need to be counted as being completely inactive with regard to
political parties by any means. Additionally, 85.8% do not extent their participation
further than to attend elections. Both of these groups add up to those 97.8% of the
population, that meet in cluster 1 named the voters. This leaves only a hair above
2% for those, who can legitimately be considered as being party-politically active.
At this stage, it shall be remembered that the members/electorate-ratio, as has been
presented in chapter 2 on page 30, is equally 2%.
Voting is one way of political participation, which is fairly common. For elections
to the German federal level parliament, voter turnout has never dropped below 70%
of the electorate since 1949. Moreover, voting brings along fairly low overall costs
(which might be one reason for its popularity), no matter which type of costs are
considered. Voting is not only anonymous to any kind of governmental authority,
but, according to the German constitution, keeping the choice for oneself is a highly
regarded and secured right of every voter. Hence, it is easy to make a secret decision
(or lie about the specific decision) and therefore, in most cases no social costs may
apply at all. Moreover, voting does create no or only very marginal financial costs.
Elections in Germany are always held on a Sunday, which makes it unnecessary for
most people to stay away from work, which could have financial consequences. And
for those, who work on Sunday, or are hindered by anything else to cast their vote
directly, postal voting is accessible several weeks before the actual election date.
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Figure 8.21: Overview of party affiliation
Additionally, voting does not create any tight bond between a party and an indi-
vidual. Sure, in the case of Germany, in general only after four years, voters are given
the chance to correct their decision. But a voter does neither conclude any kind of
legally binding contract with a party, as traditional membership is based on, nor
does a voter publicly express commitment or invest money in a party. In all cases,
voters stay outside of a party, whereas members of other affiliation modes (except
news audience maybe) somehow enter a party’s sphere and can therefore take over
a completely different role in favor of a party. That is why the actually interesting
ways of affiliation are all other modes, where members perform some kind of party
affiliation beyond average or besides voting.
As important as a large number of voters is for a party, other affiliation modes
are the core of Scarrow’s theory and the multi-speed party membership model. As
the title of this construction suggests, the model is set out to provide an alternative
to party membership, not to the act of voting. Therefore, the general discussion
focuses on clusters two to eight in the following. In terms of the main purpose of the
multi-speed membership model, which is to provide a structure to determine and
to investigate party affiliation beyond, yet including, traditional party membership,
the results are ambivalent.
On the one hand, there are only two clusters, in which traditional membership
drops below 100%, namely the hyperactives and the analog activists. In all other
clusters, where a relevant percentage of cases is active in at least one affiliation mode
besides voting (clusters two to eight), traditional membership not only plays a lead-


































Figure 8.22: Standard deviation of mode representation among clusters
to define individual affiliation patterns for nearly all cluster members. Only with hy-
peractives and analog activists, traditional membership looses some of its distinctive
relevance and drops to 66.7% or 36.4% of the cluster respectively. Accordingly, only
with these two clusters, party related political participation occurs without the ne-
cessity of accompanied traditional party membership. Hence, the first and foremost
important result of this cluster analysis is that unlike Scarrow’s proposed scenario,
traditional party membership still plays the leading role in shaping party related
political participation.
This can additionally be backed up by corresponding data. Figure 8.22 shows,
how affiliation modes are spread across clusters by simply reporting the standard
deviation of each mode in percentage points. Obviously, affiliation via voting stands
out positively. However, of all other affiliation modes, traditional party membership
shows a fairly low standard deviation, meaning that across all clusters, traditional
party membership is spread much more evenly than other affiliation modes.
On the other hand, there are two important notes to be made that might challenge
this interpretation. Firstly, not only does cluster 1 contain by far most of the cases in
absolute numbers, but also a very large share of individuals carrying out one or more
activities that are considered affiliation modes. This is very relevant information that
remains hidden with the radar charts representing each cluster’s affiliation pattern
(figures 8.5 to 8.8 on page 185-186).
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Figure 8.23: Distribution of traditionally registered party members across clusters
Although only between .1% and 8.6% of the first cluster’s members can be as-
cribed to one of the affiliation modes (except voting) and thus this cluster’s pattern
is heavily shaped by the protruding relevance of voting (86.2%), most of each modes’
associates are actually members of this cluster of affiliates. This is, because individ-
uals are only assigned to one of the other clusters, if their specific affiliation pattern
is close enough to a number of other affiliates. The consequence of this is that the
overall size of cluster 1 has to be considered, if the relevance of affiliation modes
is evaluated, especially their relationship to traditional party membership. Cluster
1, the voters, might cover certain aspects. Yet, in order to somehow assess this
relationship at all, cluster analyses seems to be the most promising technique.
Traditional party membership however, does not follow the trend that most of
a modes’ associates are ascribed to the voters (cluster 1). For traditional party
membership, only .2% of the cases belong to the voters as figure 8.23 reveals. Or
put the other way round: 99.8% of all traditional party members do actually belong
to one of the other clusters. Therefore, this section shows rather all-embracingly, how
traditional party members understand their role and shape their affiliation pattern
accordingly.
But still, cluster 1 might contain a relevant number of affiliates of other modes,
the affiliation structure of which remains hidden. However, this is for good reason.
Cluster analysis is meant to determine not individual combinations of variables, but
combinations that are distinct enough to be separated from other combinations.
In the end, the affiliation patterns of figures 8.5 to 8.8 on pages 185–186 might
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hide individual affiliation patterns, either including traditional party membership or
not. In fact, it hides exactly .2% of the information that could possibly be drawn
from traditionally registered party members. But what is not hidden, is any kind
of relevant combinations of affiliation modes that are distinct in discrimination to
other clusters.
Another restriction to the cluster solution and interpretation presented above lies
in the demographic structure, especially of the hyperactives and the analog activists.
Coincidentally, clusters two and seven have not only been identified as groups with
relatively low shares of traditional party members. They also stand out from the
crowd in terms of socio-demographic and economic characteristics. Hyperactives
and analog activists show the largest share of sex disparity and they are fairly
young compared to other clusters, whereas specifically analog activists stand proud
in this respect. Moreover, both clusters feature the largest shares of technical college
or university alumni as well as the highest total household incomes.
While it is not very surprising that all these characteristics go along with each
other, especially these clusters being the youngest overall, can be a hint at an ongo-
ing trend of changing affiliation patterns over time, i.e. it might be a cohort effect
that is examined here. To be more precise, it is possible that non-traditional party
affiliation plays a varying role according to different cohorts of politically participat-
ing people. On the one hand, there are relatively old people, for whom traditional
party membership is still the center of party related participation. In their under-
standing and practice, new modes of party affiliation are rather accompanying ways
to carry out their style of party membership. On the other hand, younger people
might consider traditional party membership as being only one variety of alternative
ways of party affiliation. For these new cohorts, traditional party membership might
not be a central and necessary core of party affiliation. Instead, they might opt for
or against party membership, but without being completely in or out with regard to
party affiliation in general. However, a new generation of party affiliates only slowly
over time builds up the majority of party affiliates, which at present, results in the
found cluster structure of party affiliates.
Although this interpretation seems logical, we cannot be certain about this devel-
opment. Unfortunately, since only one point of measurement is available, it is also
possible to examine simply different ways of political party affiliation that change
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with age. In this interpretation, it were the case that traditional party membership is
one of many ways of party related affiliation that, on average, becomes more attrac-
tive when people grow older. Unsurprisingly, there are actually other aspects that
support this version as well. Thinking about time consuming party workload, and
maybe even social aspects that party membership might present, it is not unlikely,
that age rather than societal change over cohorts is the driving factor behind the
present affiliation structure. Unfortunately, with only one point of measurement, we
are unable to answer this question, which is unavoidable with this kind of research
design or with introducing a new theoretical model into empiric survey research.
211

9 Preconditions and Motivations of
Non-Traditional Party Affiliates
Only a few party affiliates are actually not traditional party members at thesame time. As the previous chapter has shown, most groups of party affiliates
resulting from the cluster analysis are characterized by party membership ratios of
100%. This leads to a structure of three distinct groups of clusters, which will also
be the basic layout for the upcoming chapter about preconditions and motivations
of non-traditional party affiliates.
1. On the one hand, the voters (1) is a cluster of generally inactive people in terms
of participation within the realm of political parties. This group is mostly solely
affiliated with a party by means of voting. Other affiliation modes are carried
out only by a small number of cluster members and are done in such a way,
as it does not justify assessing them as a coherent and distinct variation of
party affiliation in the capacity of enrolled membership substitution. Yet, this
research design is not meant to negate the important role of group members
as voters and potential multipliers.
2. On the other hand, clusters of social media opposers (3), apathetic members
(4), financiers (5), interested sustainers (6) and informed members (8) make up
a second group. This group displays the natural scale of how traditional party
members understand their role within the party or which role they concede
to their party. Some may only hold their traditional membership and do not
engage with the party in other ways. Maybe they have never done so and
only joined the party for expressive reasons, or they lost interest over time.
Others maybe would like to engage more with the party, but do not have the
time due to occupational or family obligations. Those may at least take part
in on-line discussions and may even support the party with financial grants.
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Yet, with the social media opposers, this group also features a high intensity
affiliation group, the members of which actively participate in a number of
affiliation modes, though mostly refuse on-line activity. Whatever the reasons
for different interpretations of party membership might be, this group shares
one important factor: Traditional i.e. registered party membership itself. In all
of these five clusters of different affiliation patterns, rates for traditional party
membership reach 100%.
3. Lastly, the hyperactives (2) and the analog activists (7) constitute a third
group that sets itself apart. Again, just like the five aforementioned clusters
of traditional party members, these two groups offer different approaches on
how to affiliate with a party beyond voting.
As the name implies, hyperactives take part in almost all of the different af-
filiation modes by a very high ratio. Besides voting for the party in national
elections, following the party on Facebook and regularly following the news
about their party is central for the hyperactives’ way of party affiliation. Addi-
tionally, most of them take part in some kind of membership-exclusive on-line
content as a cyber-member, and support their party with analog manpower,
thus qualifying as an activist. A little less common for this group of affiliates is
connecting to the party via financial support. Financial grants are considered
in this respect, if they are not part of a membership fee, or a pass-on of office
holding allowances. In Germany, the latter is very common for elected officials
on the community level, who are expected to provide their efforts for municipal
councils on a honorary basis. Thus, only voluntary financial benefits that are
not legal obligations or expected by the party based on their membership and
finance rules qualify as financial sustaining. Lastly, still around two thirds of
the hyperactives reckon among traditional party members.
Analog activists mirror the hyperactives in some respect. This is the case,
when it comes to voting for the party in national elections and for following the
news about their party. Moreover, the ratio of party activists as well as financial
sustainers among the analog activists is not too far off from the equivalent ratio
among the hyperactives. Yet, with regard to other modes, hyperactives and
analog activists differ remarkably from each other. Foremost, this is true for
variations of party affiliation based on meeting like-minded people, though in
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a virtual environment. While social media followers are hardly existent within
the group of analog activists with a ratio of only 10 %, not a single case qualifies
as a cyber-member (therefore the name analog activists, see above chapter 8
on page 163). Somewhere in between these poles sits the ratio for traditional
party membership among analog activists. With 36.4%, only slightly above
one third of those is a traditional party member.
The idea behind this structure is drawn from the theoretical basis of this study.
Scarrow develops her multi-speed membership model, as she reviews the roots of
describing and understanding party affiliation, as proposed by Maurice Duverger
in his 1954 publication on parties and party systems (Duverger 1959). As there
is only one type of party members, as well as only one type of extra-traditional
supporters in Duverger’s approach, Scarrow criticizes strict distinctions between
traditional members on the one hand and supporters on the other hand. Moreover,
all party affiliates closer to the core of the party necessarily recruit from the outer
circles of supporters, which makes it theoretically impossible for people to be only
a traditional member and not a supporter in another way. While Scarrow argues
that Duverger’s model has probably never been accurate, she points out at least
with recent developments:
“Parties have responded to voter disaffection (...) with initiatives that
deliberately blur the lines between members and other supporters, making
it easier for supporters to link to the party, even if only in very loose
ways.”
(Scarrow 2015, p. 28)
Hence, one of the key features of the new multi-speed membership parties is that
different modes of party affiliation are not strictly divided into offerings, aiming at
traditional party members, and those aiming at extra-traditional supporters. Party
affiliation developments are rather about offering a potpourri of modes, from which
all those interested can choose whatever they like. Of course this includes traditional
party members, in the case of which other affiliation modes do actually function as an
expansion and diversification of traditional members’ support. However, what is also
possible is that people interested in supporting a party choose whatever affiliation
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modes they like, except for traditional party membership. In this case, different
affiliation modes rather fulfill a function of attracting interested supporters, who
are, for whatever reason, not keen on being a traditional party member. Just in
the latter case, it is reasonable to talk about a linkage between people and a party,
which deserves to be addressed as a new way of party affiliation that should be
considered on the same level as traditional party members, but strictly separated
from them as well. Yet, as has been the result of the above cluster analysis, only
the groups of hyperactives (2) and analog activists (7) qualify in this respect. Other
clusters, namely social media opposers (3), apathetic members (4), financiers (5),
interested sustainers (6), and informed members (8), actually need to be understood
as variations of traditional members, for whom different affiliation modes (besides
traditional membership) act as the aforementioned expansion, diversification, or
maybe modernization of traditional party membership. Additionally, on an aggregate
level, the voters (1) are not affiliated with a party up to a ratio, that justifies to be
considered as party affiliates at all.
Consequently, with the idea of multi-speed affiliates in mind, this chapter aims to
explore preconditions and motivations of people, dismissing traditional party mem-
bership, while still affiliating with a party in a way that needs to be recognized
much more, when the basis of parties in terms of voter turnout, finances and society
linkage is studied. It does so by making use of multinomial logistic regression anal-
ysis for all theoretical models of independent variables that have been introduced
above in chapter 4 on page 61. In general, binomial logistic regression is a method
to estimate effects of independent variables on dichotomous dependent variables.
Contrary to that, with multinomial logistic regression, the necessity of dependent
variables being dichotomous can be dismissed and variables can be replaced by vari-
ables on any nominal scale. Hence, for the purpose of this chapter, values of the
dependent variable are no longer Yes or No pertaining to one specific cluster, but
rather the cluster number itself. Multinomial logistic regression then computes odds
ratios for all possible pairwise combinations, which results in (n2 − n)/2 combina-
tions, since the order of values is not important, i.e. which value is actually examined
in a specific pairwise combination and which value is considered being the reference
group. Rather, the reciprocal value of odds can be calculated (1/oddsratio), which
expresses the change in odds just the other way around. In order to provide a com-
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plete picture, tables A.14 to A.17 on pages 305–310 report results for all 28 possible
binary contrasts from clusters 1 to 8 that are calculated with multinomial logistic
regression methods for all models of independent variables that are considered.
Yet, the focus of this chapter is on the hyperactives (2) and analog activists (7)
as has been laid out above. This is why, within this chapter, results of multinomial
logistic regression analyses are presented in a simplified approach, that supports
comprehensibility of the effects and, even more important, of the story behind the
data. Tables in this chapter will display the effects of independent variables only for
membership with the hyperactives (2) and the analog activists (7) in contrast to
each of the other affiliation clusters respectively. Contrasts between clusters within
the groups introduced above, will not be addressed. The same applies to contrasts to
the cluster of mere voters. All of these however, can be reviewed using the complete
regression tables in the Appendix (starting on page 285). This method boils down
the number of contrasts from 28 to only 10 for each model of independent variables.
Moreover, exact figures of all odds ratios will also not be displayed within this
chapter. Rather, it will only be indicated, whether independent variables result in
significant odds ratios above or below 1. Significant odds ratios above 1 will be
assigned to a plus sign (+) and express that a unit increase of the independent
variable increases the odds of membership with the examined cluster in comparison
to the reference group. Equally, significant odds ratios below 1 will be assigned to a
minus sign (−) and express that a unit increase of the independent variable decreases
the odds of membership with the examined cluster in comparison to the references
group. Significance in this respect is defined as p < .05. Empty cells indicate non-
significant effects (p ≥ .05). Since unstandardized odds ratios are not comparable
across different independent variables, this information loss seems acceptable.
In addition to significant effects of independent variables, information is given
regarding contribution of each independent variable. Since with logistic regression
variance cannot be calculated, the coefficient of determination known from linear
regression (Pearson-correlation, R2) is also not applicable. Therefore, in order to
rate logistic regressions model fit, different measures have been proposed that are
similar to the coefficient of determination with linear regression models. Not based
on observed and predicted values, but rather on predicted and actual outcomes,
these measures use other methods such as the likelihood function, the log-likelihood
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function or correlation based measures. Hence, these indicators are called pseudo-
R2. It seems that none of the proposed measures really has become more accepted
than others, which is why the three most popular measures are reported within this
study. That includes McFadden-R2, Cox & Snell-R2 as well as Nagelkerke-R2. In
general, McFadden’s pseudo-R2 (R2Mc) is more conservative, which is why this mea-
sure is the one considered in the following review of regression results. Besides R2Mc,
which gives information on explained “variation” of a model containing only one in-
dependent variable respectively, ∆−R2Mc is reported as well. This measure reports,
the amount of additional explanation an independent variable provides, when it is
entered into the statistical model after all other variables have already been factored
in. Since independent variables are most likely not completely uncorrelated, some
of the predictive power of a variable is already present in the model with other
variables and ∆−R2Mc represents a pessimistic estimation of a variable’s contribu-
tion. Hence, while R2Mc represents the most optimistic contribution an independent
variable can have, ∆ − R2Mc incorporates the most pessimistic approach. It should
also be kept in mind, that all reported pseudo-R2s apply to the whole multinomial
logistic regression model, not only to group contrasts highlighted in this chapter.
Finally, it should be underlined at this stage that the approach of this chapter,
with its two distinct and separated groups of clusters (cluster 2 and 7 on the one
side and cluster 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 as reference groups on the other side), is not meant
to undermine results of the cluster analysis of chapter 8. Groups of clusters only
serve as a logical structure for interpretation of the results of the regression analyses.
Statistically however, no two clusters are merged and results from all possible binary
comparisons can be reviewed in the appendix.
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9.1 A General Incentives Model
9.1.1 General Incentives Variables
In order to transpose the general incentives model into empirical data, each variant of
positive or negative incentives is assessed by one item. Selective incentives however,
which have proven to be major driving forces for inner-party activity (Klein 2006,
p. 57), are measured using two items of which the average is calculated. Table 9.1
on the following page shows an overview of all individual variables and the original
wording95 that is used to measures the respondents perception of each item on a
five-point scale.
One important aspect relating to the information of the general incentives vari-
ables has to be mentioned. The general incentives model has originally been devel-
oped in order to explain high intensity participation as an effusion of traditional
party membership. As such, non-membership participation of individuals within or
with a party has consequently not been considered and all items have been framed
with regard to formal party membership. While not all items literally refer to tradi-
tional party membership, some of them require some degree of experience or imag-
ination to be reasonably answered by non-formal party affiliates, or even people,
who do not have anything to do with a political party. This problem has crystallized
most with the question on monetary expenses that come along with formal party
membership. Reviewing the data on this question shows, that about one third of
those respondents, who are not and never have been members of a party formally,
answer they did not know. This cumulation of missing values is a major problem
when estimating the regression models. Due to the method of listwise deletion, an
entire case is excluded when a single value is missing. Consequently, this happens
much more often with never-party members than with other strata of this sample.
To avoid this problem, an arithmetic mean imputation is used for each sample stra-
tum respectively. Of course, variability is drastically reduced by this method, which
is why table 9.2 on page 228 and the complete regression table A.14 on page 305
report a very poor Pseudo-R2.
95The wording has been translated into English in order to present a coherent work with regard to
language and support non-German speakers’ comprehension. For the original wording that has
been used for data collection, see table A.9 on page 300.
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Table 9.1: Operationalization of a general incentives model
Incentive Item1 Scale
positive incentives
Selective-outcome People like me do have occupational
















People aiming for a professional po-
litical career should be active party
members as well.
Selective-process Being an active party member, one
can get in touch with nice people.
Being an active party member, one
can develop expert knowledge for
political issues.
Collective-political Being active with a party is an ap-
propriate way to personally influ-
ence policies that are being taken.
Normative Those who are active with a party
can expect respect and apprecia-
tion.
Altruistic Democracy only works, if people are
active with a political party.
Ideological Being a party member, one does
evince one’s support for the polit-
ical ideas of the party.
Expressive Being a party member, one does
evince one’s sympathy for the party
and its politicians.
negative incentives
Opportunity costs Being active with a party often
leaves too little time for friends and
family.
Disutility of labor To work for a party can be very bor-
ing.
Financial costs Party membership goes along with
major financial fees.
1 Items have been translated in order to provide a coherent work with regard to language
and support non-German speakers’ comprehension. For the exact German wording that
has been used see table A.9 on page 300.
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9.1.2 Results and Interpretation
Results of the multinomial regression analysis estimating a general incentives model
are displayed in table 9.2 on page 228. This table tells, in which way membership
with the hyperactives and the analog activists is influenced by selected variables of
a general incentives model in contrast to each of those clusters, which are consid-
ered variants of traditional membership in the first place. Hence, by investigating
table 9.2 it is possible to tell, which aspects drive new types of party affiliates,
and how they differ from traditional members. The results for both non-traditional
clusters each do show a number of significant effects, coherently affecting member-
ship across all different reference groups. This means, non-traditional party affiliates
actually differ systematically from traditional party members, no matter which vari-
ant of traditional party membership is considered. The overarching motivation for
non-traditional affiliates of the hyperactives and the analog activists is unsurpris-
ing, yet pleasing since it fits so well to theoretical assumptions. Both clusters of
non-traditional party affiliates are significantly negatively affected by ideological in-
centives. Essentially, this shows that the odds of membership with non-traditional
clusters are higher for party affiliates, who report less motivation form the oppor-
tunity to support general political ideas. However, if it is not ideology that moti-
vates those people, it has to be something else that makes people participate in
the sphere of a political party. In this respect, the positive reasons for participa-
tion, both non-traditional clusters differ substantially from each other and will be
reviewed separately in the following.
Membership with the Hyperactives
Across all five comparisons, selective-outcome as well as selective-process incentives,
normative, and altruistic incentives do not show any significant effects for mem-
bership with the hyperactives. Of course, this does not mean hyperactives are not
at all affected by these independent variables. Yet, it tells that the perception of
these variables does not differ significantly between hyperactives and other affilia-
tion groups. Hence, the general perception of those types of motivating concepts by
hyperactives is not different compared to the perception of different traditional ref-
erence groups, at least not with a certainty that justifies to be considered. Coming
back to variables that have actually been evaluated differently, expressive incentives
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show significant effects for all five pairwise combinations. As indicated by the plus
sign, the opportunity to evince sympathy for a party and its politicians increases
the odds of being a member of the hyperactives in comparison to membership with
all variants of traditional party affiliation.
Apart form this even pattern to explain the hyperactives’ motivation, significant
effects occur only sporadically. In contrast to overall rather inactive apathetic mem-
bers (4), collective political incentives as well as financial costs do show significant
positive effects for membership with the hyperactives. Additionally, in contrast to
the informed members (8), all different variants of expenses affect membership with
the hyperactives significantly. Yet, while high perception of financial charges and
disutility of labor increase the odds of membership, opportunity costs decrease the
odds of membership with this non-traditional affiliation cluster.
Membership with the Analog Activists
Interestingly, effects for membership with the analog activists differ remarkably from
those for membership with the hyperactives. This is true except for the aforemen-
tioned negative effects of ideological incentives of course, which act as a defining
characteristic of both non-traditional clusters. Additionally, effects for the analog
activists draw a much more complex picture of what distinguishes analog activists
from traditional membership clusters.
Across the whole range of contrast to traditional party membership clusters,
selective-process and altruistic incentives increase the odds of membership with the
analog activists significantly. Similarly, the odds of membership with the analog
activists are also increased significantly in contrast to all reference groups by high
perception of disutility of labor. The same is true for opportunity costs, while the
effect of a contrast to the informed members (8) lacks the required level of signifi-
cance.
Only very selective effects can be observed from selective outcome and expressive
incentives. While the latter significantly increase the odds of membership in contrast
to apathetic members (4) and interested sustainers (6), the former actually decrease
the odds of membership with the analog activists compared to social media opposers.
Going further down the line, collective-political and normative incentives as well as
financial costs do not affect the odds of membership significantly at all.
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Overall, great political ideas (not in the sense of awesomeness, but in the sense of
traditional overarching normative systems), the burdens of often administrative and
tedious party work, and alternative leisure activities or obligations seem to hinder
membership with the analog activists. Otherwise, this poor motivation of analog
activists is balanced by a greater motivation from individual advantages that result
from taking part in the political process. Additionally, a sense of need for political
participation in order to make democracy work sets analog activists apart from
traditional party affiliates, who are centered around traditional party membership
enrollment.
Measures of Determination96
In addition to significant positive or negative odds ratios from table 9.2 on page 228,
table 9.3 on page 229 reports various pseudo-R2s for each independent variable con-
sidered and for the model as a whole. With a total McFadden-R2 of only 3.3%, a
general incentives model provides a very poor result in this respect. With regard to
single-variable contribution to this total score, it can be seen that selective-process,
ideological and expressive incentives contribute the most with .5%. Collective-
political and normative incentives range at the other end of the spectrum with .1%
McFadden-R2. This picture also replicates very similarly, if the additional deter-
mination represented by ∆-McFadden-R2 is considered. Yet, ideological incentives
stand out at the top on their own with a score of .8%.
Besides the fact that only a rather small amount of group membership can be
explained by a general incentives model, the difference between these two measures
deserves additional attention for selected variables. As has been explained with the
introduction to this chapter on page 213,R2Mc is based on regression models with only
one independent variable and therefore represents the most optimistic estimation
regarding determination. To balance this information, ∆−R2Mc is reported as well.
This second measure is the difference of a total model’s R2Mc minus R2Mc of a model
missing the variable in question. In the end, this provides a most pessimistic approach
with respect to explanatory power, since other variables act as control variables and
the measure expresses the additional amount of variation in group membership that
96Pseudo-R2 are named like that due to the fact that their estimation differs from the actual
coefficient of determination. Yet, for the sake of readability and with regard to the similar
function of pseudo-R2, the term measures of determination is used here nonetheless.
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can be explained by inserting a variable into a regression model at last. Therefore,
in general, R2Mc should be larger than ∆−R2Mc. Yet, this is not the case for all the
variables discussed here. Both ideological and expressive incentives fail in this respect
and show higher ∆ − R2 than single-variable-R2, meaning that the explanatory
power of those variables actually improves, when other variables are included into
the regression model. Hence, ideological and expressive incentives are somewhat
dependent on other variables. This is very likely to be the result of suppression
effects, where variance, irrelevant for the criterion (dependent variable), is correlated
with other predictor variables, which are themselves totally not or only marginally
correlated with the criterion. Since this irrelevant share of variance is bound by other
independent variables, once they are considered, the predictive power of independent
variables increases (Tzelgov & Henik 1991). Unfortunately, this study provides no
additional capacities to consider such suppression effects. However, what can be said
is that this is not a problem of McFaden-R2, since the same phenomenon shows with
alternative measures97 as well.
Discussion
Leaving statistics aside for the moment, what can be learned about Scarrow’s idea
of multi-speed party membership when the attention is drawn to those individuals,
who represent this theoretical approach best? First of all, it can be seen that very
distinct similarities occur between those clusters that feature the least amount of
traditional party membership. At the same time however, hyperactives and analog
activists differ from each other quite drastically too. This dualism leads the upcoming
discussion.
When it comes to non-traditional party affiliation, the lack of ideology seems to be
a key factor. The odds of membership with the hyperactives and the analog activists
are much lower in comparison to all reference groups, if the function of party mem-
bers to support certain political ideas, has been evaluated being of lower relevance.
That means, individuals, who appreciate certain ideological ideas are more likely to
avoid non-traditional party affiliation and opt for traditional members enrollment
with higher odds. To underline this correlation even further, ideological incentives
97Since it is not dealt with this phenomenon in further detail, Cox & Snell-∆-R2s and Nagelkerke-
∆-R2s are not reported.
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do only make a significant differences, when one of the non-traditional clusters is
involved. Simultaneously, always when one of these clusters is involved, ideological
incentives produce significant effects. Additionally, no significant effects of ideologi-
cal incentives can be seen, when both of the non-traditional clusters are compared.
All of these additional comparisons can be reviewed from table A.14 on page 305.
In a nutshell, ideology acts as the major defining motive for the question, whether
a politically participating individual is active in either one of the non-traditional or
traditional clusters.
Yet, when ideology acts as the defining motive in a negative way, there must be
some motivation, that positively sets non-traditional clusters apart from traditional
clusters. Otherwise, it was very likely, that people simply did not participate in
the party-political process at all. This is where the second part of the said dualism
comes into play. With regard to a motivation structure accompanying the denial of
ideology, both non-traditional clusters, the hyperactives (2) and the analog activists
(7) differ remarkably.
Hyperactives on the one hand, do not need much of additional motivation. Yet,
apart from sporadically significant effects of other incentives, the defining positive
difference to traditional party membership clusters are expressive incentives. Hence,
while hyperactives are less interested in showing support for ideological concepts,
they are more interested in promoting the party itself and its political leaders.
On the other hand, analog activists differ from traditional membership clusters
not only with regard to ideological incentives. Additionally, two variants of negative
incentives, i.e. costs of party membership, shape their incentives pattern. Conse-
quently, analog activists can be described as affiliates, who feel less tied to the
ideological concept of their party, and additionally, experience higher burdens of
party work as well as of the need to organize different activities or obligations.
Yet, just as has been the case for hyperactives, there are also positively motivating
elements for analog activists in comparison to traditional party members, which keep
individuals of this group active in the sphere of their party respectively. One of these
elements is altruistic incentives. Analog activists, much more than all traditional
membership clusters, feel the need to participate in order to make democracy work.
However, analog activists, to a large extent, do not try to make democracy work by
means of party membership, but via activism and financial sustaining. Of course it
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can be argued, that in order to support democracy, traditional party membership
offers the greatest opportunities. In general, only traditional enrollment gives access
to party structures that define political goals. Furthermore, crucial positions within
legislative or executive bodies can only be achieved with the support of a party, if
not by legal, then by political requirements.
The same applies to selective process incentives. In contrast to traditional member-
ship based clusters, the odds of membership with analog activists are significantly
higher, when people are active with a party in order to get in touch with other
like-minded people or develop expert knowledge with regard to political processes,
institutions and certain policy issues. Of course, this holds true for other incentives
as well, since the whole idea of the general incentives model is built around assump-
tions of costs and benefits that come with party membership. However, selective
incentives stand out from the crowd due to their distinct characteristic of being in-
dividual benefits that only benefit those, who engage with a party. They are linked
strongly to a party’s intermediate position between society and state institutions, as
well as to a party’s intellectual and networking resources. Hence, accessibility of se-
lective incentives is much more likely, if individuals actually take the risk and become
both registered traditional as well as registered active members. Yet, this argument,
as well as the one above on the accessibility of altruistic incentives, peculates three
important aspects that need to be considered too. This will help to understand, why
even non-formal party members can be motivated by selective-process and altruistic
incentives.
Firstly, what constitutes a democracy, should not be defined too narrowly. Of
course, German democracy is currently unthinkable without parties. Parties play
the leading role when it comes to candidate selection for parliamentary seats and
government offices. Yet, democracy is not limited to and parties do not only act
within an official political arena such as the parliamentary system. Parties, as inter-
mediate actors between state and society, also need to be visible outside these polity
institutions. Parties can for example act as agenda setting institutions, organize po-
litical campaigns, or simply go into the community and practically develop societal
live and social integration. This is why there actually is room for parties and for
non-traditional supporters as members of a civil society, who try to make a change
in an altruistic manner outside official political bodies.
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Secondly, it is to be expected, that the vast majority of politically active respon-
dents of the German Party Members Survey and the accompanying general popula-
tion survey are actually active on the local level of German politics. This is simply
a consequence of the very limited number of state, federal or even European level
mandates and offices. Yet, due to the often discussed declining attractiveness of par-
ties and their correspondingly declining membership rates (van Biezen et al. 2012;
Scarrow 2015), parties are having trouble to find a necessary number of candidates
for city and county councils. Together with a declining relevance of party mem-
bership regarding local mayor elections (Klein & Lüdecke 2018), this offers greater
opportunities for non-traditional members to even occupy positions in legislative po-
litical bodies, where politics and society are still influenced the most and therefore
altruistic incentives can be achieved best98.
Thirdly, In the age of digital mass media, parties themselves cannot only be shaped
via their own institutional structure, but also via public debate and formation of
opinion. Of course, in the end it is party conferences, leaders, and the party’s execu-
tive committee who decide on the manifesto or select candidates. However, in a time
when opinions can be spread all over the country within seconds, public opinion can
develop a great power and influence deciding institutional structures. Moreover, an
increasing number of parties is experimenting with open primaries, or consultation
of not-enrolled participants on community level politics.
All these aspects mentioned provide a reasonable interpretation of non-traditional
affiliates’ motivational structure. Furthermore, it allows a general incentives model,
which has been originally developed to explain party membership and inner party
activity, to be adapted to modern age communications technology and habits, as
well as to an opening party structure on the ground. Contrary to these theoretical
considerations however, table 9.3 on page 229 reports very poor pseudo-R2 for all
individual independent variables, as well as for the total regression model considering
all variables at once.
98Legally, the description of German city and county councils as part of the legislative authority
is not correct, since they are technically not the state, but rather part of the states executive
structure. Correspondingly, they only give law in terms of local level “Satzungen” and “Verord-
nungen”, not in terms of generally binding laws (“Gesetze”). This is part of local self-government
as it is intended in the German constitution (Art. 28 II GG) and embellished in state level mu-
nicipal constitutions (e.g. Niedersächsisches Kommunalverfassungsgesetz). Politically though,
municipal councils are understood and act increasingly like communal parliaments (see e.g.





Table 9.2: Significant effects of general incentives variables
Variables membership with the Hyperactives (2) compared toSM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Selective-outcome · · · · ·
Selective-process · · · · ·
Collective-political · + · · ·
Normative · · · · ·
Altruistic · · · · ·
Ideological − − − − −
Expressive + + + + +
Opp. costs (n) · · · · −
Disutility of labor (n) · · · · +
Financial (n) · + · · +
Variables membership with the Analog Activists (7) compared toSM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Selective-outcome − · · · ·
Selective-process + + + + +
Collective-political · · · · ·
Normative · · · · ·
Altruistic + + + + +
Ideological − − − − −
Expressive · + · + ·
Opp. costs (n) + + + + ·
Disutility of labor (n) + + + + +
Financial (n) · · · · ·
- The upper half displays significant positive and negative effects of incentives on membership with the hyperactives (2) in
comparison to the reference group respectively. For example, the odds of membership with the hyperactives in comparison to
social media opposers (3) increase significantly, if expressive incentives increase by one unit.
- Reference groups’ full designations: Social media opposers (3), apathetic members (4), financiers (5), interested sustainers (6),
informed members (8). Cluster number in parentheses.
- +: significant positive effect (odds ratio > 1), −: significant negative effect (odds ratio < 1), ·: non-significant effect.
Significance refers to p-values smaller than .05.
- (n) = negative incentives.
- Table displays simplified results. Complete information can be found in table A.14 on page 305.
- N=3002.
228
Preconditions and Motivations of Non-Traditional Party Affiliates
Table 9.3: Pseudo-R2 for general incentive vari-
ables, in%







Selective-outcome .2 .2 .5 .5
Selective-process .5 .4 1.3 1.4
Collective-political .1 .1 .2 .2
Normative .1 .1 .2 .3
Altruistic .4 .2 .9 1.0
Ideological .5 .8 1.2 1.4
Expressive .5 .6 1.2 1.4
Opp. costs (n) .4 .2 .8 .9
Disutility (n) .2 .2 .6 .6
Financial (n) .3 .2 .8 .9
Total 3.3 n/a 7.6 8.4
- R2Mc=McFadden-R




- ∆−R2 is the result of the total R2 minus a regression model
without the variable in question. Hence, ∆ − R2 is the most
pessimistic estimation, while R2 is the most optimistic esti-
mations.
- All pseudo-R2s apply to the complete multinomial logistic
regression model as shown in table A.14 on page 305.
9.2 A Social-Psychological Model
9.2.1 Variables
In this section, another proposed explanation for political participation shall be
tested using the cluster membership data: a social-psychological approach. As ex-
plained in further detail in the above theory section, a social-psychological expla-
nation of political behavior is based on the assumption that attitudes shape human
behavior. Hence, human political behavior is said to be a product of distinct polit-
ical attitudes. Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist a fixed set of attitudes
that are theoretically or empirically grounded with regard to their effect on political
behavior. It is rather the case that scholars take into account what they have on
hand.
The German Party Members Survey gives access to four variables to build a social-
psychological model. Firstly, political efficacy is measured by four items that provide
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access to perceived internal and external political efficacy. The idea behind political
efficacy is to measure, how people evaluate their capabilities when it comes to poli-
tics. While internal efficacy aims for measuring how people assess their own resources
in political discussions, external efficacy rather focuses on the responsiveness of the
political system and its key players. Both dimensions are assessed by two questions
each.
Moreover, people are simply asked about their personal political interest. This
questions seems simple, yet it provides sufficient information about how relevant
political issues are for individual respondents. The idea is that relevance supports
behavior associated with the object of interest.
Lastly, since the underlying survey originally focuses on party membership, two
items assess party affinity. Again, party activity or at least party membership (in a
traditional way) is expected not to be accidental. Rather, membership is understood
as a product of distinct and intrinsic affinity towards a specific party, its core ideolog-
ical ideas, and traditional roots. Both questions on party affinity (party affinity itself
and its intensity) are merged into one item, which results in four social-psychological
items in total. Table 9.4 on the facing page provides information on all items of the
social-psychological model, questions, and scales.
9.2.2 Results and Interpretation
All results of a multinomial regression analysis are accessible with table A.15 on
page 307. Yet, presentation of these results will again follow the structure as has
been introduced above. That is why table 9.5 on page 235 shows regression results
for membership with the hyperactives and the analog activists only and also follows
the described simplified manner.
Membership with the Hyperactives
For membership with the hyperactives, estimating the effects of four social-
psychological variables provides a much more distinct picture compared to the gen-
eral incentives model. Internal efficacy, representing personal capabilities of taking
over an active role when it comes to political issues, results in significant positive
effects with four out of five reference groups. The same applies to party affinity,
namely in comparison to apathetic members (4), financiers (5), interested sustain-
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Table 9.4: Operationalization of the social-psychological model
Variable Item1 Scale
Internal efficacy Politics is too complicated that
people like me can understand
what is going on.2

metric,
Five-point scale: Agree very
strong, strong, moderate,
weak, very weak.
low efficacy/interest (1) - high
efficacy/interest (5)
I am confident, playing an active
roll with a group, dealing with po-
litical issues.
External efficacy Politicians do not care much what
people think.2
Politicians in general make an ef-
fort to represent people’s interests.
Political interest How much do you care about poli-
tics? Do you care very much, much,
moderate, less or not at all about
politics?
Intensity of party affinity Many people in the Federal Repub-
lic generally lean towards a certain
party, although they vote for an-
other party now and then. What
about you: Do you lean towards a
specific party in general?

metric,
Four-point scale: Very strong;
strong; moderate; weak, very
weak or no party affinity.3
low party affinity (1) - high
party affinity (4)
All in all, how strong or weak
do you lean towards that specific
party? Do you lean very strong,
strong, moderate, rather weak or
very weak towards this party?
1 Items have been translated in order to provide a coherent work with regard to language and support
non-German speakers’ comprehension. For the exact German wording that has been used see table A.10
on page 301.
2 Scales have been inverted to compensate for negative wording.
3 Original scales: Question 1, party affinity: binary [Yes(1)/No(0)]; Question 2, intensity of party affinity:
metric [very weak(1)-very strong(5)]. For the purpose of multinomial regression analyses, items have
been merged to one scale.
ers (6), and informed members (8). Political interest still supplies significant positive
effects in comparison to three traditional-membership clusters. Notably, no signifi-
cant effects can be measured from external efficacy, as well as in comparison to social
media opposers (3).
Membership with the Analog Activists
Regarding internal efficacy, table 9.5 on page 235 shows a result for membership with
the analog activists equal to the effects that have been seen for membership with
the hyperactives. In contrast to the same four out of five reference groups, internal
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efficacy significantly increases the odds of membership with the analog activists.
Also equal to the hyperactives are effects from external efficacy on membership with
the analog activists, namely no significant effects at all. On the other hand, two
variables result in very different effects. Political interest only makes a difference in
comparison to the apathetic members (4), whereas party affinity actually results in
odds ratios below one. As indicated by the minus-sign, with increasing party affinity,
the odds of membership with the analog activists decrease in contrast to all five of
the traditional membership reference clusters.
Measures of Determination
Table 9.6 on page 236 reports a McFadden-R2 of 17.9% total, which indicates a
model, fitting the data better than the general incentives model, which has been re-
ported with only 9.5% McFadden-R2. Among different independent variables, party
affinity is reported with the largest single-variable determination (11.6%), as well as
with the largest additional-variable determination (6.1%). Party affinity is followed
in decreasing order of determined percentage by: political interest (8.9%), inter-
nal efficacy (6.9%) and external efficacy (2.0%). However, this is only a statistical
measurement, which does not make interpretation obsolete with regard to content.
Discussion
What can be taken from the simplified regression tables, once more is not very
satisfying. On the one hand, effects from internal efficacy show, that hyperactives (2)
and analog activists (7), as non-traditional membership party affiliates, are people
who feel more confident with political issues and believe in their own skills more
than people who choose patterns of affiliation connected to traditional membership.
This could mean, parties do not reach out anymore to those people, who might be
the most valuable due to their political skills and knowledge. Yet, this effect is again
only present in contrast to reference groups, who are rather passive. Once social
media opposers (3) act as the reference cluster, there is no significant difference
going back to perceived internal efficacy. This is an important aspect, since it raises
the question, whether effects of internal efficacy are rather a product of activity level
than following the criterion of traditional or non-traditional membership affiliation.
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The same applies to effects of political interest on membership with the hyper-
actives. In three out of five pairwise comparisons, an increase in political interest
results in rising odds for membership with the hyperactives. However, this once more
does not include a significant difference to social media opposers, a cluster with a
high traditional membership rate and a level of activity that is comparable to the
level of the hyperactives.
Interestingly, party affinity produces ambiguous effects for both affiliation groups
with lower traditional membership rates. For analog activists, significant negative
effects of party affinity can be observed in contrast to all reference groups. Hence,
an increase in party affinity significantly lowers the odds for membership with the
analog activists. This low relevance of psychological ties to a party is quite expectable
for a group of people which is politically active, yet does not see traditional party
membership as the core of their engagement.
However, two aspects deserve further investigation. Firstly, regarding membership
with the hyperactives, party affinity actually increases the odds of membership in
contrast to many other traditional membership affiliates. Although hyperactives
feature a much smaller share of traditional party members with only 66.7%, the
odds of membership, compared to all reference groups except social media opposers
(3), increase, when party affinity increases. Consequently, although hyperactives
are not tied to their party as formally as other affiliates, they actually feel more
closely related to their party. In contrast to highly engaged social media opposers, no
significant effect from party affinity can be observed, which again poses the question,
whether the observed effects in total might be related to different levels of activity.
Secondly, the one exception from positive effects on membership with the hyper-
actives outlined in the previous paragraph, results in an interesting detection. In
the end, hyperactives, analog activists and social media opposers are, from a social-
psychological point of view, basically the same group of people. They do not differ
with regard to their perception of individual political capabilities, general political
interest or their sense of responsiveness of the political system. Only analog activists
seem to be less affine to a special party than the other groups.
These results somehow mirror the diagnosis that has been made with the general
incentives model. Hyperactives (2) really only set themselves apart in contrast to
groups featuring fairly low intensity affiliation patterns. Accordingly, comparing hy-
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peractives to high intensity affiliation social media opposers reveals no differences
between these groups whatsoever. Additionally, analog activists (7) as well do not
differ remarkably from politically active social media opposers (3). Only lower per-
ception of party affinity by the analog activists distinguishes these two groups. In
summary, this again gives rise to the question, whether the distinct aspect, which
needs to be explained, is not so much the question of traditional party membership,
but rather the level of affiliation intensity, where traditional membership is simply











Table 9.5: Significant effects of social-psychological variables
Variables
membership with the Hyperactives (2) compared to
SM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Internal efficacy · + + + +
External efficacy · · · · ·
Political interest · + · + +
Party affinity · + + + +
Variables
membership with the Analog Activists (7) compared to
SM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Internal efficacy · + + + +
External efficacy · · · · ·
Political interest · + · · ·
Party affinity − − − − −
- Reference groups’ full designations: Social Media Opposers (3), Apathetic Members (4), Financiers (5), Interested
Sustainers (6), Informed Members (8). Cluster number in parentheses.
- +: significant positive effect (odds ratio > 1).
−: significant negative effect (odds ratio < 1).
·: non-significant effect.
Significance refers to p-values smaller than .05.
- Table reads as described with table 9.2 on page 228.
- Table displays simplified results. Complete information can be found in table A.15 on page 307.
- N=2919.43 (Fractions due to weighting).
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Table 9.6: Pseudo-R2 for social-psychological vari-
ables







Internal efficacy 6.9 1.4 12.7 17.8
External efficacy 2.0 .3 4.3 6.0
Political interest 8.9 1.9 17.2 24.1
Party affinity 11.6 6.1 21.1 29.5
Total 17.9 n/a 35.1 38.6
- R2Mc=McFadden-R




- ∆ − R2 is the result of the total R2 minus a regression model
without the variable in question. Hence, ∆ − R2 is the most
pessimistic estimation, while R2 are the most optimistic esti-
mations.
- All Pseudo-R2s apply to the complete multinomial logistic re-
gression model as shown in table A.15 on page 307.
9.3 A Socio-Economic Model
9.3.1 Variables
In order to provide the greatest insight into socio-economic determinants of non-
traditional party affiliation, a fairly extensive socio-economic model has been esti-
mated. Table 9.7 on page 241 gives an overview of all variables, which have been
considered in the model.
Firstly, survey respondents were asked, which year they were born. This is sup-
posed to give the age in years at the time of the survey of course. However, a lack
of definition must be admitted, since the year of birth only, does not give the infor-
mation, whether the respondents’ birthday in the year 2017 already has passed by
the time of the interviews. Hence, to be accurate, two possible values do exist for
this variable. Commonly, the age is calculated by subtracting the year of birth from
the year of the survey. Chances are therefore that people are in fact younger than
represented by the data.
Respondents were not questioned about their sex. This information has rather
been filled in by the interviewer. Since no other information is available that allows
for a guess regarding the interviewee’s sex, this can only be done based on the voice
of the interview partner.
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Civil status has been measured by simply asking for this information. For the
purpose of this study, this information is divided into two groups: Married and not
married. Due to the fact that most legal regulations of marriage have also been
applied to registered partnerships99, those relationships are included in the category
married.
Income has been assessed in terms of disposable household income per month.
With a first question on this topic it has been tested to get access to an exact figure.
Yet, since a fair part of interviewees is reluctant when it comes to money, a second
question has been asked. This time the importance of the information has been
underlined again and respondents have been asked to self-assess into one of several
income categories. For the purpose of this model, all information on disposable
household income has been boiled down into a binary variable with values high
and low. High income refers to incomes above the upper quartile (.75%-quantile)
of disposable household incomes, while low incomes range below this threshold of
income distribution.
Formal education also has been measured using two questions. The first question
asked about the highest general-education degree, ranging from Left school without
graduation to University entrance degree. With a second question, respondents with
a certain level of general education have been asked whether they hold a university
or technical college degree. To make use of a simple binary variable, respondents
with at least a technical college entrance degree have been rated high in terms of
education, respondents with educational degrees below technical college entrance
level have been rated low.
Moreover, a simple two-step question about club membership tries to assess,
whether respondents are socially integrated in other formal ways than party mem-
bership. After having been questioned about the basic membership in one or more
clubs or associations, people were also asked to give information about the kind of
organization they are a member of. Examples such as trade unions or sports clubs
are given to help question comprehension. The kind of organization is of no further
interest for this analysis though.
Respondents are further asked to assign themselves to one of five social strata.
Options are denominated lower, lower middle, middle, higher middle and high class.
99Between 2001 and 2017, a registered partnership gave the opportunity of a legally recognized
partnership for people of the same sex. Since October 2017, marriage is open to all couples.
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In comparison to other variables regarding socio-economic criteria, this question
relies on the respondents’ own evaluation of whatever criteria they choose. People
are in this case not provided with any further information on how this assignment is
meant to be done, i.e. if one or more characteristics shall be considered and if certain
characteristics shall be favored over others. It is most likely that respondents answer
this question based on their own formal education and financial accouterment. Yet,
while the respondents’ exact considerations cannot be traced, they are provided with
an additional option. Those, who dismiss the whole concept of a society, divided by
horizontal strata, or simply do not have an idea on the basis of which considerations
this assignment shall be done, can express their refusal by selecting none of these.
Lastly, it is tried to access extensive information about occupational prestige via
a concept called Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS). The
idea is, to face methodical challenges that arise when socio-economic variables like
income and formal education are considered as indicators for the socio-economic sta-
tus of survey respondents. Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik (2003) for example already warns, that
higher educational spheres have been made accessible for all societal groups and the
common educational degree has been raised. This politically pursued transformation
of the population’s education leads to the German Gymnasium not being an elite
school anymore, but rather a people’s school. This alters the relationship between
formal education and job enduringly. While higher formal education formerly had
been a status plus, it now offers nothing more than a better starting position for
the next competition for tertiary education and/or jobs (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2003,
p. 123). Additionally, information about income is tied to two major methodical
problems. On the one hand, figures on income do not consider spending power as
it is affected by inflation or deflation. Effectively, a long-term stagnation of income
developments has led to decreasing real life wages. On the other hand, as mentioned
above in section 7.2 on page 141, income is a sensitive topic for a lot of people.
Information about levels of income or even exact figures is therefore only provided
by a limited number of respondents.
SIOPS tries to measure a more robust variable of societal status, based on job
description and follows the hypothesis, that vocational prestige is one of the major
determinants in social interaction (Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996; Treiman 1977).
The origin for this variable is a 4-digit code, which collates individuals to specifi-
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cally described professions. The codes derive from the ISCO-08 classification, which
“provides a system for classifying and aggregating occupational information” (Inter-
national Labour Office 2012). With this coding system, the International Labour Of-
fice (ILO) continues its efforts, started in 1958 with the first ISCO codes (ISCO-58).
Since then, ISCO-codes have been updated in 1968, 1988 and finally in 2008. The
main objective of this classification is, to make jobs internationally comparable while
not being dependent on nationally, regionally or even locally specific designations.
ISCO-08 divides jobs into 436 unit groups, which aim to capture every job existing
in the world. On higher levels of aggregation, these unit groups form 130 minor
groups, 43 sub-major, and 10 major groups, “based on their similarity in terms of
the skill level and skill specialization required for the job” (International Labour
Office 2012).
Yet, while jobs are clearly marked with a distinct code, there is not more infor-
mation available than exactly this code. In order to make use of all the informa-
tion hiding behind the code in quantitative empirical research, ISCO-codes need to
be translated into a metric variable that accounts for occupational prestige. This
is what the SIOPS aims for. First introduced to match ISCO-68 codes, Treiman
(1977) assignes occupational titles from national and local prestige studies to the
3-digit ISCO-68 codes. Differences that have been found in those prestige studies,
albeit not in the provided ISCO-codes, are recorded in a fourth digit (Ganzeboom &
Treiman 1996). This results in a data matrix, which contains prestige information for
509 separate occupations from 60 countries, thus many of the cells must have been
left blank since not all occupations are included in the underlying national/regional
occupational prestige surveys. Scale construction then follows two major steps:
1. Converting all scores to a standard metric which results in separate prestige
scores for each country and occupation between 0 and 100.





X ′ij = the transformed prestige score for occupation i rated in country j,
Suj = the standard deviation of the United States’ scores, for occupations
rated in both the United States and country j,
Sju = the standard deviation of the country j scores, for occupations rated in
both the United States and country j,
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Xij = the original metric prestige score for occupation i rated in country j,
Xju = the mean of the country j scores, for occupations rated in both country
j and the United States, and
Xuj = the mean of the United States’ scores for occupations rated in both
country j and the United States.
2. Averaging the scores for each occupation across all countries100.
While the basic idea has been left untouched, SIOPS scores have been adjusted
in accordance with updates of the underlying ISCO-codes (ISCO-88 (Ganzeboom
& Treiman 1996), ISCO-08101). To finally convert ISCO-08 codes into the SIOPS
scale, an SPSS Syntax module (Assignment of SIOPS (Treiman’s) prestige scores to
ISCO-08 codes) has been used (Ganzeboom & Treiman 2019).
100Given that Treiman found an average intercorrelation of .81 across 55 countries, this procedure
seems legit (Hauser & Warren 1997, p. 189).












Table 9.7: Operationalization of a socio-economic model
Variable Item1 Scale
Age When have you been born? Please tell me your year of birth. metric
Sex Has not been asked but filled in by interviewer. binary, 1: male / 0: female
Income What is the monthly disposable income of your household? I mean the
sum of wages, self-employment earnings and pensions, after taxes and
social security tax. Please add incomes from public welfare, tenancy,
leasing, housing benefits, child benefits and other incomes as well.

binary, 1: high (above upper
quartile) / 0: low (below upper
quartile)
Your information will of course, like all other information you pro-
vided, be treated completely anonymously, so that no conclusion to
you or your household can be drawn. Results of this survey should,
among others things, be evaluated along the lines of income groups.
We would appreciate it very much if you could name the group of
income, you belong to. Please tell me the group of income your house-
hold net income fits best.
Civil status What is your civil status? binary, 1: married2/ 0: not married
Education What is your highest general-education degree? Do you hold a uni-
versity or technical college degree?
binary, 1: high (min. technical col-
lege entrance degree) / 0: low (be-
low technical college entrance de-
gree)
Club membership Are you a member of one or more clubs or associations? If so, what
kind of clubs or associations are you a member of? We mean for ex-
ample trade unions, sports clubs and churches.
binary, 1: yes (at least one mem-
bership) / 0: no (no membership)
Occupational prestige Based on 4-digit ISCO-08 coding, which is itself based on several ques-
tions regarding actual or former job characteristics. For the complete
list of questions see table A.12 on page 303 or table A.13 on page 304
for the original German wording.
metric
Social stratum Today, a lot is talked about social classes. What class would you assign
yourself to?
binary, 1: high (higher middle, high
class) / 0: low (lower, lower middle,
middle class)
1 See table A.11 on page 302 for the exact German wording that has been used.
2 Includes registered partnerships that have been contracted between 2001 and 2017. As of October 1st 2017, marriage in Germany is open
to all couples.241
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9.3.2 Results and Interpretation
Taking socio-economic independent variables into account, table 9.8 on page 250 re-
ports results from a multinomial logistic regression analysis for membership with the
group of hyperactives and analog activists. In addition to information on significant
positive or negative odds ratios, table 9.9 on page 251 reports data on pseudo-R2s,
indicating the contribution each variable adds to explaining cluster membership.
Membership with the Hyperactives
Reviewing the top part of table 9.8 shows that membership with the hyperactives is
mainly driven by the members’ sex. Plus signs indicate that being male significantly
increases the odds for being part of the hyperactives in contrast to all reference
clusters but the social media opposers (3). On the other hand, all seven remaining
variables play a significant role only in very few comparisons or even none at all.
Civil status (i.e. being married), high education levels, as well as high levels of
occupational prestige are factors that show no significant effects at all. Hence, on the
basis of the chosen minimum level of significance (p< .05), it makes no difference for
the question whether people belong to the hyperactives or to one of the traditional
affiliation clusters (3, 4, 5, 6, & 8), whether they differ in one of these characteristics.
Minor effects can be seen from age, high income levels, club membership and
subjective social status. Age decreases the odds of being a member of the hyperac-
tives, yet this is only true in comparison to social media opposers (3) and apathetic
members (4). Additional to age and sex, in contrast to apathetic members (4), high
subjective social status plays a significant role for the odds of membership as well,
as does the fact of being member of one or more voluntary associations. Both inde-
pendent variables increase the odds of being a hyperactive, rather than an apathetic
member of a party. In contrast to other affiliation groups, no significant difference
in the outcome can be seen from these latter two attributes.
Lastly, high income also makes a difference in cluster membership in two contrast-
ing pairs of affiliation groups. With a monthly disposable income above the upper
quartile, it is more likely to belong to the group of hyperactives than to the social
media opposers (3) or the informed members (8).
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Membership with the Analog Activists
Again, just as has been seen with earlier models of cluster determination, the group
of analog activists can be defined much more easily and clearly compared to the
hyperactives (see table 9.8 on page 250). Four independent variables out of eight show
the same (significant) effect’s direction across all sub groups lined up. These are high
monthly disposable household income, high formal education, high social stratum,
and occupation based SIOPS scores. Yet, education as well as self assessed social
stratum are not in a single comparison significant predictors of group membership.
Contrary to this redundancy of educational levels and subjective social position,
high income (above upper quartile) is a significant factor to determine whether
people are an analog activist or traditional party member in any of the five deducted
variations. The same is true for occupational prestige scores. Yet, contradictory
to the positively directed impact of high income on membership with the analog
activists, occupational prestige works the other way around. While high income
increases the odds of membership, higher occupational prestige decreases the odds
of being an analog activist; a contra-intuitive pattern that will be assessed in detail
in the following discussion of statistical outcomes.
In addition to coherently acting variables across all comparisons, some of the
model’s independent variables only have significant effects in selected pairwise combi-
nations. The respondents’ age is such a fussy characteristic, meanwhile only slightly.
While age statistically makes no difference for the question of membership with
the analog activists compared to the informed members (8), it does so in all other
remaining compositions of two groups. In contrast to social media opposers (3), ap-
athetic members (4), financiers (5) and interested sustainers (6), the general rule
applies: The older an individual, the lower the odds of being part of the analog
activists compared to each other group respectively. With positive effects in four
out of five groupwise comparisons, age can still be considered a major factor for the
analog activists’ framework.
Moreover, being male works in a positive direction and significantly increases the
odds of membership with the analog activists in contrast to social media opposers
(3), financiers (5) and apathetic members (4). Comparing analog activists to the
latter, having joined at least one voluntary association also influences the odds of
membership positively. Although the expression apathetic derives only from party
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related activities, this effect is no surprise since being active with any voluntary
association proves at least a basic readiness to actively participate in social interac-
tions.
Lastly, the civil status option of being married mostly does not make any difference
in cluster membership. Only compared to social media opposers (3), analog activists
are more likely to be wed.
Measures of Determination
In addition to the significant effects’ direction, table 9.9 on page 251 reports pseudo-
R2 for all variables considered in the socio-economic model. According to this
measure, age plays the most important role within the regression model with a
McFadden-R2 score of 4.6%. Moreover, being a member of at least one volun-
tary association (3.2%), high Income (2.2%), and being male (1.8%) add substan-
tially to the explanatory power of the total socio-economic model, which results
in a McFadden-R2 of 13.4%. With this score, a socio-economic model of explana-
tion ranges between the previously estimated models representing general incentives
(McFadden-R2: 3.3%) and social-psychological determinants (17.9%). Additionally,
the phenomenon of larger delta-R2s that is familiar from general incentives results
(section 9.1.2 on page 221) shows again. Both age and occupational prestige show
larger delta-R2s than single variable McFadden-R2s. Yet, in the case of age the
problem disappears when Cox & Snell or Nagelkerke-R2 are considered. Otherwise,
the formerly stated applies regarding assumed suppression effects (see discussion to
chapter 9.1.2 on page 224).
Discussion
In addition to rather abstract statistical measures and the aforementioned anomaly,
what can be learned from this subsection regarding socio-economic determination of
non-traditional party affiliation? As has been seen with section 8.2.3 on page 188,
hyperactives and analog activists share some demographic similarities, as well as
differences on a descriptive statistical basis. In this section however, it is the question,
what happens to these findings, once effects are controlled for other socio-economic
characteristics.
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At first, it is obviously the most important factor to be of relatively young age
to be attracted by non-membership party affiliation. For the majority of pairwise
comparisons, age is one of the key factors. This supports previous bivariate findings,
which reported miss-balanced age structures for hyperactives and analog activists
towards the younger generations. Although it cannot be told, whether this effect is
actually the result of age or rather a cohort effect determined by the year of birth, it
is likely that parties will have to deal with the challenge of non-membership in future
times and need to find means to stay attractive. No matter, whether it is younger
people, who stay away from traditional means of party affiliation, and grow out of
this behavior over time, or if they remain adverse to traditional membership when
they grow older and younger generations do not show this effect. In both scenarios,
there is a part of society that does not fancy traditional party membership for the
foreseeable future.
Another factor that partially survives multinomial regression analysis is sex. Be-
ing male positively increases membership with the duo of non-traditional clusters.
While this is not the case with all contrasts, it is true for at least one contrast
with each reference group. Odds for membership with apathetic members (4) and
financiers (5) even decrease in contrast to both of the non-traditional affiliation
clusters, if respondents are male.
Hence, while controlling for other socio-economic factors, it is fewer years of age
and being male, that brings people to support parties in a more modern (i.e. multi-
speed) way of activism, rather than sticking to traditional means of political party
membership and/or activity. Albeit, both of these driving factors are only valid on
their own, since they are regressors never considered simultaneously. Hence, it is the
case that under control of an individual’s sex (and all other variables included in the
model), an increase in age decreases the odds of membership and under control of an
individual’s age, being male increases the odds of membership with non-traditional
affiliation clusters.
Traditionally, young people are very underrepresented in political parties. For Ger-
many, the most recent Party Members Survey of 2017 shows (though on a bivariate
level) that party members are progressively increasing in age (Klein et al. 2019).
While in 1998, only one quarter of party members was aged 65 or older, this portion
has increased to nearly fifty percent in 2017. Although the percentage of very young
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members aged below 35 remained roughly the same, the share of mid-agers between
35 and 49 cut by half within 19 years and presently ranges at only 13%. Taking into
account mid-agers between 50 and 64 years of age, still a decrease by nearly thirty
percent can be seen. Admittedly, the total population’s age distribution shifted into
the same direction, yet it did so much more moderately (Statistisches Bundesamt
2019a).
Similarly, party memberships are to a great extent shaped by sex. Once again,
taking the Party Members Survey of 2017 as an empirical basis, Klein et al. (2019)
show that parties on the ground are dominated by males. Across all parties, 72% of
the members are male in 2017, which corresponds to only a very marginal decrease
since 1998. Even the Green Party, who started to apply quotas on their candidate
selection and office holding processes directly from their foundation on and relatively
early compared to their opponents, did not increase its share of female members over
a period of almost 20 years. Male members are still responsible for 62% of the total
membership. Interestingly, The Left Party actually increased their share of male
members from 57% in 1998 to 64% in 2017102.
Both has also proved robust in multivariate analyses, which explicitly model socio-
economic determinants for party membership on the basis of German membership
data. Utilizing the 2009 German Party Members Survey, Hoffmann and Springer
(2019) estimate an ordinal regression model comparing party members and non-
members. They find statistical proof for individual characteristics male and aged 50-
64 (which is at least not considered young by the author) to be major determinants
for party membership. An effect for being aged 65 or older can only be found on
a 10% level of significance (p< .1). Yet, a more reliable effect is likely to be a
victim of incorporating an employment status control variable, which also considers
retirement. Due to a generally applicable retirement age of 65 years for a very long
time103, the majority of people over 65 are retired. Additionally gender (i.e. being
102The Left Party however has a rather different history being the successor of the German Demo-
cratic Republic’s Socialist Unity Party (SED), which heavily promoted equality of women and
took measures to actively increase women’s membership share.
103In Germany, a general retirement insurance had been initiated in 1900 with a standard retirement
age of 70 years. Between 1911 and 1916, the standard retirement age was lowered to 65. The
pension act of 2007 gradually increases the standard retirement age for people born after 1946
up to 67.
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male) is also a highly significant predictor for party membership according to this
study.
Therefore, we can see partially different patterns for non-traditional affiliation in
comparison to what has been the result of studies dealing with a contrast between
party members and non-members. The chances of general party membership are
positively determined by age and being male, while the chances of non-traditional
membership in comparison to traditional membership are negatively determined by
age and positively by being male. But exactly this is, what might eminently chal-
lenge political parties’ desire for registered traditional members in the future. Social
biases in party membership are somewhat tackled by the results of this section since
younger people simply choose different modes of affiliation, but do not stay away
from party-political affiliation in general. That, however, does not necessarily mean
that parties will profit from this development. On the one hand, parties suffer from
an increasingly aging membership basis (see above). On the other hand, it is fair
to say that parties will be challenged in the future to recruit members, whose un-
contested center of affiliation is traditional membership. Younger people obviously
feel more attracted by non-traditional multi-speed affiliation patterns than by tra-
ditional ways of acting out party membership with a strong focus on registered
membership. Men, who have for decades been identified as the structural basis of
German parties’ organization and grass roots activities, are equally appealed by
affiliation patterns of hyperactives and analog activists, rather than by means of
democratic participation of their fathers and grandfathers. All this would not be
a problem for parties, if non-traditional affiliates could be considered as reliable a
resource as traditional members. Yet this is not the case. It is the very basic idea
of multi-speed party membership that individuals choose their distinct pattern of
affiliation due to changing personal circumstances. Hence, the only thing parties can
rely on regarding their future multi-speed affiliates, is that they better should not
trust too much in multi-speed revenues.
Especially analog activists are more sharply distinguishable from traditional af-
filiation clusters, which is no surprise given that this cluster features the lowest
share of traditional party members across all different groups. Hence, with these
contrasts, we might see best, what discriminates a new type of party affiliates from
traditional membership variations. Besides the aforementioned effects of age and
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sex (young men), income and occupational prestige determine, in which way people
engage with a political party. Yet, both of these variables work in different ways,
which seems contra-intuitive. While high income increases the odds of membership
with the analog activists, occupational prestige lowers the odds of membership. In
general, it could be expected, that occupational prestige and income should both go
hand in hand with each other. Yet, two aspects put this alleged contradiction into
perspective.
Firstly, the actual meaning of regression effects of one independent variable has
to be considered. It is too short a statement to say that members of the analog
activists earn less and feature lower occupational prestige than other affiliation clus-
ters. Rather, every significant change in odds has to be considered by itself. Analog
activists actually do feature a lower occupational prestige, albeit only under the con-
dition that all other independent variables of the regression model, including income,
are equal. This ceteris-paribus assumption should not be easily dismissed, since it is
the very idea behind multivariate regression analyses: to isolate effects of a certain
variable from effects of other variables. Following this route, it has to be asked, what
occupational prestige actually is, once income is ruled out of the equation?
This question leads to the second aspect to put the record straight regarding a
discrepancy between effects of occupational prestige and income. Put simply, both
variables mean nowhere near the same thing. Of course it may be tempting and is
hardly a surprise to frivolously equalize occupational prestige and income, especially
in a world dominated by material endeavors of individuals. Hauser and Warren
(1997, p. 179) use a similar thought, yet to accuse social sciences to have focused
too much on strictly economic measures, when socio-economic status is assessed and
thus have “diverted (...) from other major and consequential sources, dimensions,
and consequences of social inequality”. In fact, both terms are supposed to mean and
measure very different things104. While income is easily understandable as a purely
economic measure of financial opportunities, the concept of occupational prestige is
far more complicated and not necessarily ascertainable ad hoc. Instead of dealing
104However, there is evidence, that occupational prestige is in fact to a large extent only a deriva-
tive of educational requirements. Income on the other hand is said to be much more “processed
through the affective meaning of social identities especially their Potency” (MacKinnon & Lang-
ford 1994, p. 231). Aspects of moral evaluation only play a role for the occupational prestige of
occupations generally connected to lower incomes and educational requirements (MacKinnon &
Langford 1994).
248
Preconditions and Motivations of Non-Traditional Party Affiliates
with preconditions and outcomes of certain occupations, namely necessary education
and income, occupational prestige tries to measure a societal aspect of occupations.
The question is not how much money one can make, but rather how well regarded
an occupations is. The idea is that with occupational prestige, moral assumptions
are the important point. What does an occupation contribute to the well being
or functioning of society? How well regarded are their aims and means and how
trustworthy are representatives in general? Compared to the strictly subject-related
measure of income, occupational prestige always reflects a society-related collective





Table 9.8: Significant effects of socio-economic variables
Variables
membership with the Hyperactives (2) compared to
SM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Age − − · · ·
Sex, male · + + + +
Income, high + · · · +
Civil status, married · · · · ·
Education, high · · · · ·
Club Membership, Yes · + · · ·
Occupational Prestige · · · · ·
Social Stratum, high · + · · ·
Variables
membership with the Analog Activists (7) compared to
SM Opposers (3) Apathetic M. (4) Financiers (5) Interested S. (6) Informed M. (8)
Age − − − − ·
Sex, male + + + · ·
Income, high + + + + +
Civil status, married + · · · ·
Education, high · · · · ·
Club Membership, Yes · + · · +
Occupational Prestige − − − − −
Social Stratum, high · · · · ·
- Reference groups’ full designations: Social Media Opposers (3), Apathetic Members (4), Financiers (5), Interested Sustainers
(6), Informed Members (8).
- +: significant positive effect (odds ratio > 1), −: significant negative effect (odds ratio < 1), ·: non-significant effect.
Significance refers to p-values smaller than .05.
- Table reads as described with table 9.2 on page 228.
- Table displays simplified results. Complete information can be found in table A.16 on page 308.
- N=2493.65 (Fractions due to weighting).
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Table 9.9: Pseudo-R2 for socio-economic variables







Age 4.6 5.1 10.4 11.4
Sex, male 1.8 1.2 4.3 4.7
Income, high 2.2 1.5 5.2 5.7
Civil Status .8 .2 1.9 2.1
Education, high .8 .2 1.9 2.1
Club membership, Yes 3.2 2.1 7.4 8.1
Occupational prestige .9 1.4 2.2 2.4
Social stratum, high 1.1 .4 2.5 2.8
Total 13.4 n/a 28.0 30.6
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- ∆− R2 is the result of the total R2 minus a regression model with-
out the variable in question. Hence, ∆ − R2 is the most pessimistic
estimation, while R2 is the most optimistic estimations.
- All pseudo-R2s apply to the complete multinomial logistic regression
model as shown in table A.16 on page 308.
9.4 The Integrated Model of Party Affiliation
The previous sections of this chapter reveal, how traditional models of precondi-
tions and motivations are capable of predicting differences in party affiliation across
groups of individuals, who are not necessarily registered (i.e. traditional) party mem-
bers. According to statistical measures, some models proved to be more reasonable
than others. Again it is important to keep in mind, although this study is foremost
interested in what distinguishes non-traditional party affiliates from traditional reg-
istered party members, measures addressing model fit (total model pseudo-R2) and
contribution of single variables (single variable pseudo-R2) derive from a multinomial
regression analysis. This method provides the overall model fit measures as a result
of all possible comparisons between groups of affiliates and members. However, the
benefit of this approach is the possibility to review each comparison on its own, and
get insight into what way multiple variations of party members and affiliates (i.e.
the clusters) differ from one another.
Based on the chosen measure McFadden-R2, a general incentives model is only
capable to explain 3.3% of membership with one or another cluster in comparison
to all other clusters. The socio-economic model can raise this number by around
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10%-points to 13.4%. Yet, a social-psychological model, with only four independent
variables, even explain 17.9% of the individual affiliation pattern.
These numbers show that a social-psychological model is best to explain, what
characteristics prompt non-traditional party affiliates to chose their way of taking
part in people centered party politics. It is not the outlook to certain benefits as
represented by the general incentives model, although there are distinct significant
effects which are also rather homogeneous across all cluster comparisons and can
be interpreted in a reasonable manner. Yet, the rather poor McFadden-R2 reveals
that a very large amount of cluster membership is affected by important additional
independent variables that have not been considered yet. A similar evaluation applies
to other models of independent variables, both a socio-economic as well as a socio-
psychological model, albeit to a much smaller extent.
9.4.1 Results
In order to try to increase the amount of explained variation in cluster membership,
an integrated model is estimated in the following, which considers all three differ-
ent theoretical approaches at once. By doing so, not only the amount of explained
cluster variation is expected to increase, but also correlations between independent
variables of different models can be sorted out and significant effects become more
reliable. Results of this integrated model are displayed with table 9.10 on page 256
for membership with the hyperactives as well as 9.11 on page 257 for the analog
activists. In order to support easy accessibility, the way of presenting results is ad-
justed with these tables. In addition to the effects of an integrated model, which are
presented on the right of both tables, all single model effects are presented on the
left. This allows for fast comparison of effects and makes changes of effects easy to
trace down. Hence, the left half of tables 9.10 and 9.11 on pages 256-257 is a mirror
image of tables 9.2 (p. 228), 9.5 (p. 235) and 9.8 (p. 250). Additionally, significant
positive effects are now indicated by light-green highlighted cells, whereas significant
negative effects are shown in a light-red shade. Empty cells refer to effects that do
not reach the required level of significance (p < .05).
Starting with the hyperactives (2), it can be seen that in most cases where changes
can be observed, it is the case that solitary significant effects are not significant any-
more with the integrated regression model. This applies to positive effects of high
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income compared to the social media opposers (3) and the informed members (8),
positive effects of collective political incentives and financial costs, as well as from
a high social stratum in contrast to apathetic members (4), and to a significantly
negative effect from opportunity costs compared to informed members (8). Similarly,
the odds of membership with the hyperactives compared to financiers (5) have orig-
inally not been affected significantly by political interest. With the integrated model
however, this is exactly the case, and the positive effect on the odds also resembles
other effects from this variable.
Yet, unfortunately it did also occur that previously uniform effects from a spe-
cific variable are disrupted by the use of the integrated regression model. Expressive
incentives constantly have shown significant positive effects on the odds of member-
ship with the hyperactives. With the abandonment of the straight general incentives
model however, the formerly positive effect in contrast to financiers (5) changes to
non-significance.
In addition to separate changes in effects, results also show parallel shifts from
particular independent variables for a number of pairwise comparisons. Effects of al-
truistic incentives have been completely insignificant in the original model. Now, in
three out of five comparisons, namely in contrast to the financiers (5), the interested
sustainers (6) and the informed members (8), odds are affected positively by altru-
istic incentives. For the exact same comparisons, a negative effect of age can now be
observed as well, which has previously not been the case. Albeit, in the latter case,
effects become more consistent over all comparisons, whereas the effects of altruistic
incentives become unsteady. Lastly, a fairly steady chain of effects of sex (male),
which has lead to significantly positive effects on membership with the hyperactives
in four out of five comparisons, is now lost completely. With the integrated model,
effects of being male shift to an even steadier structure and have no significant effect
at all.
All in all, hyperactives can be separated from other party affiliation groups along
six main criteria, accompanied by criteria, distinct to only few comparisons. Socio-
economic variables almost completely confine to negative effects of age. Social-
psychological variables, except for external efficacy, preserve their relevance for de-
termining cluster membership. Yet, in contrast to social media opposers (3), hyper-
actives do not differ with regard to social-psychological criteria. Hyperactives also
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remain negatively distinguishable from other types of party affiliation in ideological
ways as well as positively with regard to expressive incentives.
For the odds of membership with the analog activists (7), changes in effects are
even more prevalent. Selective-outcome and selective-process incentives change in
contrast to the social media opposers (3) from significant to non-significant. The
former has been negatively significant, whereas the latter has been positively signifi-
cant with the original general incentives model. Altruistic incentives lose significance
in all comparisons except with the financiers (5). A steady row of positively signif-
icant effects hence changes into a single effect for the integrated regression model.
The same is true for effects from ideological incentives, which have all been nega-
tively significant with the original model. Now, ideological incentives do not have any
effect on the odds of membership. Expressive incentives in comparison to apathetic
members (4) and interested sustainers (6) change from a positive significant effect
to a non-significant effect. Moreover, four positive effects from opportunity costs
change into non-significance with the consideration of additional control variables.
This trend continues with social-psychological variables. In contrast to apathetic
members (4), odds of membership with the analog activists (7) have been posi-
tively affected by greater internal efficacy and political interest. Internal efficacy
also proved to be a significant factor for membership in contrast to financiers (5) as
well as informed members (8). All of these effects do not reach the required level of
significance anymore when estimating an integrated regression model. Consequently,
social-psychological variables are dominated by negative effects from greater party
affinity.
Similarly, effects of being male change for comparisons with social media opposers
(3) and financiers (5) from positive to not significant. A high level of household
income also changes from being positively significant to non-significant. Analog ac-
tivists are in contrast to social media opposers (3) not affected anymore by being
married and their occupational prestige. In comparison to apathetic members (4)
and informed members (8), the question of membership with other voluntary asso-
ciations misses the required level of significance.
In summary, negative effects from occupational prestige and age remain significant
to distinguish analog activists from other affiliation groups in most comparisons, as
do positive effects from high income. Additionally, analog activists still show signif-
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icantly lower rates of party affinity, even with extensively controlled circumstances.
With regard to a general incentives model, selective-process incentives and disutility
of labor preserve their significant position.
All in all, an integrated model leads to much cleaner results with more consis-
tent effects across all cluster comparisons. Changes that can be observed with the
switch from single model regressions to an integrated model are in most cases from
formerly significant effects to non-significance. However, for membership with the
hyperactives, the opposite can be observed as well.
Table 9.12 on page 259 additionally reports pseudo-R2 for the integrated model.
Consequently, all single variable R2 remain the same. On the contrary, ∆-R2 (sin-
gle variables as well as for each model as a whole) and the total R2 change due
to the extended number of control variables compared to single model regressions.
This table reveals that McFadden-R2 could be raised by almost 10%-points com-
pared to the best fitting single model. A combination of all considered variables in
the integrated regression model allows for 27.5% of explained cluster membership.
Considering that social phenomenon are very complex constructions, the integrated
regression model provides quite a good insight into the peoples’ decisions for one or
another affiliation pattern as described with section 8.2.1 on page 179. By far the
largest ∆-R2 and thus the greatest impact within the integrated regression model
derives from the social-psychological model with an explained cluster membership
of 11.3%, followed by the socio-economic model (6.5%) and the general incentives
model (2.4%). Party affinity as well as age prove to be the greatest contributors
with single variable ∆-R2s of 4.9% and 3.1% respectively.
Unfortunately, two variables show unusual values that need to be dealt with.
On the one hand, ∆-R2 of disutility of labor is .1%-points larger than its R2. As
explained above (see discussion to chapter 9.1.2 on page 224), this is likely to be
a sign of a hidden suppression effect. On the other hand, education even shows a
negative ∆-R2. This means, adding education as the last variable into the integrated
regression model does not increase but rather decrease the total-R2 from 27.7% to
27.5%. Hence, while education by itself is able to explain .8% of the overall variation
in cluster membership, it negatively affects the explanation of cluster variation in





Table 9.10: Effects of an integrated model on membership with the hyperactives
Model Variable membership with the Hyperactives (2) compared to





































- Reference groups’ full designations are: Social Media Opposers (C3), Apathetic Members (C4), Financiers (C5), Interested
Sustainers (C6), Informed Members (C8).
- Left half shows single model effects, right half shows integrated model effects. Table displays simplified results. Complete
information can be found in table A.17 on page 310.
- Light green cells: significant positive effect (odds ratio > 1), light red cells: significant negative effect (odds ratio < 1),
empty cell: non-significant effect, Significance refers to p-values smaller than .05.











Table 9.11: Effects of an integrated model on membership with the analog activists
Model Variable membership with the Analog Activists (7) compared to





































- Reference groups’ full designations are: Social Media Opposers (C3), Apathetic Members (C4), Financiers (C5), Interested
Sustainers (C6), Informed Members (C8).
- Left half shows single model effects, right half shows integrated model effects. Table displays simplified results from a
multinomial logistic regression analysis. Complete information on all pairwise contrasts including exact odds ratios and
3-step level of significance can be found in table A.17 on page 310.
- Light green cells: significant positive effect (odds ratio > 1), light red cells: significant negative effect (odds ratio < 1),
empty cell: non-significant effect, Significance refers to p-values smaller than .05.
- N=2453,63 (Fractions due to weighting).257
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9.4.2 Discussion
The integrated regression model delivers nice and homogeneously boiled down effects
of originally three distinct sets of independent variables. Together with almost 30%
of explained variance, the integrated model proves to be a satisfying insight into
which factors determine strong (analog activist) and weak (hyperactives) deviations
from traditional forms of party affiliation. Interestingly, both groups of non-party-
centered affiliation are younger than party-centered affiliation clusters, given all other
characteristic remain stable. Hence, it is likely, although not certain, that parties
really need to adapt to changing demands of politically interested people in the
upcoming decades. The challenges of parties within an aging society and even faster
aging party membership basis have already been addressed with the discussion of
single model socio-economic effects (see above, section 9.3.2 on page 242). Yet, the
robustness of age effects only make these contemplations more relevant and underline
the parties’ dilemma.
Which way of non-party-centered affiliation people choose, seems to be mainly
driven by their affinity towards a certain party, which by itself is not very surpris-
ing. For those with stronger party affinity (hyperactives (2)), registered membership
remains a popular option, albeit not the uncontested norm. Without this predisposi-
tion towards a certain party (analog activists (7)), traditional registered membership
is consequently an only rarely chosen option. Yet, with a greater extent of party affin-
ity, a very different understanding goes along as of what a party is, and how it can
be used. Based on their attraction towards political parties, both hyperactives and
analog activists seem to view parties from very different angles, and make differ-
ent use of a party’s potential offerings and resources. Speaking in the multi-speed
membership model’s own language, it can be said that both of these groups define
their own way of party membership, in which traditional membership itself is not
the center of gravity anymore around which members circle on different orbits.
For hyperactives who believe into their political competence more than other
affiliates, a party seems to be a vehicle of leader support (expressive incentives) and
doing good (altruistic incentives). Both of these motives are directed towards a party
member’s outside sphere. Hyperactives make use of their internal efficacy and their
greater political interest mainly in favor of others, be it party leaders running for
office or parliament, be it certain members of society, or society as a whole. Although
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Table 9.12: Pseudo-R2 for an integrated model










Selective-outcome .2 .1 .5 .5
Selective-process .5 .2 1.3 1.4
Collective-political .1 .1 .2 .2
Normative .1 0 .2 .3
Altruistic .4 .2 .9 1.0
Ideological .5 .4 1.2 1.4
Expressive .5 .4 1.2 1.4
Opp. Costs (n) .4 .1 .8 .9
Disutility of labor (n) .2 .3 .6 .6
Financial (n) .3 .1 .8 .9




Internal efficacy 6.9 1.0 12.7 17.8
External efficacy 2.0 .2 4.3 6.0
Political interest 8.9 .9 17.2 24.1
Party affinity 11.6 4.9 21.1 29.5




Age 4.6 3.1 10.4 11.4
Sex, male 1.8 .4 4.3 4.7
Income, high 2.2 0 5.2 5.7
Civil Status, married .8 .1 1.9 2.1
Education, high .8 − .2 1.9 2.1
Club membership, Yes 3.2 1.0 7.4 8.1
Occupational Prestige .9 .7 2.2 2.4
Social stratum, high 1.1 .2 2.5 2.8
Total (single model) 13.4 6.5 28.0 30.6
Total Integrated Model 27.5 n/a 49.4 54.0
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- ∆-R2 is the result of the total R2 minus a regression model without the variable in
question. Hence, ∆ − R2 is the most pessimistic estimation, while R2 is the most
optimistic estimations.
- All pseudo-R2s apply to the complete multinomial logistic regression model as shown
in table A.17 on page 310.




it is usually unlikely that a society can be understood as a unitary actor seeking
completely common goals.
Analog activist motivation on the other hand is more self-centered or even self-
ish. Analog activists shy at the workload and sometimes vicious, slow and boring
processes that party membership and foremost party activity within the various
party committees comes along with. Nonetheless, analog activists want to partici-
pate within the parties’ sphere and seek to gain benefits from participation.
However, even if parties’ future or even current potential resources are found
in rather distant orbital structures of affiliation, or even a different solar system
so to speak, it has to be acknowledged that parties do not loose ties to modern
variations of political participation completely. Especially for the hyperactives (2),
traditional membership still is a strong feature of their specific affiliation pattern.
Although traditional membership lacks relevance for this subgroup across both af-
filiation modes and across clusters, they are still considered variations of traditional
enrolled membership. Moreover, other modes of affiliation are also provided by par-
ties themselves, not only traditional enrolled membership; although parties loose
some of their sovereignty, when third party media are used. Yet, modern hyperac-
tives and especially analog activists base their political participation on different
motivations and therefore behave differently. They are likely to be politically more
self-confident and deviate from the concept of a loyal partisan. Hence, parties will
have trouble to rely on faithful members as organizational and legitimizing resources
and might rather develop into institutional platforms for individuals.
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10 Summary & Implications
The purpose of this study has been to review party membership in a new age. Due
to an ongoing decrease in party membership numbers all across European democ-
racies, regardless of party families, political systems, or party systems, questions
about the future of party membership and party politics itself have been arising
for decades now. More recently, a new approach to the understanding and concep-
tual future of party membership has emerged from this academic discourse. Based
on modern societal and technical developments as well as considering distinctive
entangled characteristics of traditional party enrollment, Scarrow (2015) proposes
a redefinition of party membership on the foundation of “multi-speed membership
parties” (Scarrow 2015, p. 3). According to this model, parties increasingly reach
out to people who are discouraged by traditional party membership and parties de-
velop new ways of non enrollment-based party affiliation. The multi-speed aspect
comes into play when party affiliates, whether traditionally enrolled or not, choose
and change their personal combination of different affiliation modes, matching their
current circumstances in life. Hence, there is no longer only one way to be a party
member, but several, individually tailored ways.
A first attempt to generate empirical evidence regarding the multi-speed model
has been undertaken by Scarrow herself, albeit only from the parties’ supply side
perspective. Making use of the 2017 German Party Members Survey, it has been the
aim of this work to gather empirical evidence of this model from the perspective of
individuals’ demand. Three dimensions of interest were introduced in the introduc-
tion to this study to break apart the overarching research goal into smaller segments.
Yet, in order to agree on a shared understanding of crucial aspects and thus achieve
a common ground to start from, Part 1 began with an explanation of why it is
the case that scholars are rethinking party membership. In the following chapter
3, Scarrow’s idea of a multi-speed membership party was clarified, since this is the
main theoretical approach this study relies upon. Additionally, in order to see the
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whole picture of supply and demand, Scarrow’s efforts to provide evidence regard-
ing the parties’ offerings of multi-speed membership were presented. In the following
chapter 4, three important theoretical models that have shaped party membership
research throughout decades were illustrated in preparation for the later question
about preconditions and motivations of non enrollment-based party affiliates. Lastly,
the corresponding literature was reviewed to achieve a comprehensive understanding
of the state of research regarding non membership-centered party affiliation.
The following Part II then explicitly drew attention to the research dimensions and
corresponding questions proposed in the introduction to this study. These dimensions
and relating questions are:
1. Basic statistical evidence of affiliation modes
In what way are alternative, non enrollment-based ways of party affiliation
not only supplied by German parties, as Scarrow argues, but also demanded
by German people, and what socio-economic characteristics constitute users
of those means of political participation?
2. Relationship between affiliation modes and traditional party enrollment
What is the relationship between enrollment and other affiliation variations?
Is it the case that there is a significant portion of party affiliates that choose to
be affiliated without being enrolled in a political party, or are affiliation types
rather circling around a centered point of gravity that consists of classical
party enrollment? What can be seen regarding relationships among affiliation
modes?
3. Motivations and preconditions of non enrollment-based party affiliates
If variations in the relationship between different affiliation types can be
found, do they follow traditional underlying structures that are proven to be
relevant to the more basic question of what explains party enrollment versus
non-enrollment, or is it necessary to theoretically reconsider the rationale for a
phenomenon of multi-speed party membership from the people’s perspective?
Reviewing results from chapters 7 to 9, we have seen that alternative ways of
party affiliation actually do play a significant role in German party politics and
they play an even greater role than traditional membership. Between 1.8% and
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9% of the population can be assigned to one of Scarrow’s affiliation modes and
thus feature some sort of relationship to a political party besides the mere act of
voting. Whether these numbers are rated high or low is subjective to the scale that is
applied. Compared to party membership figures, these modes of participation seem
quite relevant, since all but one reach at least traditional membership level. On
the other hand, the latter is hardly surprising, since traditional enrollment burdens
individuals with greater liabilities, although these liabilities are simply perceived and
not necessarily real. When other modes are considered less demanding, of course
the question arises as to why being affiliated with a political party in some way
is not a more widely spread phenomenon. Yet, the relevance of non-membership
enrollment increases when the overlap with traditional party enrollment is considered
simultaneously. Chapter 7 has also shown that most people who are participating
via some sort of non membership-based affiliation are in fact not current members
of a party. This means that although ratios of different affiliation modes are quite
small compared to the overall population, parties should increasingly incorporate
non-traditional members into their strategies and view them as an asset. Moreover,
considering that party members are not considered equal in every party or party
system, yet are generally part of a party’s “narrative of legitimacy” (Scarrow 2015,
p. 21), there seems to be no justifiable reason for why affiliates should be excluded
from this story(telling) by default.
Continuing with the review of selected socio-demographic and economic charac-
teristics of affiliates, the results have been quite mixed in comparison to the char-
acteristics of traditional party members. It is not the case that traditional party
members and other affiliates can be clearly separated from one another. Rather, tra-
ditional members have been proven to be part of a continuum of socio-demographic
and economic divergence, although they sometimes have been found to be situated
near the beginning or end of the scale. However, it is also true that non-traditional
affiliates by themselves are at least as diverse as they are different from traditional
party members. The greatest differences between affiliates and traditionally regis-
tered party members have been found in the following areas:
• age (higher than non-traditional affiliates),
• share of married individuals (higher),
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• share of single persons (lower),
• share of pensioners (higher),
• share of students (lower), and
• share of self-assessed lower-class members (lower).
In the multi-speed membership model, people are expected to pick and mix from
different modes and thus tailor their personal way of party affiliation. As it seemed
rather inefficient to identify all chosen let alone all possible combinations, this study
has taken a different approach to understanding the real world application and
meaning of this model. Taking all individually bespoke ways of party affiliation into
account, cluster analysis has been used to uncover a structure of popular combina-
tions and identify the most common variations.
Using this approach, eight distinct groups have been identified. Utilizing the share
of those group members who claim to execute each of the aforementioned affiliation
modes, an operational affiliation pattern vividly shows how each of the groups in-
terpret party affiliation in their own way. Moreover, the nature of the relationship
of traditional membership and other affiliation modes could clearly be seen. On the
basis of this cluster solution, the following types of party affiliates have been identi-
fied, leading to a much more detailed and elaborate picture of party affiliation than




3. the Social Media Opposers,
4. the Apathetic Members,
5. the Financiers,
6. the Interested Sustainers,
7. the Analog Activists, and
8. the Informed Members.
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Chapter 8 revealed how German people are affiliated with political parties by
the end of this decade (see figure 8.21 on page 207). According to this, 12% of the
German people within the considered age range (i.e. 18+, which is the age that allows
one to vote for the federal parliament) need to be described as inactive. However,
that does not mean that those people are not politically engaged in any way. They
can, of course, be member of an environmental interest group, join demonstrations
and can even be a member of the parliament, be it on the state level or the national
level. But they would not do so with any sort of relationship to a political party.
Secondly, the voters amount for nearly 86% of German society. Those people are
essentially the default citizen with regard to party political engagement, Meaning
that they go to the polling station every now and then, but do not do much apart
from that. However, while this is true for the average member of this affiliation
group, it is not a statement that necessarily holds true on the basis of single case
revision. Accordingly, between 1% and 9% of the voters are actually in contact with
a political party in one or another way. Yet, they do not engage with a party in a
way that would make these people party members when considering a redefinition
of political party membership. Nonetheless, it might be appealing for parties to also
address the average voter by newsletters and social media campaigning, not just as
a voter but rather as a multiplier in their personal peer group (which can be quite
large in the age of social media).
Lastly, not more than 2.19% are considered party affiliates under a narrower
definition. This number is only reported with two decimals in order to underline
the marginal difference to the M/E-ratio, the ratio between traditionally enrolled
party members and the electorate. Reconsidering figure 2.3 on page 30, which re-
ports an M/E-ratio for 2017 of 2.06%, the difference of both figures is small. Since
the weighted sample of the 2017 German Party Members Survey’s accompanying
population survey can, due to its minimum age requirement, be considered a repre-
sentative survey of the electorate, both numbers are justifiably comparable. Hence,
even a broad reconsideration of party membership, as Scarrow proposes, can only
increase party affiliation by a very small amount. This is a first clue as to what




When compared to the original multi-speed membership model, this is reinforced
when operational affiliation patterns for each cluster are reviewed in detail. It is not
the norm but rather the exception that people chose to be affiliated to a political
party without being traditionally enrolled at the same time. Only two of the remain-
ing seven groups of party affiliates have been detected to employ traditional party
membership by less than 100%. Across all seven affiliation clusters (hyperactives,
social media opposers, apathetic members, financiers, interested supporters, analog
activists and informed members) party membership is reported to be at 83%. So-
called hyperactives and analog activists are the only groups in which multi-mode
affiliation can be seen without simultaneously being traditionally registered as a
party member with the party itself.
Therefore, it has to be put into perspective what multi-speed offerings by parties
are actually capable of with regard to the ongoing discussion about decreasing num-
bers of party members (chapter 2 on page 13). As a vehicle to expand the reach of
political parties, modern outreach strategies by parties seem to be a good way to get
in touch with the default citizen who is moderately interested in politics, yet refuses
to actively engage with a party. What these offerings can only marginally achieve
however, is reach people who are interested in regular and active political participa-
tion with or for a party, but have been discouraged from doing so by the necessity
of formal party enrollment. As assumed at the very beginning of this study, the con-
nection between traditional party membership and modern ways of party affiliation
is quite different. Modern digital affiliation expands and diversifies the means by
which traditional party members fulfill their purpose.
In order to further increase the understanding of non enrollment-based party affil-
iation, this study also sought to identify those affiliates’ preconditions and motiva-
tion in contrast to traditionally registered party members, no matter what variation.
However, contrasts to different variations of traditional membership have been ad-
dressed as well where applicable and promising. To accomplish this, three sets of
independent variables, inspired by classic models for explaining party membership
and party activity, have been considered in multinomial regression analyses. This
has shown important differences for party affiliation that is not completely focused
on classic enrollment. At first, each model was applied independently. In order to
also control for variables of other models and to increase model fit, an integrated re-
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gression model was also estimated. All in all, with the integrated model, significantly
positive or negative effects have become much less and much more coherent across
all reference groups as compared to single model regressions. This is especially true
for the group of analog activists. According to this holistic model, both groups that
best represent Scarrow’s approach of multi-speed membership prove to be different
in terms of their preconditions and motivations, both in contrast to reference groups
as well as between each other. Yet, both investigated groups of affiliates also have
one thing in common: All things equal, non enrollment-based affiliates are younger
than their enrolled counterparts.
What do these results mean in a more general picture? This depends to a great
extent on the actual size of the picture that is drawn. Considering Scarrow’s aim to
redefine party membership in an age of digital communications technology, social
media, and omnipresent multi-optionality, it has to be acknowledged that party
membership is still far away from being a potpourri of multiple on-line or off-line
affiliation modes and will be for the foreseeable future. Although no evidence could
be found for a state of party membership that does challenge the core of political
parties, Scarrow needs to be credited with widening the view on parties and their
traditional basis. In fact, it needs to be acknowledged that in modern day affiliates,
parties have unused resources as the general demand for multi-speed options shows.
This force is quite likely to tackle the understanding of how parties work, once it
is properly exploited. And this is not to the least extent a question of the parties’
elites and their deciding bodies.
Based on the evidence that has been found for the use of different affiliation
modes, the fact that the parties’ members are growing old and the finding that
those affiliates who engage with a party, yet do not completely opt for traditional
party enrollment, are the youngest among all affiliates, the logic of political parties
might in fact change. Not only will it be the case, that future generations increasingly
dismiss the role of life-time adherents when going to polls, they also want to support
parties differently. Traditional party membership will not play the important role
that it once played, although membership-electorate-ratios have never been on the
high side in Germany (section 2.2 on page 18). Yet, people will not simply turn their
back on traditionally acting parties, so that parties can simply watch themselves
die out. Rather, it is highly likely that there will always be a core of politically
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interested people who seek to engage within political discussions and to interact
with political institutions and they will expect to find opportunities to support
parties by other means than traditional membership. This challenges parties since
they have to stretch their efforts between two poles. On the one hand, traditional
membership is not likely to be completely obsolete, which means that parties have
to attract traditional members and offer selective benefits to those who really go all
in. On the other hand, parties cannot afford to completely dismiss people who do
not want to opt for traditional membership; instead, they have to be offered different
opportunities for participation as well. Balancing these groups will be the major task
for parties who want to be successful in the future.
Increasing the scope of the picture, one scenario might be that parties develop from
membership-based but functionally isolated institutions to platforms of professionals
that work differently with regard to their vote-maximizing power. This scenario can
also be described with an ongoing Americanization of party life. Webb et al. (2017,
p. 65) describe the same thought regarding issue specific recruiting and community
organizing. A concept that had been applied to developments as diverse as culture,
business, media and politics, the term itself is debatable. Nevertheless, it is used here
since it is the United States party system in which a similar role of parties and party
members can be observed, although it can be confusing to speak of members here.
Whether this is called Americanization, modernization, diversification, or simply
change is not that important in the end.
In the United States, parties operate differently than in Germany or the rest
of western Europe. Parties in the US are organizationally much looser and, while
official registration does exist, members do not have corresponding rights as well as
obligations. Party affiliation is much more a question of self-assessment based on
party affinity than a legal issue. The closest approximation to party membership
in the European style is voter registration for closed primary elections. In contrast
to general elections, primaries are meant to select one of several candidates of the
same party and thus are somewhat an inner-party mechanism, although anyone who
meets a list of low-level criteria, such as for example US citizenship, being at least 18
years of age, and not being convicted (or rights restored) can register. Accordingly,
the organizational logic of political parties follows a different approach and affiliates
engage with their party rather differently. While the European party ideal is that of a
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bottom-up process on the basis of voluntary citizen engagement, the American party
model limits this grassroots idea. Instead of actively participating in the political
process and working on a party’s platform, affiliates in the US are a means of support
and communication. Coordination of a party’s strategy, party platform formulation
and event organization is rather in the hands of elected national or state level party
committees. Policy formulation is even up to individual candidates. The role of
affiliates, on the other hand, is more a supporting force in times of elections.
US parties, especially those on the federal level, are organizational campaign units,
vehicles to support individuals, not the essence of it’s members’ general will that
crystallizes through endless debates and moves from the grassroots up to the top of
the crown. Germany’s parties’ solution to decreasing membership can be a devel-
opment in exactly this direction. This, however, would mean acknowledging change
and showing that political parties’ societal linkage is not necessarily a question of
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Table A.1: Total and relative development of membership for selected German parties, 1945-2017
Year CDU ∆1 SPD ∆ CSU ∆ FDP ∆ Green2 ∆ Left3 ∆ AfD ∆ Total
1946 - - 701,449 - 69,370 - - - - - - - - - 701,449
1947 - - 875,479 24.8 82,189 18.5 55,000 - - - - - - - 999,849
1948 360,000 - 846,518 -3.3 85,247 3.7 - - - - - - - - 1,288,707
1949 - - 736,218 -13.0 66,554 -21.9 - - - - - - - - 821,465
1950 - - 684,698 -7.0 61,763 -7.2 - - - - - - - - 751,252
1951 - - 649,529 -5.1 34,558 -44.0 64,320 16.9 - - - - - - 775,612
1952 210,000 - 627,827 -3.3 35,350 2.3 66,137 2.8 - - - - - - 938,522
1953 215,000 2.4 607,456 -3.2 32,985 -6.7 - - - - - - - - 857,806
1954 - - 586,143 -3.5 - - - - - - - - - - 619,128
1955 245,000 - 589,051 0.5 - - - - - - - - - - 834,051
1956 219,950 -10.2 626,221 6.3 - - - - - - - - - - 846,171
1957 253,605 15.3 626,189 0.0 - - - - - - - - - - 879,794
1958 - - 623,816 -0.4 - - - - - - - - - - 623,816
1959 - - 634,254 1.7 - - - - - - - - - - 634,254
1960 243,628 -3.9 649,578 2.4 52,277 58.5 80,000 21.0 - - - - - - 973,206
1961 - - 644,780 -0.7 58,327 11.6 - - - - - - - - 697,057
1962 248,484 2.0 646,963 0.3 - - - - - - - - - - 953,774
1963 248,633 0.1 648,415 0.2 58,737 0.7 - - - - - - - - 897,048
1964 279,770 12.5 678,848 4.7 70,403 19.9 - - - - - - - - 1,017,355
1965 287,591 2.8 710,448 4.7 71,479 1.5 - - - - - - - - 1,068,442
1966 280,781 -2.4 727,972 2.5 83,548 16.9 - - - - - - - - 1,080,232
1967 285,804 1.8 733,004 0.7 80,904 -3.2 57,644 -27.9 - - - - - - 1,160,000
1968 286,541 0.3 732,446 -0.1 73,625 -9.0 55,581 -3.6 - - - - - - 1,155,472
1969 303,532 5.9 778,945 6.3 70,216 -4.6 58,705 5.6 - - - - - - 1,214,807
1970 329,239 8.5 820,202 5.3 75,001 6.8 56,486 -3.8 - - - - - - 1,276,143
1971 355,745 8.1 847,456 3.3 74,713 -0.4 53,986 -4.4 - - - - - - 1,332,188





Year CDU ∆1 SPD ∆ CSU ∆ FDP ∆ Green2 ∆ Left3 ∆ AfD ∆ Total
1972 422,968 18.9 954,394 12.6 106,951 43.1 58,097 7.6 - - - - - - 1,510,172
1973 457,393 8.1 973,601 2.0 111,913 4.6 63,520 9.3 - - - - - - 1,601,465
1974 530,500 16.0 990,682 1.8 122,872 9.8 70,891 11.6 - - - - - - 1,703,986
1975 590,482 11.3 998,471 0.8 132,591 7.9 73,585 3.8 - - - - - - 1,795,129
1976 652,010 10.4 1,022,191 2.4 144,263 8.8 78,750 7.0 - - - - - - 1,897,214
1977 664,214 1.9 1,006,316 -1.6 159,475 10.5 79,248 0.6 - - - - - - 1,909,253
1978 675,286 1.7 997,444 -0.9 165,709 3.9 80,236 1.2 - - - - - - 1,918,675
1979 682,781 1.1 981,805 -1.6 169,248 2.1 82,534 2.9 11,156 - - - - - 1,927,524
1980 693,320 1.5 986,872 0.5 172,420 1.9 84,289 2.1 20,520 83.9 - - - - 1,957,421
1981 705,116 1.7 956,490 -3.1 175,275 1.7 86,073 2.1 18,193 -11.3 - - - - 1,941,147
1982 718,889 2.0 926,070 -3.2 178,523 1.9 73,788 -14.3 20,293 11.5 - - - - 1,917,563
1983 734,555 2.2 925,630 0.0 185,428 3.9 71,371 -3.3 28,348 39.7 - - - - 1,945,332
1984 730,395 -0.6 916,485 -1.0 184,226 -0.6 68,668 -3.8 31,235 10.2 - - - - 1,931,009
1985 718,590 -1.6 916,383 0.0 182,852 -0.7 65,425 -4.7 37,024 18.5 - - - - 1,920,274
1986 714,089 -0.6 912,828 -0.4 182,369 -0.3 63,736 -2.6 38,170 3.1 - - - - 1,911,192
1987 705,821 -1.2 908,921 -0.4 184,293 1.1 64,501 1.2 42,419 11.1 - - - - 1,905,955
1988 676,747 -4.1 911,916 0.3 182,738 -0.8 64,105 -0.6 40,768 -3.9 - - - - 1,876,274
1989 662,598 -2.1 921,430 1.0 185,703 1.6 65,150 1.6 41,171 1.0 - - - - 1,876,052
1990 655,200 -1.1 943,402 2.4 186,198 0.3 168,217 158.2 41,316 0.4 280,882 - - - 2,275,215
1991 751,163 14.6 919,871 -2.5 184,513 -0.9 140,031 -16.8 38,873 -5.9 172,579 -38.6 - - 2,207,030
1992 713,846 -5.0 885,958 -3.7 181,758 -1.5 103,505 -26.1 36,320 -6.6 146,742 -15.0 - - 2,068,129
1993 685,343 -4.0 861,480 -2.8 177,289 -2.5 94,197 -9.0 39,761 9.5 131,406 -10.5 - - 1,989,476
1994 671,497 -2.0 849,374 -1.4 176,250 -0.6 87,992 -6.6 43,899 10.4 123,751 -5.8 - - 1,952,763
1995 657,643 -2.1 817,650 -3.7 179,647 1.9 80,431 -8.6 46,410 5.7 114,940 -7.1 - - 1,896,721
1996 645,786 -1.8 792,773 -3.0 178,573 -0.6 75,038 -6.7 48,034 3.5 105,029 -8.6 - - 1,845,233
1997 631,700 -2.2 776,183 -2.1 178,457 -0.1 69,621 -7.2 48,980 2.0 98,624 -6.1 - - 1,803,565




Year CDU ∆1 SPD ∆ CSU ∆ FDP ∆ Green2 ∆ Left3 ∆ AfD ∆ Total
1998 626,342 -0.8 775,036 -0.1 178,755 0.2 67,897 -2.5 51,812 5.8 94,627 -4.1 - - 1,794,469
1999 638,056 1.9 755,066 -2.6 183,569 2.7 64,407 -5.1 49,488 -4.5 88,594 -6.4 - - 1,779,180
2000 616,722 -3.3 734,667 -2.7 181,021 -1.4 62,721 -2.6 46,631 -5.8 83,475 -5.8 - - 1,725,237
2001 604,135 -2.0 717,513 -2.3 177,661 -1.9 64,063 2.1 44,053 -5.5 77,845 -6.7 - - 1,685,270
2002 594,391 -1.6 693,894 -3.3 177,705 0.0 66,560 3.9 43,881 -0.4 70,805 -9.0 - - 1,647,236
2003 587,244 -1.2 650,798 -6.2 176,989 -0.4 65,192 -2.1 44,052 0.4 65,753 -7.1 - - 1,590,028
2004 579,526 -1.3 605,807 -6.9 172,892 -2.3 64,146 -1.6 44,322 0.6 61,385 -6.6 - - 1,528,078
2005 571,881 -1.3 590,485 -2.5 170,117 -1.6 65,022 1.4 45,105 1.8 61,270 -0.2 - - 1,503,880
2006 553,896 -3.1 561,239 -5.0 166,928 -1.9 64,880 -0.2 44,677 -0.9 60,338 -1.5 - - 1,451,958
2007 536,668 -3.1 539,861 -3.8 166,392 -0.3 64,078 -1.2 44,320 -0.8 71,711 18.8 - - 1,423,030
2008 528,972 -1.4 520,970 -3.5 162,232 -2.5 65,600 2.4 45,089 1.7 75,968 5.9 - - 1,398,831
2009 521,149 -1.5 512,520 -1.6 159,198 -1.9 72,116 9.9 48,171 6.8 78,046 2.7 - - 1,391,200
2010 505,314 -3.0 502,062 -2.0 153,890 -3.3 68,541 -5.0 52,991 10.0 73,658 -5.6 - - 1,356,456
2011 489,896 -3.1 489,638 -2.5 150,585 -2.1 63,123 -7.9 59,074 11.5 69,458 -5.7 - - 1,321,774
2012 476,347 -2.8 477,037 -2.6 147,965 -1.7 58,675 -7.0 59,653 1.0 63,761 -8.2 - - 1,283,438
2013 467,076 -1.9 473,662 -0.7 148,380 0.3 57,263 -2.4 61,359 2.9 63,756 0.0 17,687 - 1,289,183
2014 457,488 -2.1 459,902 -2.9 146,536 -1.2 54,967 -4.0 60,329 -1.7 60,551 -5.0 20,728 17.2 1,260,501
2015 444,400 -2.9 442,814 -3.7 144,360 -1.5 53,197 -3.2 59,418 -1.5 58,989 -2.6 16,385 -21.0 1,219,563
2016 431,920 -2.8 432,706 -2.3 142,412 -1.3 53,896 1.3 61,596 3.7 58,910 -0.1 26,409 61.2 1,207,849
2017 425,910 -1.4 443,152 2.4 140,983 -1.0 63,050 17.0 65,065 5.6 62,300 5.8 27,621 4.6 1,228,081
2018 414,905 -2.6 437,754 -1.2 138,354 -1.9 63,912 1.4 75,311 15.7 62,016 -.5 33,516 21.3 1,225,768
%4 34.7 36.1 11.5 5.1 5.3 5.1 2.2 100
For references of party membership numbers see notes of table A.2 on page 291.
1 Difference in membership in % in comparison to previous accessible number.
2 1979-1993: Die Grünen (1979 only state level branches exist), since 1993: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (unification with Bündnis 90).
3 1946-1989: SED (numbers are not considered due to anti-democratic regime in German Democratic Republic), 1989-1990: SED-PDS,
1990-2005: PDS, 2005-2007: The Left Party.PDS, 2007-present: The Left (unification with WASG).
4 Percent of total party membership of selected parties in 2018.
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Table A.2: Development of party membership for German Parties I, 1945-2019
Year CDU1 SPD2 CSU3 FDP4 Green5 Left6 AfD7 Pirates8
1945 -9 - - - - - - -
1946 - 701,449 69,370 - - - - -
1947 - 875,479 82,189 55,000 - - - -
1948 360,000 846,518 85,247 - - - - -
1949 - 736,218 66,554 - - - - -
1950 - 684,698 61,763 - - - - -
1951 - 649,529 34,558 64,320 - - - -
1952 210,000 627,827 35,350 66,137 - - - -
1953 215,000 607,456 32,985 - - - - -
1954 - 586,143 - - - - - -
1955 245,000 589,051 - - - - - -
1956 219,950 626,221 - - - - - -
1957 253,605 626,189 - - - - - -
1958 - 623,816 - - - - - -
1959 - 634,254 - - - - - -
1960 243,628 649,578 52,277 80,000 - - - -
1961 246,056 644,780 58,327 - - - - -
1962 248,484 646,963 - - - - - -
1963 248,633 648,415 58,737 - - - - -
1964 279,770 678,848 70,403 - - - - -
1965 287,591 710,448 71,479 - - - - -
1966 280,781 727,972 83,548 - - - - -
1967 285,804 733,004 80,904 57,644 - - - -
1968 286,541 732,446 73,625 55,581 - - - -
1969 303,532 778,945 70,216 58,705 - - - -
1970 329,239 820,202 75,001 56,486 - - - -
1971 355,745 847,456 74,713 53,986 - - - -
1972 422,968 954,394 106,951 58,097 - - - -
1973 457,393 973,601 111,913 63,520 - - - -
1974 530,500 990,682 122,872 70,891 - - - -
1975 590,482 998,471 132,591 73,585 - - - -
1976 652,010 1,022,191 144,263 78,750 - - - -
1977 664,214 1,006,316 159,475 79,248 - - - -




Year CDU1 SPD2 CSU3 FDP4 Green5 Left6 AfD7 Pirates8
1978 675,286 997,444 165,709 80,236 - - - -
1979 682,781 981,805 169,248 82,534 11,156 - - -
1980 693,320 986,872 172,420 84,289 20,520 - - -
1981 705,116 956,490 175,275 86,073 18,193 - - -
1982 718,889 926,070 178,523 73,788 20,293 - - -
1983 734,555 925,630 185,428 71,371 28,348 - - -
1984 730,395 916,485 184,226 68,668 31,235 - - -
1985 718,590 916,383 182,852 65,425 37,024 - - -
1986 714,089 912,828 182,369 63,736 38,170 - - -
1987 705,821 908,921 184,293 64,501 42,419 - - -
1988 676,747 911,916 182,738 64,105 40,768 - - -
1989 662,598 921,430 185,703 65,150 41,171 - - -
1990 655,200 943,402 186,198 168,217 41,316 280,882 - -
1991 751,163 919,871 184,513 140,031 38,873 172,579 - -
1992 713,846 885,958 181,758 103,505 36,320 146,742 - -
1993 685,343 861,480 177,289 94,197 39,761 131,406 - -
1994 671,497 849,374 176,250 87,992 43,899 123,751 - -
1995 657,643 817,650 179,647 80,431 46,410 114,940 - -
1996 645,786 792,773 178,573 75,038 48,034 105,029 - -
1997 631,700 776,183 178,457 69,621 48,980 98,624 - -
1998 626,342 775,036 178,755 67,897 51,812 94,627 - -
1999 638,056 755,066 183,569 64,407 49,488 88,594 - -
2000 616,722 734,667 181,021 62,721 46,631 83,475 - -
2001 604,135 717,513 177,661 64,063 44,053 77,845 - -
2002 594,391 693,894 177,705 66,560 43,881 70,805 - -
2003 587,244 650,798 176,989 65,192 44,052 65,753 - -
2004 579,526 605,807 172,892 64,146 44,322 61,385 - -
2005 571,881 590,485 170,117 65,022 45,105 61,270 - -
2006 553,896 561,239 166,928 64,880 44,677 60,338 - 353
2007 536,668 539,861 166,392 64,078 44,320 71,711 - 680
2008 528,972 520,970 162,232 65,600 45,089 75,968 - 888
2009 521,149 512,520 159,198 72,116 48,171 78,046 - 11,720
2010 505,314 502,062 153,890 68,541 52,991 73,658 - 12,856




Year CDU1 SPD2 CSU3 FDP4 Green5 Left6 AfD7 Pirates8
2011 489,896 489,638 150,585 63,123 59,074 69,458 - 19,200
2012 476,347 477,037 147,965 58,675 59,653 63,761 - 34,322
2013 467,076 473,662 148,380 57,263 61,359 63,756 17,687 29,974
2014 457,488 459,902 146,536 54,967 60,329 60,551 20,728 25,374
2015 444,400 442,814 144,360 53,197 59,418 58,989 16,385 16,294
2016 431,920 432,706 142,412 53,896 61,596 58,910 26,409 12,259
2017 425,910 443,152 140,983 63,050 65,065 62,300 27,621 10,552
2018 414,905 437,754 138,354 63,912 75,311 62,016 33,516 8,563
1 Pre-1990: Franz and Gnad (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
2 Pre-1990: Boyer and Kössler (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
3 Pre-1990: Franz and Gnad (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
4 Pre-1990: Gnad et al. (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
5 Pre-1990: Boyer and Kössler (2005), 1990-present: Niedermayer (2019).
6 Niedermayer (2019).
7 Niedermayer (2019).
8 2006-2013: Spier (2014), 2014-present: Statista (2019).
9 - : Either no numbers available or party not existent.
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Table A.3: Development of party membership for German Parties II, 1945-2019
Year KPD1 DKP2 BHE3 DZP4 BP5 NPD6 MLPD7 REP8 DVU9
1945 80,280 -10 - 50,459 - - - - -
1946 243,851 - - 41,632 - - - - -
1947 324,214 - - 53,977 - - - - -
1948 293,511 - - 52,870 15,060 - - - -
1949 195,511 - - 50,635 25,763 - - - -
1950 149,303 - - 35,159 24,925 - - - -
1951 128,448 - - - 26,000 - - - -
1952 129,958 - - - 24,486 - - - -
1953 103,130 - 158,300 - 20,923 - - - -
1954 84,332 - 164,900 - - - - - -
1955 - - 153,500 - - - - - -
1956 78,000 - 158,000 - - - - - -
1957 - - 122,000 - - - - - -
1958 - - 113,700 - - - - - -
1959 - - 90,900 - - - - - -
1960 - - - - - - - -
1961 - - - - - - - - -
1962 - - - - - - - - -
1963 - - - - - - - - -
1964 - - - - - 250 - - -
1965 - - - - - 13,700 - - -
1966 - - - - - 25,000 - - -
1967 - - - - - 28,000 - - -
1968 - - - - 27,000 - - -
1969 - 23,000 - - - 28,000 - - -
1970 - 30,000 - - - 21,000 - - -
1971 - 33,410 - - - 18,300 - - -
1972 - 36,000 - - - 14,500 - - -
1973 - 39,344 - - - 12,000 - - -
1974 - 40,000 - - - 11,500 - - -
1975 - 40,000 - - - 10,000 - - -
1976 - 40,000 - - - 9,700 - - -
1977 - 42,000 - - - 9,000 - - -




Year KPD1 DKP2 BHE3 DZP4 BP5 NPD6 MLPD7 REP8 DVU9
1978 - 42,000 - - - 8,500 - - -
1979 - 40,000 - - - 8,000 - - -
1980 - 40,000 - - - 7,200 - - -
1981 - 40,000 - - - 6,500 - - -
1982 - 40,000 - - - 5,900 900 - -
1983 - 40,000 - - - 6,000 1,000 150 -
1984 - 40,000 - - - 6,100 1,100 -
1985 - 40,000 - - - 6,100 1,300 2,500 -
1986 - 40,000 - - - 6,100 1,300 4,000 -
1987 - 38,000 - - - 6,200 1,300 5,000 14,500
1988 - 35,000 - - - 6,400 1,300 8,000 18,500
1989 - 22,000 - - - 7,000 1,400 25,000 25,000
1990 - 11,000 - - - 5,400 1,500 20,100 22,000
1991 - 8,000 - - - 6,100 1,500 16,800 24,000
1992 - 7,000 - - - 5,000 1,700 19,900 26,000
1993 - 6,000 - - - 5,000 2,000 23,000 26,000
1994 - 6,000 - - - 4,500 2,300 20,000 20,000
1995 - 6,000 - - - 4,000 2,700 16,000 15,000
1996 - 6,200 - - - 3,500 2,700 15,000 15,000
1997 - 6,200 - - - 4,300 2,500 15,500 15,000
1998 - 6,500 - - - 6,000 2,500 15,500 18,000
1999 - 5,000 - - - 6,000 2,000 14,000 17,000
2000 - 4,500 - - - 6,500 2,000 13,000 17,000
2001 - 4,500 - - - 6,102 2,000 10,804 15,000
2002 - 4,700 - - - 5,432 2,000 8,895 13,000
2003 - 4,700 - - - 4,652 2,000 8,336 11,500
2004 - 4,500 - - - 4,918 2,000 8,034 11,000
2005 - 4,500 - - - 6,379 2,300 7,402 9,000
2006 - 4,200 - - - 6,694 2,300 6,384 8,500
2007 - 4,200 - - - 7,014 2,300 6,666 7,000
2008 - 4,200 - - - 6,782 2,300 6,466 6,000
2009 - 4,000 - - - 6,732 2,000 6,257 4,500
2010 - 4,000 - - - 6,376 2,000 5,959 3,000




Year KPD1 DKP2 BHE3 DZP4 BP5 NPD6 MLPD7 REP8 DVU9
2011 - 4,000 - - - 6,300 2,000 5,503 -
2012 - 3,500 - - - 6,000 1,900 5,116 -
2013 - 3,500 - - - 5,500 1,900 5,000 -
2014 - - - - - - - 4,533 -
2015 - - - - - - - - -
2016 - - - - - - 1,800 - -
2017 - 3,500 - 905 5,000 4,500 2,000 4,500 -
2018 - 2,850 - - - 4,000 2,800 - -
1 Spier (2014).
2 1969 - 2013: Spier (2014), 2017: Bundeswahlausschuss (2017), 2018: Bundesministerium des
Innern, für Bau und Heimat (2019).
3 Spier (2014).
4 1945 - 1950: Spier (2014), 2017: Bundeswahlausschuss (2017).
5 1948 - 1953: Spier (2014), 2017: Bundeswahlausschuss (2017).
6 1964 - 2013: Spier (2014), 2017/18: Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat
(2019).
7 1982 - 2013: Spier (2014), 2016: Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat
(2018), 2017: Bundeswahlausschuss (2017), 2018: Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau
und Heimat (2019).
8 1983 - 2013: Spier (2014), 2014: Deutscher Bundestag (2016), 2017: Bundeswahlausschuss
(2017).
9 1987 - 2010: Spier (2014).
10 - : Either no numbers available or party not existent.
Table A.4: Development of party membership of the SED, 1946-1990
Year Members Year Members Year Members
1946 1,298,000 1955 1,473,000 1980 2,131,000
1947 1,786,000 1961 1,611,000 1981 2,172,000
1948 2,000,000 1963 1,680,000 1984 2,238,000
1949 1,774,000 1966 1,770,000 1986 2,304,000
1950 1,750,000 1971 1,910,000 1989 2,300,000
1951 1,221,000 1973 1,952,000 1989 (December) 1,463,762
1953 1,230,000 1976 2,044,000 1990 (June) 350,000
1954 1,413,000 1977 2,075,000 1990 (December) 280.882
1946-1989: Jesse (2001, p. 96), December 1989 & December 1990: Moreau
and Schorpp-Grabiak (2002, p. 91), June 1990: Schroeder (2013, p. 504).
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Table A.5: Questionnaire items to asses different modes of multi-speed membership,
German wording
Mode Party Member Item Non-Party Member Item
Electors Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, würden Sie dann sicher
wählen gehen, wahrscheinlich wählen gehen, wahrscheinlich nicht wählen
gehen oder sicher nicht wählen gehen?
Social media followers Folgen Sie im Internet bei Facebook, Twitter oder ähnlichen Diensten
einer politischen Partei? Yes/No
News audience1 Besuchen Sie regelmäßig die Internetseite einer politischen Partei? Yes/No
Haben Sie im Internet den Newsletter oder vergleichbare Angebote einer
politischen Partei abonniert? Yes/No
Activists Wie würden Sie Ihre gegenwärtige
Aktivität in der [Partei] insgesamt
einschätzen? Für wie aktiv halten Sie
sich persönlich? Halten Sie sich für
sehr aktiv, ziemlich aktiv, weniger ak-
tiv oder überhaupt nicht aktiv?
Auch wenn Sie kein Mitglied sind,
arbeiten Sie gelegentlich bei einer
Partei mit? Yes/No
Financial sustainers Ihre Mitgliedsbeiträge einmal
ausgenommen, haben Sie in den
letzten fünf Jahren Geld an eine
politische Partei gespendet? Yes/No
Haben Sie in den letz- ten fünf
Jahren Geld an eine politische Partei
gespendet? Yes/No
Traditional members Sind Sie gegenwärtig Mitglied einer
Partei? Yes/No
N/A
Cyber-members Haben Sie sich auf den Internetseiten einer Partei als Parteianhänger
angemeldet? Yes/No
Light-members Two-step question design: Respon-
dents, who reported to be a party
member, have been asked:
Und handelt es sich dabei um eine
Vollmitgliedschaft oder aber um2
• a) eine Gastmitgliedschaft?
• b) eine Gastmitgliedschaft
bzw. den Status der Unter-
stützerin/des Unterstützers?
• c) eine Gast- oder Probemit-
gliedschaft?
• d) eine Probemitgliedschaft?
• e) den Status der
Förderin/des Förderers?
• f) eine Gast-, Probe- oder
Testmitgliedschaft?
N/A
1 A Yes to either or both questions has been sufficient to count as part of the news audience.
2 Question stimulus has been matched to party membership and exact terminology of each party
according to their membership regulations.




Table A.6: The Multi-Speed index
Affiliation Mode/Item Options
Traditional Members - Member only pages
- New member discount
- Youth discount
Light Members - Registered sympathizers
- Trial members
Financial Sustainers - Ask for donation
- Accept on-line donation, PayPal or credit card
- Accept text message





News Audience - Subscription news letter
- RSS feed
- Phone alert
- Refrence: Scarrow (2015, p. 154).
- Each item scored:
0 points: None of the options applied.
1 point : One of the options applied.
2 points: Two or more of the options applied.
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Table A.7: The On-line Accessibility Index
Item Accessibility options
Membership 0: Applying for membership isn’t obviously discussed.
1: Can’t start application process on-line on national party web page.
(Includes parties which redirect to provincial party web pages.)
2: Can print PDF of form or send e-mail to ask for more information.
3: Can complete on-line membership form.
Donations 0: No directions on how to give.
1: Gives address for mailing check or bank account number. No imme-
diate giving option.
2: Can make on-line donation or give by text message.
3: Gives both on-line and text message donation options.
Volunteering 0. None.
1: Mentions on-line or off-line action opportunities.
2: Mentions both on-line and off-line action opportunities.
3: Offers on-line volunteer sign-up form or website gives directions on
where/whom to e-mail to sign up as a party volunteer.
- Refrence: Scarrow (2015, p. 154).
- Each item scored 0-3 points according to its accessibility.
Table A.8: Extract of cluster analysis agglomeration schedule
Stage Cluster Combined Simple MatchingCoefficient
Stage Cluster
First Appears Next Stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
1 2840 2842 1 0 0 3
2 2839 2841 1 0 0 4
3 1 2840 1 0 1 11
...
2921 6 2461 1.000 2505 0 2922
2922 6 197 0.999 2921 0 2923
2923 6 2736 0.999 2922 0 2924
2924 6 2628 0.998 2923 0 2926
2925 1 226 0.997 0 2719 2934
2926 6 2587 0.997 2924 0 2927
2927 6 2319 0.997 2926 0 2929
2928 7 192 0.996 2917 0 2939
2929 6 178 0.996 2927 0 2930
2930 6 2862 0.995 2929 0 2931
2931 6 2808 0.994 2930 0 2933
2932 198 2629 0.994 0 354 2969




Stage Cluster Combined Simple MatchingCoefficient
Stage Cluster
First Appears Next Stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
2933 6 2711 0.994 2931 0 2935
2934 1 2586 0.993 2925 0 2943
2935 6 201 0.993 2933 0 2937
2936 179 1971 0.992 2749 981 2975
2937 6 184 0.992 2935 0 2940
2938 193 2909 0.991 0 90 2956
2939 7 181 0.991 2928 2748 2948
2940 6 202 0.991 2937 0 2941
2941 6 2359 0.990 2940 607 2944
2942 194 2462 0.989 2741 513 2968
2943 1 2 0.988 2934 2920 2955
2944 6 203 0.988 2941 0 2946
2945 1845 2592 0.988 1104 388 2972
2946 6 204 0.987 2944 0 2947
2947 6 219 0.986 2946 2725 2949
2948 7 188 0.985 2939 2744 2961
2949 6 1824 0.984 2947 1123 2950
2950 6 2317 0.983 2949 644 2953
2951 2210 2213 0.983 748 746 2984
2952 185 2042 0.983 2746 911 2974
2953 6 176 0.981 2950 2750 2954
2954 6 2429 0.979 2953 541 2957
2955 1 2588 0.979 2943 391 2964
2956 193 2975 0.977 2938 25 2980
2957 6 199 0.977 2954 2739 2959
2958 2737 2809 0.975 254 185 2990
2959 6 2152 0.974 2957 803 2960
2960 6 1819 0.971 2959 1127 2963
2961 7 166 0.970 2948 2759 2993
2962 2173 2446 0.969 784 526 2987
2963 6 1962 0.968 2960 989 2965
2964 1 2320 0.965 2955 643 2976
2965 6 2998 0.964 2963 4 2970
2966 2728 2815 0.964 261 180 2985
2967 2863 2902 0.962 134 96 2986
2968 194 2451 0.961 2942 522 2990
2969 198 2712 0.961 2932 275 2988
2970 6 2720 0.960 2965 268 2973
2971 2257 2795 0.958 703 197 2983
2972 1845 2326 0.957 2945 638 2989
2973 6 205 0.955 2970 2738 2977
2974 185 2679 0.951 2952 305 2991
2975 179 2157 0.951 2936 799 2992
2976 1 1828 0.951 2964 1120 2984
2977 6 2381 0.949 2973 587 2978
2978 6 2537 0.942 2977 439 2981
2979 2399 2432 0.937 570 539 2994
2980 193 2694 0.936 2956 291 2994




Stage Cluster Combined Simple MatchingCoefficient
Stage Cluster
First Appears Next Stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
2981 6 2361 0.932 2978 606 2983
2982 1935 2135 0.931 1015 819 2992
2983 6 2257 0.922 2981 2971 2987
2984 1 2210 0.919 2976 2951 2995
2985 2340 2728 0.917 625 2966 2996
2986 2863 2979 0.912 2967 22 2996
2987 6 2173 0.910 2983 2962 2989
2988 198 2596 0.908 2969 385 2998
2989 6 1845 0.898 2987 2972 2991
2990 194 2737 0.896 2968 2958 2998
2991 6 185 0.887 2989 2974 2993
2992 179 1935 0.878 2975 2982 2997
2993 6 7 0.872 2991 2961 2995
2994 193 2399 0.865 2980 2979 3000
2995 1 6 0.847 2984 2993 2997
2996 2340 2863 0.831 2985 2986 3000
2997 1 179 0.824 2995 2992 2999
2998 194 198 0.816 2990 2988 2999
2999 1 194 0.785 2997 2998 3001
3000 193 2340 0.781 2994 2996 3001
3001 1 193 0.717 2999 3000 0
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Table A.9: Operationalization of a general incentives model, German wording
Incentive/Variable Item Scale
Positive Incentives
Selective-outcome Es bringt auch Leuten wie mir berufliche
Vorteile, wenn man sich in einer Partei en-
gagiert.
metric,
Five-point scale: Agree very
strong, strong, moderate,
weak, very weak.
Low efficacy/interest (1) -
high efficacy/interest (5)
Wer eine Karriere als hauptberuflicher
Politiker anstrebt, muss aktives Parteim-
itglied sein.
Selective-process Als aktives Parteimitglied kann man inter-
essante Leute kennenlernen.
Als aktives Parteimitglied kann man für
politische Fragen Sachverstand entwickeln.
Collective-political Die aktive Mitarbeit in einer Partei ist ein
geeigneter Weg, um persönlich Einfluss auf
die Politik auszuüben.
Normative Wer sich in einer Partei engagiert kann mit
Achtung und Anerkennung rechnen.
Altruistic Demokratie kann nur funktionieren, wenn
die Bürger in politischen Parteien mitar-
beiten.
Ideological Mit der Mitgliedschaft in einer Partei
bekundet man seine Unterstützung für die
politischen Ideen dieser Partei.
Expressive Mit der Mitgliedschaft in einer Partei
bekundet man seine Sympathie für die
Partei und ihre Politiker.
Negative Incentives
Opprtunity costs Das Engagement in einer Partei lässt häu-
fig zu wenig Zeit für Freunde und Familie.
Disutility of labor Für eine Partei zu arbeiten, kann sehr
langweilig sein.




Table A.10: Operationalization of a social-psychological model, German wording
Incentive/Variable Item Scale
Internal efficacy Die ganze Politik ist so kom-
pliziert, dass jemand wie ich
nicht versteht, was vorgeht.1
metric,
Five-point scale: Agree very
strong, strong, moderate,
weak, very weak.
low efficacy/interest (1) - high
efficacy/interest (5)
Ich traue mir zu, in einer
Gruppe, die sich mit politis-
chen Fragen befasst, eine ak-
tive Rolle zu übernehmen.
External efficacy Die Politiker kümmern sich
nicht viel darum, was die Leute
denken.1
Die Politiker bemühen sich im
Allgemeinen darum, die In-
teressen der Bevölkerung zu
vertreten.
Political interest Wie stark interessieren Sie sich
für Politik: Interessieren Sie
sich sehr stark, stark, mittel,
wenig oder überhaupt nicht für
Politik?
See question stem.
Intensity of party affinity Viele Leute in der Bundesre-
publik neigen längere Zeit einer
bestimmten politischen Partei
zu, obwohl sie auch ab und
zu mal eine andere Partei
wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen:
Neigen Sie – ganz allgemein
gesprochen – einer bestimmten
Partei zu?
metric,
Four-point scale: Yery strong;
strong; moderate; weak, very
weak or no party affinity.3
low party affinity (1) - high
party affinity (4)Wie stark oder wie schwach
neigen Sie alles zusam-
mengenommen dieser Partei
zu? Neigen Sie dieser Partei
sehr stark, ziemlich stark,
mäßig, ziemlich schwach oder
sehr schwach zu?




Table A.11: Operationalization of a socio-economic model, German wording
Variable Item Options
Age Wann sind Sie geboren? Bitte nennen Sie mir Ihr Geburtsjahr. non provided
Sex Has not been asked but filled in by interviewer. N/A
Income Wie hoch ist das monatliche Nettoeinkommen Ihres Haushalts insgesamt? Ich
meine damit die Summe, die sich aus Lohn, Gehalt, Einkommen aus selbständi-
ger Tätigkeit, Rente oder Pension, jeweils nach Steuern und Sozialversicherungs-
beiträgen ergibt. Rechnen Sie bitte auch die Einkünfte aus öffentlichen Beihilfen,
Einnahmen aus Vermietung, Verpachtung, Wohngeld, Kindergeld und sonstige
Einkünfte hinzu.
non provided
Ihre Angabe wird - wie auch alle anderen Angaben in diesem Interview - selb-
stverständlich vollständig anonym gehalten, so dass keinerlei Rückschlüsse auf
Sie selbst oder Ihre Haushalt möglich sind. Die Ergebnisse der Umfrage sollen
u.a. nach dem Einkommen ausgewertet werden.Dabei genügen Einkommensgrup-
pen. Es würde uns sehr helfen, wenn Sie die Einkommensgruppe nennen könnten,
zu der Sie gehören. Bitte sagen Sie mir einfach, in welche der folgenden Einkom-
mensgruppen das Nettoeinkommen Ihres Haushalts fällt.
unter 500€
500 bis unter 1.000€
1.000 bis unter 2.000€
2.000 bis unter 3.000€
3.000 bis unter 4.000€
4.000 bis unter 5.000€
5.000€ und mehr
Civil status Welchen Familienstand haben Sie? verheiratet und mit Ehepartner zusammen-
lebend; eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft,




Education Welchen höchsten allgemeinbildenden Schulabschluss haben Sie? Bin zurzeit Schüler(in); Schulausbildung
beendet ohne Abschluss; Volks-/Hauptschule
bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule, vor der
10. Klasse abgegangen; Mittlere Reife, Re-
alschule bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule 10.
Klasse (Fachhochschulreife); Fachhochschul-
reife (Abschluss einer Fachoberschule),
Ingenieurschule, Erweiterte Oberschule
(EOS) ohne Abschluss; Abitur, Allgemeine
Hochschulreife, Erweiterte Oberschule
(EOS) mit Abschluss; Sonstige
Verfügen Sie über einen Fachhochschul- oder Hochschulabschluss? Ja/Nein
Club membership Sind Sie Mitglied in einer oder mehreren Organisationen bzw. Vereinen? Wenn
ja, in welchen Organisationen bzw. Vereinen sind Sie Mitglied? Gemeint sind
z.B. Gewerkschaften, Sportvereine oder kirchliche Gruppen.
non provided
Occupational prestige Based on 4-digit ISCO-08 coding, which is itself based on several questions regarding
actual or former job characteristics. For the complete list of questions in German
language see table A.13 on page 304.
N/A
Social stratum Es wird heute viel über die verschiedenen Bevölkerungsschichten gesprochen.
Welcher Schicht rechnen Sie sich selbst am ehesten zu?
Unterschicht, untere Mittelschicht, Mit-
telschicht, obere Mittelschicht, Oberschicht
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Table A.12: Survey questions for ISCO-08 coding
Item Options
Are you yourself employed right now? Which
of the following characteristics fits best? Em-
ployment means every paid job, regardless of
the hours spent at work
Full-time employed, min 35 hours a week;
Part-time employed, 15 to under 35 hours a week;
Part-time or hourly employed, under 15 hours a week;













Others, Other reasons of not being employed;
Do not belong to one of these groups, Employed
Have you ever been employed Yes / No
What kind of work are you doing/ have you done? Please give me the exact designation. Can you describe
this job even more concrete? Does your (former) job have an even more precise designation? open question,
no options available
What kind of education is/was regularly nec-
essary for this job
Completed professional education;
Completed university- or technical college degree;
No professional training necessary
What is/was your professional position? Are
you/ Have you been
blue collar worker;
white collar worker;
Civil Servant, Professional Soldier, Judge;
Self-employed farmer;
Academic freelancer (e.g. doctor, lawyer, tax advisor);
Self-employed in trade, business, crafts, industry, services;
Helping family member;
In education
Are you/ Have you been employed as a ... untrained worker;




Are you/ Have you been employed as a ... Employee with basic tasks
Employee with qualified tasks
Employee with highly qualified tasks or managerial functions
Employee with extensive managerial functions
master craftsman with permanent position
Are you/ Have you been employed as a ... Low level civil servant
Mid level civil servant
Higher level civil servant
High level civil servant
How many employees do/did you have. Do
not count yourself.
No employees;
1 to 9 employees;
10 or more employees
Are you/ Have you been employed by a pub-
lic institution?
Yes / No
Is/was it part of your job to supervise others‘




Table A.13: Survey questions for ISCO-08 coding, German wording
Item Options
Sind Sie selbst zurzeit erwerbstätig? Welche
der folgenden Einordnungen trifft auf Sie
zu? Erwerbstätigkeit meint jede bezahlte
Tätigkeit, egal welchen zeitlichen Umfang sie
hat!
Vollzeit erwerbstätig ab 35 Stunden pro Woche
Teilzeit erwerbstätig von 15 bis unter 35 Stunden pro Woche
Teilzeit oder stundenweise unter 15 Stunden pro Woche
Mutterschafts-/Erziehungsurlaub oder sonstige Beurlaubung
Auszubildender, Lehrling, in Umschulung
Zurzeit in einem 1-Euro-Job tätig
Zurzeit nicht erwerbstätig
Sagen Sie mir bitte, ob Sie zu einer der fol-
genden Gruppen gehören:
Rentner, Pensionär, im Vorruhestand
Student
Hausfrau/Hausmann




Sonstiges bzw. aus anderen Gründen nicht erwerbstätig
Gehöre zu keiner dieser Gruppen/bin erwerbstätig
Waren Sie jemals berufstätig? Nicht gemeint
sind Nebentätigkeiten!
Ja / Nein
Welche berufliche Tätigkeit üben Sie gegenwärtig aus/haben Sie in Ihrer letzten Stelle ausgeführt? Geben
Sie mir bitte die genaue Bezeichnung an. Können Sie mir diese Tätigkeit noch konkreter benennen? Hat
das, was Sie gemacht haben, noch eine genauere Bezeichnung? open question, no options available
Welche Art von Ausbildung ist/war für diese
Tätigkeit in der Regel erforderlich. . .
eine abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung
ein abgeschlossenes Fachhochschul- oder Hochschulstudium
keine Ausbildung erforderlich






Akademiker im freien Beruf (z.B. Arzt, Rechtsanwalt, Steuer-
berater etc.)




Sind Sie bzw. waren Sie beschäftigt als Ungelernte/r Arbeiter/in
Angelernte/r Arbeiter/in
Facharbeiter/in, Geselle/in
Vorarbeiter/in bzw. Kolonnenführer/in oder
Meister/in bzw. Polier/in?
Sind Sie bzw. waren Sie beschäftigt als Angestellte/r mit einfacher Tätigkeit
Angestellte/r mit qualifizierter Tätigkeit
Angestellte/r mit hochqualifizierter Tätigkeit oder Leitungs-
funktion
Angestellte/r mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben
Industrie- oder Werkmeister/in im Angestelltenverhältnis?




Wie viele Beschäftigte haben Sie/hatten Sie
– wenn überhaupt? Zählen Sie Ihre Person
dabei nicht mit.
Keine Beschäftigten;
1 bis 9 Beschäftigte;
10 und mehr Beschäftigte
Sind bzw. waren Sie im öffentlichen Dienst
tätig?
Ja / Nein
Gehört/gehörte es zu Ihren beruflichen Auf-
gaben, die Arbeit anderer Arbeitnehmer zu






Table A.14: Multinomial logistic regression analysis, general incentives model
cluster... Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
compared to... Voters (1) (Hyperactives 2)
Selective-outcome .999 1.295 .880 1.093 .831 .832 1.123 1.296 .881 1.094 .832
Selective-process .997 1.246 1.168 .958 .962 3.181∗∗∗ 1.129 1.249 1.171 .960 .964
Collective-political 1.200∗ 1.142 .927 .965 1.008 .878 1.004 .952 .773∗ .804 .840
Normative .830∗ .886 1.006 .981 1.060 1.107 .959 1.068 1.213 1.182 1.278
Altruistic 1.039 1.049 1.049 .944 .952 1.609∗∗∗ .988 1.009 1.009 .909 .917
Ideological .573∗∗∗ .968 1.091 .974 1.097 .547∗∗∗ 1.016 1.689∗∗ 1.903∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗
Expressive 1.914∗∗∗ 1.063 .964 1.291∗ .887 1.553∗ 1.072 0.556∗∗ .504∗∗∗ .675∗ .464∗∗∗
Opp. costs (n) .823∗ .949 .914 1.005 .890 1.344∗ 1.028 1.152 1.110 1.220 1.081
Disutility of labor (n) 1.128 1.008 1.100 1.006 1.066 1.383∗∗ .912 .894 .975 .892 .945
Fin. costs (n) 1.290∗∗ 1.062 .954 .903 1.099 1.017 .848 .823 .739∗∗ .700 .852
cluster... Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8
compared to... Hyperactives (2) Social Media Opposers (3) Apathetic Members (4)
Selective-outcome .832 1.124 .679∗∗ .844 .641∗ .642∗ .867 1.243 .944 .945 1.276∗
Selective-process 3.190∗∗∗ 1.132 .938 .769 .772 2.554∗∗ .907 .820 .824 2.724∗∗∗ .967
Collective-political .732∗ .837 .812 .845 .883 .769 .879 1.041 1.087 .947 1.083
Normative 1.335 1.156 1.136 1.107 1.197 1.250 1.083 .974 1.053 1.100 .953
Altruistic 1.549∗ .950 1.000 .901 .908 1.535∗ .942 .900 .908 1.534∗ .941
Ideological .955 1.773∗∗∗ 1.127 1.006 1.133 .565∗∗ 1.050 .893 1.006 .502∗∗∗ .932
Expressive .811 .560∗∗∗ .907 1.214 .835 1.460 1.009 1.339∗ .920 1.610∗ 1.112
Opp. costs (n) 1.632∗∗∗ 1.248∗ .963 1.059 .938 1.416∗ 1.083 1.099 .974 1.471∗∗ 1.124
Disutility of labor (n) 1.226 .808∗ 1.091 .998 1.058 1.372∗ .904 .915 .970 1.257∗ .829∗
Fin. costs (n) .788 .657∗∗∗ .898 .850 1.035 .958 .799 .946 1.152 1.066 .890
Continued on next page
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore
are not comparable. This is why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done with logistic regression analyses.





cluster... Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 8
compared to... Financiers (5) Inter. Suppor. (6) (7)
Selective-outcome .760 .761 1.027 1.001 1.351∗ 1.350
Selective-process 1.004 3.321∗∗∗ 1.179 3.307∗∗∗ 1.174 .355∗∗∗
Collective-political 1.044 .910 1.041 .871 .996 1.144
Normative 1.081 1.129 .978 1.045 .905 .866
Altruistic 1.009 1.704∗∗∗ 1.046 1.690∗∗∗ 1.037 .614∗∗
Ideological 1.126 .562∗∗∗ 1.043 .499∗∗∗ .926 1.857∗∗∗
Expressive .688∗∗ 1.203 .831 1.750∗∗ 1.208 .691
Opp. costs (n) .886 1.338∗ 1.023 1.510∗∗ 1.154 .765
Disutility of labor (n) 1.060 1.374∗∗ .906 1.297∗ .855 .659∗∗∗








Selective-outcome .2 .2 .5 .5
Selective-process .5 .4 1.3 1.4
Collective-political .1 .1 .2 .2
Normative .1 .1 .2 .3
Altruistic .4 .2 .9 1.0
Ideological .5 .8 1.2 1.4
Expressive .5 .6 1.2 1.4
Opp. costs (n) .4 .2 .8 .9
Disutility of labor (n) .2 .2 .6 .6
Fin. costs (n) .3 .2 .8 .9
Total 3.3 7.6 8.4
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- [-] Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to
the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore are not comparable. This is
why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done with logistic regression analyses.




Table A.15: Multinomial logistic regression analysis, social-psychological model
cluster... Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 3
compared to... Voters (1) (2)
Internal efficacy 2.436∗∗∗ 2.153∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗ 1.274∗ 1.289∗ 2.883∗∗∗ 1.585∗∗∗ .884
External efficacy 1.148 1.385∗ 1.133 1.257∗ 1.483∗∗ 1.218 1.186 1.206
Political interest 3.451∗∗∗ 3.312∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 2.424∗∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗ 3.064∗∗∗ 2.076∗∗∗ .960
Party affinity 6.027∗∗∗ 4.489∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗ 3.321∗∗∗ 2.402∗∗∗ 1.013 2.146∗∗∗ .745
cluster... Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
compared to... Hyperactives (2) Social Media Opposers (3)
Internal efficacy .512∗∗∗ .523∗∗∗ .529∗∗ 1.183 .651∗ .579∗∗∗ .592∗∗ .599∗
External efficacy .987 1.094 1.291 1.061 1.033 .818 .907 1.071
Political interest .448∗∗∗ .703 .518∗ .888 .602∗ .467∗∗ .732 .539∗
Party affinity .380∗∗∗ .551∗∗ .399∗∗∗ .168∗∗∗ .356∗∗∗ .510∗∗ .740 .535∗∗
cluster... Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 6 Cluster 7
compared to... Social Media Opposers (3) Apathetic Members (4) Financiers (5)
Internal efficacy 1.339 .736 1.022 1.034 2.313∗∗∗ 1.272 1.012 2.263∗∗∗
External efficacy .880 .857 1.109 1.308∗ 1.075 1.047 1.180 .969
Political interest .925 .627 1.568∗∗ 1.155 1.981∗∗ 1.343 .737 1.264
Party affinity .226∗∗∗ .478∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗ 1.049 .442∗∗∗ .937 .723 .305∗∗∗







Ncompared to... Financiers (5) Interested Sustainers (6) (7)
Internal efficacy 1.244 2.237∗∗∗ 1.230 .550∗∗ 6.9 1.4 12.7 17.8
External efficacy .944 .821 .800 .974 2.0 .3 4.3 6.0
Political interest .856 1.715 1.162 .678 8.9 1.9 17.2 24.1
Party affinity .646∗∗ .422∗∗∗ .893 2.119∗∗∗ 11.6 6.1 21.1 29.5
Total 17.9 35.1 38.6
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds
Ratios are unstandardized and therefore are not comparable. This is why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done




Table A.16: Multinomial logistic regression analysis, socio-economic model
cluster... Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
compared to... Voters (1) (Hyperactives 2)
Age 1.012 1.057∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ .991 1.012 1.044∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.073 1.077
Sex, male 2.697∗∗∗ 1.760∗ 1.154 1.540∗ 2.192∗∗∗ 5.541∗∗∗ 2.958∗∗∗ .653 .428∗∗ .571∗∗∗ .813∗∗∗
Income, high 2.793∗∗∗ 1.318 1.690∗∗ 2.098∗∗ 2.718∗∗ 8.840∗∗∗ 1.141 .472∗∗∗ .605 .751 .973
Civil status, married 1.284 1.883∗ .803 .992 1.139 .713 1.151 1.466 .626 .772 .887
Education, min high 1.247 2.101∗ 1.222 1.444 1.763∗ 2.773∗ 1.830∗∗ 1.685 .980 1.158 1.414
Club Membership, Yes 7.075∗∗∗ 4.369∗∗∗ 1.870∗∗∗ 3.248∗∗∗ 4.319∗∗∗ 18.564∗∗ 1.956∗∗ .618 .264∗∗∗ .459 .610
Occupational Prestige 1.012 .993 1.013∗ 1.003 1.002 .947∗∗∗ 1.010 .981 1.000 .991 .989
Social stratum, high 1.745∗ 1.399 .957 1.484 1.420 .876 1.607∗ .802 .548∗∗ .850 .814
cluster... Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8
compared to... Hyperactives (2) Social Media Opposers (3) Apathetic Members (4)
Age .979 1.000 .984 1.028∗ 1.031∗ .937∗∗∗ .958∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ .952∗∗∗ .973∗∗∗
Sex, male 2.054 1.097 .656 .875 1.246 3.148∗ 1.681 1.335 1.900∗ 4.802∗∗ 2.564∗∗∗
Income, high 3.165∗ .408∗∗ 1.283 1.592 2.062 6.709∗∗∗ .866 1.241 1.608 5.230∗∗∗ .675
Civil status, married .555 .897 .427∗ .527 .605 .378∗ .612 1.235 1.418 .887 1.433
Education, min high 2.225 1.468 .581 .687 .839 1.320 .871 1.182 1.443 2.270 1.498
Club Membership, Yes 2.624 .276∗∗ .428∗∗∗ .743 .989 4.249 .448 1.737∗∗ 2.310∗ 9.926∗ 1.046
Occupational Prestige .935∗∗∗ .998 1.019 1.010 1.008 .953∗∗ 1.017 .991 .989 .935∗∗∗ .998
Social stratum, high .502 .921 .684 1.061 1.015 .626 1.149 1.551 1.484 .915 1.679
Continued on next page
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore





cluster... Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 8
compared to... Financiers (5) Inter. Suppor. (6) (7)
Age 1.003 .912∗∗∗ .932∗∗∗ .909∗∗∗ .929∗∗∗ 1.022
Sex, male 1.424 3.598∗ 1.921 2.528 1.349 .534
Income, high 1.295 4.214∗∗ .544 3.253∗∗∗ .420∗ .129∗∗∗
Civil status, married 1.149 .718 1.161 .626 1.011 1.616
Education, high 1.221 1.921 1.267 1.573 1.038 .660
Club Membership, Yes 1.330 5.715 .602 4.298 .453 .105∗
Occupational Prestige .998 .944∗∗∗ 1.007 .945∗∗∗ 1.009 1.067∗∗∗








Age 4.6 5.1 10.4 11.4
Sex, male 1.8 1.2 4.3 4.7
Income, high 2.2 1.5 5.2 5.7
Civil status, married .8 .2 1.9 2.1
Education, high .8 .2 1.9 2.1
Club membership, Yes 3.2 2.1 7.4 8.1
Occupational prestige .9 1.4 2.2 2.4
Social stratum, high 1.1 .4 2.5 2.8
Total 13.4 28.0 30.6
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the
Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore are not comparable. This is why




Table A.17: Multinomial logistic regression analysis, integrated regression model
cluster... Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
compared to... Voters (1) Hyperactives (2)
G
IM
Selective-outcome 1.018 1.192 .900 1.126 .839 .917 .917 1.171 .884 1.106 .824
Selective-process .902 1.217 1.113 .986 .976 2.572∗∗ 2.572∗∗ 1.350 1.234 1.093 1.082
Collective-political 1.109 1.145 .903 .953 .979 1.228 1.228 1.033 .815 .860 .883
Normative .933 .788 .987 .965 1.086 1.112 1.112 .845 1.058 1.035 1.164
Altruistic 1.223∗ 1.045 1.149∗ .971 1.016 1.389∗ 1.389∗ .855 .939 .793∗ .830
Ideological .581∗∗∗ 1.083 1.137 .910 1.130 .767 .767 1.864∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗ 1.945∗∗∗
Expressive 1.914∗∗∗ 1.115 1.030 1.356∗ .940 1.302 1.302 .583∗ .538∗∗∗ .709 .491∗∗∗
Opp. Costs (n) .868 1.094 .913 .980 .919 1.166 1.166 1.261 1.052 1.130 1.060
Disutility of labor (n) 1.223∗ .960 1.119 1.031 1.134 1.519∗∗ 1.519∗∗ .785 .915 .843 .927
Financial (n) 1.227 1.174 .999 .960 1.162 1.004 1.004 .956 .814 .782 .947
SP
M
Internal efficacy 2.839∗∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗ 1.225 2.531∗∗ 2.531∗∗ .727 .487∗∗∗ .508∗∗ .431∗∗∗
External efficacy 1.232 1.388∗ 1.157 1.134 1.404∗ 1.410 1.410 1.127 .939 .921 1.140
Political interest 3.050∗∗∗ 2.498∗∗ 1.369∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗ 1.392 2.077∗ 2.077∗ .819 .449∗∗ .570∗ .456∗∗
Party affinity 5.554∗∗∗ 4.067∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗ 3.473∗∗∗ 2.384∗∗∗ 1.207 1.207 .732 .380∗∗∗ .625∗ .429∗∗∗
SE
M
Age .990 1.043∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ .988 .988 1.053∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗
Sex, male 1.409 1.308 .976 1.296 1.850∗ 3.421∗∗ 3.421∗∗ .929 .693 .920 1.313
Income, high 1.439 .899 1.296 1.469 2.211∗∗ 4.574∗∗∗ 4.574∗∗∗ .625 .900 1.021 1.537
Civil Status, married .915 1.545 .737 .813 1.067 .745 .745 1.688 .805 .889 1.166
Education, high .931 1.328 .926 1.058 1.362 1.289 1.289 1.427 .995 1.137 1.463
Club membership, Yes 5.328∗∗∗ 3.214∗∗ 1.654∗∗ 2.740∗∗∗ 4.280∗∗∗ 9.316∗ 9.316∗ .603 .311∗∗ .095 .803
Occupational Prestige 1.002 .986 1.010 1.000 1.001 .962∗∗ .962∗∗ .984 1.008 .997 .999
Social stratum, high 1.294 1.069 .820 1.258 1.166 .748 .748 .826 .634 .972 .901
Continued on next page
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore are
not comparable. This is why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done with logistic regression analyses.





cluster... Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8
compared to... Hyperactives (2) Social Media Opposers (3) Apathetic Members (4)
G
IM
Selective-outcome .901 .986 .755 .944 .704 .769 .841 1.251 .932 1.019 1.115
Selective-process 2.852∗∗ 1.269 .914 .810 .802 2.113 .940 .886 .877 2.311∗ 1.028
Collective-political 1.107 1.004 .789 .832 .855 1.072 .972 1.055 1.084 1.359 1.233
Normative 1.192 .968 1.252 1.225 1.378 1.410 1.145 .978 1.101 1.127 .915
Altruistic 1.135 .855 1.099 .929 .972 1.328 1.001 .845 .884 1.209 .910
Ideological 1.320 1.652∗∗ 1.050 .841 1.043 .708 .887 .801 .994 .675 .845
Expressive .680 .587∗∗ .924 1.217 .843 1.168 1.008 1.317∗ .912 1.264 1.091
Opp. Costs (n) 1.344 1.218 .834 .896 .840 1.066 .966 1.074 1.007 1.277 1.158
Disutility of labor (n) 1.242 .758∗ 1.165 1.074 1.181 1.582∗ .965 .922 1.013 1.357∗ .828
Financial (n) .818 .705∗ .852 .818 .990 .855 .738∗ .960 1.163 1.004 .866
SP
M
Internal efficacy .892 .540∗∗ .669 .699 .593∗ 1.226 .743 1.044 .887 1.832 1.109
External efficacy 1.145 1.016 .833 .817 1.011 1.016 .901 .981 1.214 1.219 1.081
Political interest .681 .622 .548∗ .695 .557 .831 .759 1.268 1.017 1.517 1.384
Party affinity .217∗∗∗ .400∗∗∗ .519∗∗ .854 .586∗ .297∗∗∗ .546∗ 1.646∗∗ 1.130 .572∗∗ 1.053
SE
M
Age .998 1.007 .989 1.031∗ 1.034∗ .947∗∗∗ .956∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ .958∗∗ .967∗∗∗
Sex, male 2.428 1.704 .746 .991 1.414 2.615 1.835 1.328 1.896∗ 3.505∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗
Income, high 3.178∗ .600 1.441 1.634 2.460∗ 5.088∗∗ .961 1.134 1.707 3.530∗∗ .667
Civil Status, married .814 1.112 .477∗ .526 .691 .482 .659 1.104 1.448 1.011 1.382
Education, high 1.385 1.225 .697 .796 1.025 .971 .858 1.143 1.471 1.393 1.232
Club membership, Yes 1.749 .324∗ .515 .852 1.332 2.898 .536 1.656 2.587∗ 5.631 1.042
Occupational Prestige .960∗∗ 1.004 1.024∗ 1.014 1.015 .975 1.021 .990 .991 .952∗∗∗ .997
Social stratum, high .578 .969 .767 1.177 1.090 .700 1.173 1.533 1.421 .912 1.528
Continued on next page
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized and therefore are
not comparable. This is why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done with logistic regression analyses.












Ncompared to... Financiers (5) Inter. Suppor. (6) (7)
G
IM
Selective-outcome 0.745 0.814 0.891 1.093 1.196 1.094 .2 .1 .5 .5
Selective-process 0.990 2.609∗∗ 1.160 2.635∗∗ 1.172 0.445∗ .5 .2 1.3 1.4
Collective-political 1.027 1.288 1.168 1.254 1.137 0.907 .1 .1 .2 .2
Normative 1.125 1.152 0.935 1.023 0.831 0.812 .1 0 .2 .3
Altruistic 1.046 1.431∗ 1.078 1.367 1.030 0.753 .4 .2 .9 1.0
Ideological 1.241 0.843 1.055 0.679 0.850 1.252 .5 .4 1.2 1.4
Expressive 0.693∗ 0.960 0.828 1.386 1.196 0.863 .5 .4 1.2 1.4
Opp. Costs (n) 0.938 1.189 1.078 1.268 1.149 0.906 .4 .1 .8 .9
Disutility of labor (n) 1.100 1.473∗ 0.899 1.339 0.817 0.610∗∗ .2 .3 .6 .6
Financial (n) 1.211 1.046 0.902 0.864 0.745∗ 0.863 .3 .1 .8 .9
Total GIM 3.3 2.4 7.6 8.4
SP
M
Internal efficacy .849 1.755 1.063 2.067∗ 1.251 0.606 6.9 1.0 12.7 17.8
External efficacy 1.238 1.243 1.103 1.004 0.891 0.887 2.0 .2 4.3 6.0
Political interest 0.801 1.196 1.091 1.492 1.362 0.913 8.9 .9 17.2 24.1
Party affinity 0.686 0.348∗∗∗ 0.640∗ 0.507∗∗ 0.932 1.840∗∗ 11.6 4.9 21.1 29.5
Total SPM 17.9 11.3 35.1 38.6
SE
M
Age 1.002 0.919∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 1.009 4.6 3.1 10.4 11.4
Sex, male 1.427 2.639 1.852∗ 1.849 1.298 0.702 1.8 .4 4.3 4.7
Income, high 1.505 3.113∗ 0.588 2.068 0.391∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 2.2 0 5.2 5.7
Civil Status, married 1.312 0.916 1.252 0.698 0.954 1.366 .8 .1 1.9 2.1
Education, high 1.288 1.219 1.078 0.947 0.837 0.884 .8 −.2 1.9 2.1
Club membership, Yes 1.563 3.401 0.629 2.176 0.403∗ 0.185 3.2 1.0 7.4 8.1
Occupational Prestige 1.001 0.962∗∗ 1.007 0.961∗∗ 1.005 1.046∗∗ .9 .7 2.2 2.4
Social stratum, high 0.927 0.595 0.997 0.642 1.076 1.676 1.1 .2 2.5 2.8
Total SEM 13.4 6.5 28.0 30.6
Total 27.5 49.4 54.0
- ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05.
- R2Mc=McFadden-R
2, R2CS=Cox & Snell-R
2, R2N=Nagelkerke-R
2.
- Odds Ratios estimate the change in odds of membership in the respective cluster, compared to the Reference Cluster. Odds Ratios are unstandardized
and therefore are not comparable. This is why reciprocal values are not reported as is often done with logistic regression analyses.
- GIM: General Incentives Model; SPM: Social Psychological Model; SEM: Socio-Economic Model.
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